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Summary 
Unionism in Ulster is often considered to be paradoxical and paradox is commonly 
thought to make its politics radically incoherent. From this perspective, Unionists 
are simultaneously too British and not British enough, a perspective which lends 
itself to the explanatory categories ‘crisis of identity’ or ‘false consciousness’. The 
most celebrated formulation of paradox can be found in the title of Miller’s 1978 
book Queen’s Rebels in which the contrast between formal allegiance and actual 
experience in Unionist politics is starkly asserted. This thesis explores 
systematically the notion of paradox in Unionist identity. Part One of the thesis – 
‘Identifying Paradox’ – considers academic understanding of identity. This section 
examines how both Britishness and Unionism have been understood in terms of 
their respective paradoxes. Attention is then focused on the synthesis of Unionist 
Britishness in Northern Ireland and it is argued that the conceptual framework of 
elective affinity can be deployed effectively to contain and to explain the supposed 
radical incoherence of Unionist identity – a paradox resolving paradoxes. Part Two 
of the thesis – ‘Investigating Paradox’ - tests that conceptual framework on Ulster 
Unionist identity in a period of constitutional and political uncertainty in the United 
Kingdom, beginning with the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and ending 
with the 2016 European referendum and its aftermath. Semi-structured interviews 
with 34 Unionist politicians were conducted between 2015 and 2016 and their 
responses to questions on identity, the Union, Europe and the ‘narrative’ of 
Unionist Britishness are framed in terms of the paradoxes set out in Part One. Part 
Three of the thesis summarises the responses and concludes that the negative 
interpretation of Unionist paradox – especially the ‘crisis of identity’ trope - is 
misconceived. A much more positive reading of paradox is possible, one which 
shows that the paradoxes of Unionist Britishness are central and not marginal, as 
Miller thought, to politics in the United Kingdom.  
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Part One 
Identifying Paradox   
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1: Introduction: 
There is a something of a paradox in unionist identity which can be considered in 
terms of the distinctiveness, yet also the representativeness, of British identity 
within the context of Northern Ireland during a time of constitutional unrest across 
the whole of the United Kingdom.  It is this concept of British identity in Northern 
Ireland and its ability to be perceived as both shared and separate from that of the 
rest of the United Kingdom that forms the basis of this thesis.  What differentiates 
this research from others is that it observes identity in Northern Ireland at a time 
when Northern Ireland is now more central to British politics due to events such as 
the 2016 European referendum and the Conservative/Democratic Unionist Party 
deal following the 2017 snap Westminster Election.  When it comes to issues of 
identity, nationhood and the future of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland is no 
longer on the periphery of these questions.  Now the Ulster Question is once again 
a core component of the British Question, a tripartite theoretical approach of 
interdisciplinary theories will be used to examine and observe the often paradoxical 
nature of Northern Irish Unionists, along with providing a way of analysing 
traditional anti-Unionist critiques.  This is especially relevant to arguments 
surrounding the perceived Britishness of both Northern Ireland in general and of 
Unionism in particular (see for example Walker, 2004; Hennessey, 1996; Southern, 
2007).  The concept of elective affinity (Goethe, [1809] 1966) will be used 
throughout the thesis as a framework through which to connect the paradoxical 
aspects of British identity within Ulster Unionism (referring within this thesis to 
Unionism within a particular geographical location within the United Kingdom).  
Whilst these concepts are being introduced in this chapter, they will be explored in 
greater depth throughout the thesis.   
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1.2: Background to the research 
To establish the conceptual backbone for the research, a two part literature review 
was undertaken to look at both British identity and Ulster Unionism.  Whilst this is 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two and Chapter Three, it may be helpful to 
provide a brief synopsis of the research undertaken surrounding these areas.  This 
will provide the context to the theoretical frameworks and concepts which have 
been introduced within this chapter. 
 
Historically, the relationship between Ulster Unionism and the rest of the United 
Kingdom was most notably shaped by the Ulster Covenant of 1912.  This was as a 
result of the resistance to Irish Home Rule within Ulster (Powell, 2002: 84; 
Hennessey, 2011: 64).  The Ulster Covenant signified the importance the Protestant 
people of Ulster bestowed upon the Union with Great Britain at this time (Rose, 
1976: 14; Arthur and Jeffery; 1988: 36; Porter, 1996: 130).  Although the creation of 
a devolved Northern Ireland was an unintended side-effect of the Ulster reaction to 
the Home Rule Crisis, it did serve to reinforce the importance of maintaining 
Ulster’s place within the Union (Bogdanor, 1999: 55; Lynch, 1999: 104).  The impact 
of subsequent legislation such as the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement and the 1985 
Anglo-Irish Agreement also had a direct impact on the development of Unionism 
within Northern Ireland (Faulkner, 1978: 190; McGarry and O’Leary, 1995: 96; 
Coulter, 2013: 417-418; Osmond, 1999: 34; Patterson, 2012: 248).  The role played 
by the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland 
was also examined (McGlynn, 2014: 281; Ganiel, 2007: 319; Farrington, 2006: 2; 
Tonge et al, 2011: 123). 
 
To understand how British identity within Northern Ireland compares to that of 
Great Britain, the meaning of the term Britishness first had to be interrogated.  This 
was achieved by using the work of both political thinkers and historians such as 
Clarke (2001: 261), Aughey (2007a: 484), Colley (2014: 90) and others.  The social 
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construction of cultural and national identity, such as Britishness, and how this 
promotes strong links and connections within certain demographics was examined 
through research by Smith (2001: 19), Anderson (2006: 26), McCrone (2013: 476) 
and Goodhart (2013: 292), finding that this creates cohesion within society and 
cements individuals within a nation.  Rojek (2007: 8-9) and Millar and Ali (2014: 
253) have argued that growing national cultures and identities are increasingly 
overtaking Britishness as an individual’s primary identity. As discussed by Crick 
(1991: 73-74) and Hazell (2006: 1), the place of England has been ‘the gaping hole’ 
in arrangements post 1997.  This is likely to change with increased attention now 
being given to English Nationalism following the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum and the introduction of English Votes for English Laws at Westminster.  
The Scottish independence referendum and subsequent reassessment of 
devolution in the United Kingdom presents further changes to the concept of 
Britishness (Bechhoffer and McCrone, 2007: 252; McGlynn et al, 2012: 286 and 
Kellner, 2014).   
 
Brown (2003: 31) and Byrne and O’Malley (2013: 131-132) have advanced theories 
that  Northern Irish unionism is equally loyal and disloyal to the Union, meaning 
that by promoting the sovereignty of the Protestant Monarch and not her 
Parliament, they are actually in conflict with traditional versions of unionism that 
are prevalent in Great Britain.  As observed by O’Malley (1983: 139), this may 
initiate a crisis of identity within Northern Ireland if Great Britain fails to include 
Northern Ireland as British.  Rising national identities could lead to nations moving 
away from traditional concepts of Britishness. Commentators such as Kearney 
(1991: 4) and Southern (2007: 85) have argued that Northern Ireland has a uniquely 
‘Ulster’ identity within the ‘overarching identity’ of Britishness (McBride, 1996: 4).  
Miller (1978: 4), Nelson (1984: 27) and Gardiner (2004: 145) further contributed to 
the research on this topic.  The promotion of a separate Ulster identity may be key 
to incorporating cross-community relations within Northern Irish society as 
presumed by Trew (1994 cited Binks and Ferguson, 2014: 300).  However, NicCraith 
(2003: 6) and Hearty (2014: 5-6) stated it may also be a way of further enhancing an 
attitude of difference.  For example, in recent years British identity in Northern 
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Ireland has been viewed negatively due to media coverage of loyalist flag protests 
and parading disputes. 
 
Politically, there are differences between Unionism in Northern Ireland and Great 
Britain, as stated by Farrington and Walker (2009: 136) and Walker (2010: 251). 
Culturally, it has long been argued by commentators such as Wilson and Stapleton 
(2006: 24) and McCartney (2013) that Northern Ireland has more in common with 
Scotland than it does with England.  This view was further advanced by McAuley 
and Tonge (2009: 266).  In terms of identity, Britishness is often portrayed as a 
result of a dominant English culture, raising the question that if Northern Ireland 
has little culturally in common with England, how truly British is it (Phillips et al, 
1999: 154)?  The thesis intends to address that question in the period after the 
Scottish referendum.       
 
If the research then is considered as another study of the ‘British Question’, why is 
this necessary?  The study of Britishness itself has often been somewhat confusing, 
especially when it comes to terminology, use of language and of distinguishing what 
is ‘British’ from what is ‘English’.  Within academic research there have been many 
contrasting views on the concept of what is British and what is English.  For 
example, Krishan Kumar (2000: 256) wrote that very few institutions are English as 
opposed to British and this was ‘true of Parliament, the monarchy, the law courts, 
the civil service, the armed forces, the broadcasting system and practically every 
other important national institution’.  On the other hand, Robert Tombs (2014: 330) 
described England’s central government, common law and Parliament to be ‘the 
root-stock of Britishness onto which the others were grafted’.  For the context of 
this research, Britishness refers to the overarching identity of the United Kingdom 
and to members of the Unionist community in Northern Ireland.  Englishness on the 
other hand refers only to the single identity of the majority of individuals within 
England. Why then is the importance of making a clear distinction between the 
terminologies in academic research of British identity an issue?  It is intriguing that 
despite a generation or more of research into the territorial politics of the United 
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Kingdom (Rose, 1982; Aughey, 2013) often the distinction, or more appropriately 
the relationship between Englishness and Britishness remains undetermined or 
confused (Kenny, 2015).  It was a problem J.G.A. Pocock originally addressed with 
his plea for a new subject in 1975 with the object of writing Four Nations History 
(Kearney, 2012).  Each of the four regions of the United Kingdom provides a rich 
background of culture, history and identity which has helped to create the British 
identity that is known and recognised today (Mullen, 2014: 635).  To interchange 
Britishness with Englishness in this context is to downgrade the importance of the 
other three regions of the United Kingdom.   
 
It is not always the case that the United Kingdom forgets to promote the 
importance of the smaller regions.  Indeed, the Queen’s Coronation provided 
symbolic expression of that Union, ‘The bouquet had comprised lilies-of-the-valley 
from England, orchids from Wales, stephanotis from Scotland and carnations from 
Northern Ireland; and her Diadem had incorporated respective national symbols: 
roses, thistles and shamrocks’ (Aughey, 2016).  The role of the monarchy plays a 
huge cultural and social significance within the United Kingdom as a whole to help 
disseminate and promote a sense of Britishness which binds the Union together, as 
can be seen in the relationship between Ulster Unionists and the Crown.  One of 
the difficulties of maintaining a nation-state such as the United Kingdom is that 
each of the four regions must be supported and valued by the whole in order to 
prevent any possible attempts to weaken or destroy the Union.  As Lord Bew (2009) 
memorably put it when describing modern Britishness, consent used to be the 
principle which dared not speak its name but it is now the governing principle of 
the Union. The most recent example of the principle of consent playing a major role 
within the governance of the Union is that of the Scottish independence 
referendum of 2014 in which 45% of the population voted to leave the United 
Kingdom (Scottish Independence Referendum, 2014). Whilst the majority of people 
in Scotland did vote to remain in the Union, it remains an example of the present 
questioning of the value and permanence of the United Kingdom (Alexander cited 
Wintour, 2014).  The principle of consent is not a new phenomenon within British 
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politics.  Over thirty years ago Richard Rose (1982) developed an argument in which 
consent for the Union was ‘contingent’.  This notion of consent as contingency has 
often been discussed by theorists and historians who specialize in speculation 
about the potential break-up of the United Kingdom (Nairn, 1977; Colley, 1992).    
 
According to Aughey in his 1989 book Under Siege this is how Unionism has 
perceived itself to be historically and politically, irrespective of its majority status in 
Northern Ireland and its monopoly of government office between 1921 and 1972.  
Whilst Under Siege was written as an observation of the response of Ulster 
Unionists to the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, this thesis can be viewed as an 
analysis of the response of Ulster Unionists in regards to constitutional events such 
as the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 and the European referendum of 
2016.  Since its creation in 1921 Northern Ireland has been a contested territory, 
with a large minority of its population refusing to acknowledge or actively resisting 
its existence (Rose, 1976: 3).  Therefore, for Unionists in Northern Ireland, how do 
you develop and promote a sense of Britishness when you feel that your identity is 
constantly under attack? How has this sense of an identity under threat developed 
alongside Britishness in Northern Ireland? What does this mean for the future of 
Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom? These are fundamental questions for 
any study of Britishness in the United Kingdom (with the challenge of nationalism in 
Scotland, for example) as well as in Northern Ireland and these questions remain of 
enduring significance. 
 
British identity at the nation-state level is an important level of analysis, but by 
bringing the focus down to the more micro level of Ulster Unionism more detailed 
questions can be asked of the changing nature of what it means to be British in the 
twenty-first century.  In traditional research on the politics of the United Kingdom, 
Northern Ireland has often been thought of as an exception to the rule.  While the 
history of Great Britain has been predominantly concerned with Pulzer’s (1967) 
famous statement that ‘Class is the basis of British party politics; all else is 
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embellishment and detail’, it is true the same cannot be said for Northern Ireland.  
While there is clearly a class system at play in Northern Ireland, it has its own 
unique structure to party politics that is separate from the party structures of the 
mainland.  The Northern Irish political party structure is one that is formed by 
religious and ethno-national differences, not class.  This has developed due to two 
circumstances.  First, Northern Ireland as a state of its own has only been in 
existence since 1921.  Second, ethno-national tensions and subsequent conflict has 
focused political attention in Northern Ireland on this issue, rather than that of 
class.  Yet for all its time spent as an exception to the general rule of British politics 
Northern Ireland and in particular Ulster Unionism has found itself now very much 
front and centre of British politics.  Northern Ireland’s place within the Union is now 
as secure as it has ever been, with Scotland having taken over the mantel of the 
region of the Union most likely to leave.  Most obvious is the 2017 deal between 
the Conservatives and the Democratic Unionist Party in which the Democratic 
Unionist Party became in effect a political kingmaker, or rather ‘queenmaker’, at 
Westminster, allowing them the ability to negotiate better deals for Northern 
Ireland whilst supporting the Conservative Party in major votes.  The thesis argues 
that Britishness, and in particular Britishness within Ulster Unionism, is now central 
to British politics and issues such as identity, consent and nationhood will be 
examined in following chapters. 
 
Studies of Ulster Unionism and how it relates to the politics and identity of the 
United Kingdom have been conducted in the past and whilst these studies have 
provided an academic basis from which this research could build upon, this study is 
necessary as it provides a more up-to-date look at this area, particularly during this 
period of constitutional unrest and rapid change (Rose, 1971; Miller, 1978; 
O’Malley, 1983; Todd, 1987).  What is interesting about past studies is the 
contrasting nature by which Unionism in Northern Ireland can be observed.  For 
Miller in Queen’s Rebels (1978), Unionists from Northern Ireland are distinctive 
from the rest of the United Kingdom and do not fit into traditional templates of 
British politics or what it means to be British.  In contrast, Rose (1971) believed that 
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the understanding of the views and opinions of Unionists from Northern Ireland is 
vital to contributing to the knowledge of British politics.  As observed by Rose 
(1971: 206), ‘An Ulster Protestant may describe himself as British, but doing this 
does not necessarily mean he thinks himself as English, Scottish and Welsh people 
do when the identify themselves thus.  For the residents of Great Britain this label 
supplements their primary nationality.  For the Ulsterman, it is a substitute for it’.  
Rose’s approach is fascinating as it outlines the importance of British identity both 
as a social identity and also as a means of Ulster Unionists electing to be a part of 
the United Kingdom.  It is this approach of Rose that the thesis most clearly draws 
inspiration from.  Academic debate on the topic of Ulster Unionism has failed to 
acknowledge and appreciate the importance of cultural and national diversity in its 
contribution to the understanding of contemporary Britishness.  Previous research 
had aimed to address this, such as Miller (1978), Nelson (1984) and O’Malley 
(1983).  However, these do not provide an up-to-date account of how British 
identity is defined and shaped within the Northern Ireland context, particularly by 
Unionist designated political elites within the post-Good Friday Agreement society.  
Tonge et al (2014: 110-128), briefly discussed this issue within the book The 
Democratic Unionist Party: From Protest to Power, yet as the chapter is only 
nineteen pages and it only focuses on one party, more research is vital to provide a 
greater understanding.  Tonge et al observed that for the Democratic Unionist 
Party, ‘the essence of the relationship with other parts of the UK has been 
encapsulated by robust claims to British identity and expressed through the values 
of cultural unionism, celebrating the virtues of Protestantism and the Union within 
a discrete ethnic identity.’ (2014: 112).  However, whilst providing a detailed look at 
cultural Unionism, it failed to take into account the elective, or instrumental, 
components which tie Ulster Unionism to the Union. 
 
This research provides a current study of this complex identity within a contested 
space during a time of ongoing political and constitutional upheaval.  How 
Britishness, and Britishness within Northern Ireland, react to these challenges is 
central to understanding the fluidity and resilience of social identities in times of 
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crisis.  Yet as research by historian Linda Colley (2014: 90) has observed, the United 
Kingdom is in an almost unique position in the world in dealing with constitutional 
change due to the flexibility of the British constitution.  Flexibility may be a 
misleading term given the fact the United Kingdom does not have a codified 
constitution, but it is this reliance on tradition and institutions that is perhaps the 
reason why the United Kingdom has survived for so long.  It is also in part the 
reason why British identity has been able to meet times of crisis head on and adapt 
to these events.  The question of the changing nature of British identity is not a new 
phenomenon as thinkers such as Dicey and Rait were discussing this very issue in 
1920 in their book Thoughts on the Union Between England and Scotland which was 
‘an attempt to comment upon the nature and the results of a great legal or political 
transaction’ which was the 1707 Act of Union (1920: vi).  As observed by Aughey 
(2001b: 60), ‘Only something that is outside history can be changeless’.  
 
1.3: Methodology 
A methodological process was established for the thesis which included both desk 
based primary research and qualitative analysis using semi-structured one-on-one 
interviews with Unionist designated politicians.  These two methods were used 
simultaneously to gather data which best answered the questions set out 
throughout this thesis.   
 
Of course, the study of identity is an area full of contradictions and of seemingly 
impossible simultaneously held viewpoints.  Often when questioned about their 
identity, participants in the research expressed this was the first time they had truly 
tried to define and label how they felt.  Identity can often be contradictory in that it 
is personal, yet it is also something that is not often analysed and dissected at an 
individual level (Lawler, 2007: 5).  It is an inert feeling held by the individual that is 
personal and held to be true to oneself, that even if it contains competing 
narratives, that these can be internalised and justified by the individual.  Identity is 
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something that is inherently different to each individual and this makes an 
academic study of group identity, particularly within an elite group, so complex.  
Political socialisation is a complex system based upon the assumption that children 
are inducted into a set of beliefs and attitudes based upon the influence of adults in 
their lives (Marsh, 1971: 456; Jennings and Niemi, 1968: 466).  Many different 
factors seek to influence and shape it, such as attitudes of family members, culture, 
the education system, geography, religion, class and roles within society, if to name 
only a few.   
 
Therefore identity cannot be rigidly structured and applied to whole sections of a 
community.  This is the dilemma faced within academia regarding Northern Ireland 
and Britishness.  One size does not necessarily fit all and this only seeks to further 
confuse and therefore narrow academic understandings of identity and 
terminology.  The decision to interview only Unionist designated politicians was an 
attempt to address the plethora of identities within the 
Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community by focusing on elite identity and how this 
appears to represent Unionist identity.  To see if there is a correlation between the 
identity of Unionist designated politicians and the community which they serve, 
information from the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey was compared to the 
data gathered from participants to provide a more holistic approach to identity. 
 
1.3.1 Literature review 
Through the critical search of previous academic literature in this field, areas were 
acknowledged where an Ulster Unionist contribution was lacking, such as during 
discussions on the future of the Union and of narratives surrounding national 
identity (Kumar, 2010).  This past inability to include the views of Ulster Unionists 
damages the academic narrative in two ways.  Firstly, it ignores the opinions and 
views of an entire region of the United Kingdom, resulting in the promotion of a 
false sense of Britishness that is defined as only referring to the geographical entity 
12 
 
that is Great Britain.  The exclusion of Northern Ireland from these discussions is 
damaging as it promotes a sense of Northern Ireland being a place apart, an almost 
second class region within the United Kingdom and therefore not being of any 
significant relevance within the Union.  Secondly, it ignores an extremely valuable 
and interesting case study of the nature of Britishness.  Northern Ireland (as 
discussed in Chapters Two and Three) has different cultural, historical, political and 
constitutional influences upon British identity that are not experienced elsewhere 
in the United Kingdom.  Britishness is an important component of life in Northern 
Ireland and for Unionists in particular the union between Northern Ireland and 
Great Britain is of intrinsic value.   
 
1.3.2: Interviews 
How therefore does one even begin to design a methodology to begin researching 
this area?  In a practical regard this is a situation where qualitative methods come 
into their own as it is the nature of qualitative research that ‘the invisible becomes 
visible’, allowing hidden themes and views to be expressed and analysed (Constas, 
1992: 254).  It was clear from an early stage in the research that quantitative 
research would never begin to provide the level of data and understanding that was 
needed for a study such as this.  Statistics, like those found in the Northern Ireland 
Life and Times Survey are a useful tool for observing what percentages of a 
population believe in a certain view, or assign to a certain societal demographic.  
However, quantitative data does not provide the answers as to why these 
individuals have chosen to assign to these particular views and expressions, which is 
where qualitative analysis provides a key component.  The personal views and 
opinions of the participants should be at the forefront of the research and ‘In-depth 
interviewing is a particularly useful method for examining the social world from the 
points of view of research participants’ (Miller and Glassner, 2011: 137).  Semi-
structured one-on-one interviews were chosen as the preferred methodology 
(Bryman, 2012: 469-470).  This form of interview was chosen as it is the best 
method of gaining large amounts of qualitative data from political elites regarding 
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their own experiences of identity and how this has shaped their political 
convictions.  It was particularly useful for observing the views of Unionist 
designated politicians on the events which have created constitutional unrest 
across the Union in recent years (Manheim and Rich, 1986: 133).  As a group which 
holds key political power and influence in Northern Ireland, Unionist designated 
politicians are at the forefront of discussions surrounding the major constitutional 
and political events of recent years which have threatened to impact upon the 
Union.  Their insights provide understanding into a specific turbulent time in British 
political history from a region of the United Kingdom that is no stranger to 
turbulent scenarios.  The method of semi-structured one-on-one interviews was 
invaluable as it provided the researcher with the flexibility to follow up on any lines 
of enquiry identified during the interview process which had not been previously 
anticipated.  Often it is the unprompted and unexpected responses that provide the 
most valuable contribution in research. 
 
By developing the question schedule (see questions in Appendix Six) within a semi-
structured framework this enabled a greater degree of communication and rapport 
between the researcher and the participants.  It also, as was intended, helped 
enable the researcher to follow up on interesting lines of enquiry which may not 
have been evident prior to the commencement of the interview process.  From a 
qualitative research standpoint this is an ideal perspective for the conduct of 
research as the ability to delve deeper into the subjects has the potential to 
discover more than was originally intended.  All interviews were transcribed by the 
researcher to ensure familiarity with the data and ‘From the transcribed 
conversations, patterns of experiences can be listed’, meaning that themes the 
researcher may have missed during the initial interview were picked up during the 
process of transcribing (Aronson, 1994).  The idea of the researcher transcribing the 
interviews rather than subcontracting this stage out to another was beneficial as 
sometimes it is not what is said in an interview, but how it is said by a participant 
which makes all the difference to the point at hand and in qualitative research this 
can be as important as the actual verbal content. 
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Identity cannot be studied within a laboratory setting as this is simply impossible.  It 
is necessary to acknowledge there will be a degree of outside influences that 
imposes upon the answers provided by participants.  The very environment of the 
interview itself can sway opinions.  For example, the majority of interviews 
conducted took place in Stormont.  Within Northern Irish politics heavy importance 
is placed upon the designation of politicians in the Northern Irish Assembly, the 
reasoning is to ensure a consociational government which represents both ethno-
national communities.  It may be the case for participants interviewed at Stormont 
that the significance of this was not lost on them and in fact may have led to them 
taking a harder stance on their identity than they may have done in a more neutral 
setting.  The theoretical approach in Chapter Four reimagines Schrödinger’s famous 
experiment for Unionists is in itself an imperfect hypothetical due to this.  The 
hypothetical box Unionists are placed can be imagined as either Northern Ireland or 
Stormont, yet neither of these are neutral spaces and both influence the potential 
possibilities of Britishness.  A further limitation of the methodology connected to 
the theoretical framework the very act of questioning identity and the paradox 
which this can create.  Within the interconnected framework of Schrodinger, 
Descartes and Baudrillard, one aspect that kept reappearing is that of doubt.  This is 
interesting in the context of the interviews as the very act of questioning the 
identity of a participant had the potential to cast doubt upon that identity.  For 
Descartes, the concept of Cogito, ergo sum can only be conducted after 
circumstance has thrown doubt upon the existence of an individual and that only by 
partaking in the logical process of Cogito, ergo sum can the individual once again 
comfortably assert that they do in fact exist (Williams, 1978: 73-74).  The doubt 
experienced when asked to define identity also connects to Baudrillard and the 
process of simulation (1994: 6).  If the participant is questioned and feels their 
identity is not British enough, they then have the potential to create a hyperreal 
version of Britishness that they believe will put to rest any supposed doubt as to the 
authenticity of their Britishness.  By having their identity questioned, the 
participant may feel as though their identity is being threatened and may answer 
accordingly.  When regarded through the lens of Schrödinger (1935) it is no surprise 
as to observe something is to inherently change it, the act of observation will only 
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ever be privy to one possibility, when it is only through the hypothetical scenario of 
Schrödinger’s thought experiment that one could believe in multiple possibilities 
existing at once (see Chapter Four, section 3.4.2).   
 
1.3.3: Ethics process 
The ethics procedure for the thesis was straightforward as the research was not 
deemed to be controversial and the participants are not from high risk or 
vulnerable groups.  This enabled the ethics process to move quickly, allowing more 
time to be devoted to the data collection period.   
 
Choosing who to interview for any qualitative research project is an important 
decision for a researcher to make.  The rationale for the recruitment of Unionist 
designated politicians from Northern Ireland was to provide an in-depth 
examination on what defines their identity as Unionist elites and how this 
influences their views and opinions on both politics and the relationship between 
Northern Ireland and Great Britain.  As outlined by Kourvetaris and Dobratz (1980: 
35), ‘Many authors assume that an analysis of origins of members of the elites 
provides some understanding of its social and political behaviour’ and within the 
research identity has been chosen as the starting point from which to begin this 
analysis.  Unionist politicians were chosen as they are elected representatives of 
their community and ‘By virtue of their elected or appointed positions in the formal 
government structures, Leaders normally exercise dominant power in the political 
system’ (Olsen, 1980: 109).  The decision was made to exclude all non-Unionist 
designated politicians from the research to focus on the lack of academic research 
which has been conducted on Unionist politicians in regards to Britishness.  Their 
contribution would have presented a different dynamic to the research and this 
could be conducted in the future as a potential follow up study to be conducted 
after the publication of this thesis to expand upon the original conclusions of the 
research. 
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To discuss the views and opinions of Unionist designated politicians, it was 
necessary to first interview them to accurately gain an understanding of how they 
self-define their identity and how they see the relationship between Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain in a contemporary United Kingdom.  Finding the right 
balance of participants for qualitative research is an important component and as 
defined by Manheim and Rich (1986: 87): 
‘A population is any group of people, objects, or events about which we 
want to draw conclusions, while a case is any member of such a population.  
A sample is any subgroup of a population of cases which is identified for 
analysis.’   
 
The recruitment process for the research was straight forwarded.  All Unionist 
designated MEPs, MPs and MLAs from Northern Ireland were invited to take part 
first via letter.  Follow up correspondence and invitations to newly co-opted or 
elected Unionist politicians were sent via email, with phone calls being used to 
establish contact after this point.  At the start, the invitation to the participant was 
sent directly to individual participants to establish a direct link between the 
researcher and the participant in the hope this would encourage rapport and a 
good working relationship.  After the original response rate dropped and follow up 
emails/phone calls failed to garner any further uptake, requests were sent to the 
press offices of both major Unionist political parties, the Democratic Unionist Party 
and the Ulster Unionist Party, in order to increase uptake in participation.  
Unfortunately, the theory behind this was more positive than the implementation 
and uptake did not increase.  Contacting the party structures to encourage support 
did very little to bolster participation, leading to the conclusion that direct contact 
is always preferable when requesting interviews with politicians. 
 
Anonymity was discussed from the start of the research.  According to Henn et al 
(2006: 94), ‘Anonymity ensures that a person remains nameless and unidentifiable’ 
meaning that in theory they cannot be recognised through their contribution to the 
research.  Although the subject matter of the research was neither contentious nor 
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inflammatory it was felt that by allowing the participants the freedom to voice their 
views without being acknowledged personally, more personal and intrinsic views 
would be provided, hence benefiting the aims of the research.  By allowing 
participants to remain anonymous this provided a safe environment for individuals 
to disagree with some of the policies or stances held by their respective parties in a 
way that would not have repercussions.  This again highly benefited the research as 
one of the objectives was to discern the personal and sometimes private views of 
Unionist designated politicians on their identity and their feelings towards 
Britishness and the United Kingdom.  The researcher was aware from the beginning 
that by applying a principle of anonymity to such a small group of high profile 
individuals is in itself inherently difficult, but everything has been done to achieve 
this.  This was particularly important during the writing up stage, as outlined by 
Hennick et al (2011: 76), in the statement that ‘Anonymity is ensured when 
selecting quotations of participants while writing the results.’ 
 
By including the clause on anonymity, a higher rate of participation was gained than 
was originally expected.  A number of participants stated off the record that they 
had agreed to take part in the research expressly because they were offered 
anonymity and felt that this allowed them greater scope to discuss topics without 
the possibility of repercussions from their parties and/or their electorate.  This was 
highly beneficial for the research as this enabled the researcher to look at the 
diversity of views and opinions not just within Unionism in Ulster, but also within 
individual Unionist political parties.  It was interesting to hear participants talking 
through their thought processes when it came to where their own personal views 
sat in relation to official party stances on issues such as the European referendum.   
In order to protect the anonymity of participants, code names were given to each 
participant, for example, ‘Participant (Number)’ was used.  This rather impersonal 
method of coding participants was chosen to prevent any subconscious researcher 
bias which may have emerged through the process of assigning a pseudonym to 
each participant.  As not every participant in this study belonged to the two main 
Unionist parties, namely the Democratic Unionist Party and the Ulster Unionist 
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Party, it was decided that no party or independent status should be provided 
alongside the participant’s code name.  This was a measure added to protect the 
anonymity of politicians who were either independents or from smaller parties. 
   
Informed consent was a major factor in the research, with all participants being 
fully informed of the nature of the research before giving their consent (Mason, 
1996: 57).  This was achieved by providing potential participants with information 
which clearly and concisely outlined the aims, objectives, and rationale of the 
research prior to their agreeing to partake.  After this a consent form was signed by 
participants prior to the interviews being conducted.  At the start of every interview 
each participant was asked if they were comfortable with their interview being 
recorded by the researcher with the option to have the interview written in notes 
rather than recorded.  Part of the process of gaining conformed consent from 
participants was that each individual had the option to withdraw their consent at 
any point prior to the submission of the thesis. 
 
Once the interviews were conducted, the issue of how and where to store the data 
became a primary ethical concern.  Under the Data Protection Act, all information 
has to be securely stored.  Raw data, such as paper copies of the interview 
transcripts and participant’s consent form, have been filed in a secure locked 
cabinet on premises at Ulster University.  All processed data, such as electronic 
copies of the recordings and transcriptions, have been stored on the Ulster 
University computer system on a password protected computer, with copies saved 
to the Cloud, an external hard drive and a password protected pen drive. 
 
1.4: Thesis structure 
The constitutional uncertainties in the United Kingdom, accentuated particularly by 
the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 and the Brexit referendum in 2016, 
have led to speculation that we are moving towards an ‘ever looser union’ (Paun 
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and Munro, 2015). This has led to some existential questioning among scholars 
‘what is the United Kingdom for?’ in terms of this ever looser union? How does this 
recalibration of the Union affect our understanding of British identity and 
subcategories of identity therein?  
 
The objective of the research is to investigate how elected Unionist representatives 
understand the implications of constitutional unrest on the United Kingdom and on 
British identity.  As outlined within Chapters Two and Three the frameworks of the 
constitutional, social and economic unions have been developed to analyse the 
diverse, yet unified nature of the United Kingdom in a way that seeks to reconcile 
the instrumental and non-instrumental components of the Union through the 
framework of elective affinity (see Chapter Four, section 4.3).  The purpose is to 
assess the state of Unionist political thinking on a range of relevant matters such as 
allegiance and identity, contract and solidarity and instrumentalism and non-
instrumentalism and to correlate these views with Northern Ireland’s place within 
the Union.  The Ulster Question has once again emerged as central to the British 
Question following events such as the deal between the Conservative Party and the 
Democratic Unionist Party in 2017 (see Chapter Three, section 3.4).  The research 
will examine if there is a common sense of Britishness which continues to bind the 
regions of the United Kingdom together or if identity within Unionism in Northern 
Ireland is more fluid and broad than previous literature on this subject would 
suggest (see Chapter Five).  This thesis has been separated into three sections to 
provide the best layout to the information provided.  Part One outlines the 
conceptual background to the thesis.  Part Two discusses the participant interviews 
and how the answers provided fit in with the framework outlined within Part One.  
Part Three will be a discussion of all that has been examined previously and will end 
by answering the questions which have been raised throughout.  The chapters will 
be laid out in the following manner. 
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Part One 
Chapter Two provides an extensive review of the relevant academic literature on 
Britishness and identity. It argues that Britishness is now the core political question 
of the twenty-first century, overtaking the issue of class.  This is due to the 
structure of the United Kingdom as a union state and the question of how 
conflicting identities can and should be managed within the Union following recent 
constitutional events such as the 2014 Scottish independence referendum and the 
2016 European referendum.  Examination of Britishness is achieved through the 
discussion of allegiance and identity, contract and solidarity and instrumentalism 
and non-instrumentalism within the frameworks of the constitution, social and 
economic unions which bind the United Kingdom.   
 
Chapter Three narrows the scope of the literature review to look at Northern Irish 
Unionism as a case study of Britishness.  This chapter examines the paradoxes of 
allegiance and identity which exist within Ulster Unionism.  From this, questions are 
developed which will be tested throughout this thesis, hypothetically in Chapter 
Four and in Part Two of the thesis through the answers provided by Unionist 
politicians. 
 
Chapter Four details two theoretical approaches which are discussed within this 
thesis.  The first is an interdisciplinary tripartite conceptual framework which 
combines the theories of Schrödinger, Descartes and Baudrillard to analyse the 
traditional anti-Unionist arguments surrounding British identity.  The second is the 
framework of elective affinity which is used to provide a positive interpretation of 
Ulster Britishness and which this thesis hypothesises could be used to reconcile the 
paradoxes which exist between Unionism and Britishness.  This chapter also 
provides hypothetical answers to the questions developed within Chapter Three. 
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Part Two 
Chapter Five examines the nature of identity within Ulster Unionism from the 
perspective of Unionist politicians.  This information is then connected back to Part 
One of the thesis through the frameworks of allegiance and identity, contract and 
solidarity and difference and unity to understand how Ulster Unionism can be used 
as a case study of Britishness within the United Kingdom. 
 
Chapters Six widens the focus to observe British Unionism and examine how the 
2014 Scottish independence referendum impacted upon both Ulster Unionists and 
of the United Kingdom as a whole.  This information will then be discussed to see 
what, if anything, this can show about the nature of the United Kingdom with 
particular focus on the concepts of shared rule and self-rule and of the instrumental 
and non-instrumental unions which exist across the Union. 
 
Chapter Seven examines the most recent constitutional event to occur within the 
United Kingdom, the European referendum of 2016 and the subsequent decision of 
the United Kingdom as a whole to leave the European Union.  With so many 
unknowns surrounding this political decision it is important to gauge what effect 
this could have on the United Kingdom as a whole. It was also an opportunity to 
ascertain the views of Ulster Unionists on current and major political events and get 
an understanding of what this decision means to them. 
 
Chapter Eight draws Part Two to a close by asking Unionist politicians for their 
views on the future of the United Kingdom.  This was core to understanding how 
Ulster Unionists see themselves and Northern Ireland as a whole within this Union. 
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Part Three 
Finally, Chapter Nine re-examines the information discussed throughout the thesis 
and presents it as a final polished product.  It re-visits the paradoxes of Britishness 
and Unionism outlined and discussed within Part One and Part Two and reframes it 
within the framework of elective affinity to answer the questions that have been 
posed by this thesis. 
 
1.5: Conclusion 
This chapter provides a condensed synopsis of what will be discussed throughout 
the thesis.  The thesis observes British identity at three distinctive levels: first as an 
in-depth examination of British identity within a contested region of the United 
Kingdom – Northern Ireland, it then analyses this to see what Britishness within 
Ulster Unionism can tell us about Britishness at the nation-state level in a time of 
rapid constitutional change, as well as overarchingly being a study of complex 
identities at a time of complex change.  
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Chapter Two 
Paradoxes of British Identity 
2.1: Introduction 
The first section of this thesis, Part One, is concerned with outlining the conceptual 
frameworks through which the paradoxes of Ulster Unionism and British national 
identity will be understood.  This will then frame the conversations surrounding the 
empirical component of this thesis which will be discussed within Part Two. 
 
Britain, according to Anderson (2006: 26), is ‘an imagined political community’ like 
all other political communities, portrayed to citizens as being ‘imagined as both 
inherently limited and sovereign’, yet both the limit and the sovereignty of the 
United Kingdom has been threatened within recent years.  At the time of writing, 
the United Kingdom is currently undergoing a period of constitutional upheaval at 
an unprecedented scale.  Due to recent events such as the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum, the 2016 European referendum and both the 2015 and 
2017 General Elections, questions over the stability of the United Kingdom as a 
multi-national state and the meaning of British national identity have been raised.  
The rise of nationalism in Scotland and England, alongside the ever present Ulster 
Question, challenges the success of the United Kingdom as an inclusive and all-
encompassing multi-national state.  While Britishness is often taken to be the 
overarching civic identity of the Union, the role of regional ethnic identities cannot 
be ignored, particularly in a time of constitutional unrest.  As argued by Farrington 
and Walker (2009: 135), these identities have been left out of academic 
understandings of Britishness for too long.  Now is the time to address this. 
 
National identity has not always been the core issue of British politics.  Ever since 
Lloyd George (as historian A.J.P. Taylor quipped) conjured the Irish Question out of 
British politics, Ulster Unionism has generally been considered to be marginal to 
modern British history and politics.  This was the case in that era inaugurated by 
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what Maurice Cowling called ‘the impact of Labour’ (1971) in which the academic 
focus shifted from the grand issues of the constitution to questions of class and 
socio-economic policy.  It was especially so after 1945 when politics was defined by 
two party competition and, according to Peter Pulzer, class was the basis of British 
politics and all else was embellishment and detail (1967).  Even amongst some 
Unionists in Northern Ireland, such as the Campaign for Equal Citizenship, it was 
thought that ‘real politics’ existed across the water and, by contrast, politics in 
Northern Ireland was stuck in a different mould.  One recent study (Biressi and 
Nunn 2013: 13-15) observed that by the mid-1990s class appeared to have been 
displaced as a useful model of analysis for understanding social change in the 
United Kingdom.  Certainly, in the 2017 General Election as Ford (2017) observed, 
class politics had actually been turned upside down.  Today things look rather 
different.  Across the United Kingdom questions of identity, the constitution, 
nationhood and the Union have become mainstream and not marginal. It is the 
politics of class which no longer seems central.  Barker argues that questions of 
national unity are more important than that of class and highlighted that the state 
has a significant role to play in the creation and promotion of British identity (1947).  
It can be argued that we are currently witnessing this shift away from class politics 
to identity politics. What happens next is dependent upon how the British state 
reacts to this challenge. 
 
Britishness has become one of the major political issues for this generation as the 
traditional institutions of Britishness are weakening, leading to a crisis of national 
identity across the United Kingdom (Wright and Gamble, 2000).  Part of this 
concern is that devolution is weakening the overall sovereignty of the nation-state 
by allowing the regions greater political autonomy.  This harks back to the 
questions raised about devolution in the 1970s when it was thought that the rise of 
nationalism would lead to the inevitable end of the United Kingdom (Nairn, 1977).  
Yet, even with Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales having their own devolved 
institutions, the Union still stands - even with the attempt of Scottish Nationalists to 
gain independence in 2014, the Union remains.  It may be that allowing a more 
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relaxed Union that allows regional identities to flourish and celebrates the diversity 
of the four regions actually helps to unify the United Kingdom, but in looser terms 
than has previously been the case (Wright and Gamble, 2000).  The question of 
identity is important as when people feel threatened they tend to retreat into 
‘exclusive identities’, such as the polarisation of Britishness and Irishness that 
occurred in Northern Ireland during the period of the Troubles (Brown, 2006).  As 
will be observed in Chapter Six, when Ulster Unionists feel secure within the Union 
they are more likely to relax their definitions of identity and to see diversity within 
the United Kingdom as a positive.  This is the same across the United Kingdom.  
Gordon Brown’s 2006 speech to the Fabian Society echoes the sentiment of Wright 
and Gamble’s paper in that in order for the Union to continue, Britishness must 
change to allow difference to be accepted and necessary.  This will be examined in 
greater depth elsewhere in the thesis. 
 
This chapter will examine the United Kingdom through the historical and political 
events and institutions which define it.  The character of Britishness will then be 
addressed both historically and culturally to provide an answer to the question 
What is Britishness?  Historical and contemporary issues of tension in British 
identity will then be examined.  The following chapter will introduce the question of 
the distinctiveness, yet also representativeness, of British identity within Northern 
Ireland Unionism during a time of constitutional unrest across the whole of the 
United Kingdom.   
 
2.2: The United Kingdom paradox 
The characteristics of nations and nationhood have been observed throughout 
history.  For Anthony Smith, the defining characteristic of a nation is territory; how 
a nation is formed, how borders are defined and protected, and who resides within 
these borders (1971; 1995).  For Benedict Anderson (2006), nationhood and 
identity are social constructs, or ‘imagined communities’ created by the individuals 
themselves (Axel, 2003: 118).  Often, nations can be viewed as a unique snapshot 
26 
 
into a current period of world history as they are constantly changing depending on 
the circumstances of the time in which they exist (Hobsbawn, 1990: 9).  How then 
would one define the United Kingdom?  Gellner theorised that, ‘…nationalism is a 
theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut 
across political ones…’ (1983: 1), yet this is not the case in the United Kingdom.  The 
biggest distinction between the United Kingdom and the majority of nations across 
the world is that it is a ‘union state’, meaning that it is a state made up of separate 
nations (Tompkins, 2015).  This distinction is important as it asks the question of 
how one relates multi-national difference to state unity within the United Kingdom.  
There is an untold bias between the ways in which the identity of the United 
Kingdom can be portrayed.  The identity of the Union can be portrayed as that of 
difference, with Nationalist identities being at the forefront, or as the unity identity 
of Britishness.  While these distinctions are part of the Union, they cannot be 
discussed in separation from each other.  To see the United Kingdom as a union 
state defined by difference fails to take into account the shared history of the 
British Isles and of the importance of political representation at Westminster, the 
national parliament.  Equally, to view the United Kingdom as unitary fails to 
understand the complexity of it as a union state and downplays the importance of 
regional identities within the Union.  The union state status of the United Kingdom 
is vital in that it represents it as both a unified nation state and also as being multi-
national (Kidd, 2015).  Like two sides of a coin, these two component concepts of 
the United Kingdom as a union state are inseparable.  One way of reconciling this 
paradox is yet another paradox - elective affinity as a means of explaining the 
complexities of British identity within the Union (see Chapter Four).   
 
George Boyce (1995) argued that the question at the time of Irish Home Rule and 
subsequently is this: ‘was the United Kingdom inhabited by a single nation, however 
much regional or even patriotic differences might distinguish its component parts’; 
or was it ‘one whose national distinctions made it essential that they should be 
given some constitutional recognition?’ This is a leitmotif of Union and it is a vital 
insight when trying to understand the United Kingdom as a union state.  When 
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looking at the first part of Boyce’s distinction, that of the United Kingdom as a 
single nation, one can see the importance of political representation in creating this 
single nation.  Yet what Boyce and subsequent political thinkers have argued based 
upon this distinction is that while it is biased towards state unity, it still understands 
that each region of the United Kingdom has its own unique cultural identity.  Dicey 
and Rait (1920) and later Pocock (1975) suggest that cultural difference within 
Britishness is more ingrained than thinkers such as Nairn would have one believe.  
They argue that the history of Britishness is the history of each of the component 
regions and that without the diversity of each of the regions there would be no 
such thing as a British identity.  Dicey and Rait (1920) argued that the separate 
nations of the United Kingdom should ‘preserve as much of the noble spirit and 
traditions of their separate nationality as may be compatible with the wider sense 
and the extended patriotism which ought to bind together all the citizens of the one 
politically united country’.  By doing so, this method promotes the individual 
cultural identities of each nation, while simultaneously protecting the overarching 
dominant identity of Britishness.  According to Sir Ernest Barker, the United 
Kingdom is simultaneously a multi-national state and a single nation.  It is this 
ability to be viewed as simultaneously one or both which has allowed the United 
Kingdom to survive for so long, even when history has shown itself to be unkind to 
multi-national states such as Austria-Hungary.  Barker’s concept of Britishness, as 
similar to both the diversity and unity and elective affinity tropes of this thesis, and 
argues that political representation is needed to bind the regions together, but that 
this elective choice is not enough without a shared sense of belonging to reinforce 
it.  In Barker’s case, the political representation is backed up by the accommodation 
of distinctive regional identities (Stapleton, 1994).  Davies argues that the entire 
British problem has been caused by the issue of nomenclature, meaning that there 
is a lack of knowledge from residents of the United Kingdom on what the state is 
(1999).  The argument for the United Kingdom being a combination of unity and 
diversity is clear in the Unionist claim that the four component regions are stronger 
together than they are apart, but that each also adds a unique contribution to the 
United Kingdom by being a part of it.  Richard Rose defined this distinction in 1982 
in the idea of the maze and the mace.  What these concepts refer to are the 
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concepts of diversity and unity.  For Rose, the maze refers to the diverse institutions 
of local government and national culture while the mace refers to the unifying 
authority of the Crown at Westminster.  Rose observed that ‘Multiform institutions 
are consistent with the maintenance of the Union so long as all partners to the 
Union continue to accept the authority of the Crown in Parliament’ (1982). Though 
in 1982 Rose was writing against devolution as a real threat to the United Kingdom, 
one may argue that devolution within the Union has redefined the balance 
institutionally. As outlined by constitutional theorist Daniel Elazar (1987), the 
United Kingdom is now a balance between ‘self rule’, referring to devolution and 
‘shared rule’ referring to the national parliament at Westminster. 
 
While the above theorists acknowledge the cultural distinctiveness of the regions 
alongside integration through political representation, not all political thinkers and 
historians agree on this.  The question of whether or not British is an artificial 
identity opposed to authentic national identities such as Scottish and Welsh has 
divided academics.  Historian Linda Colley (1992: 5) suggests that this was in fact 
the case as the Union was ‘an invented nation superimposed, if only for a while, 
onto much older alignments and loyalties’, while Tom Nairn argues this point as a 
certainty in his 1977 book The Break-Up of Britain.  For David Marquand this theory 
states that the British Empire gave meaning to the British and that without it there 
is no Union, just the component parts.   
 
When examining Boyce’s second distinction, that regional differences should mean 
that the nations of the United Kingdom should be given their own political 
representation, one can clearly see how devolution comes into the equation.  As 
Tompkins observed, devolution within the United Kingdom has been brought about 
by a mix of both popular and parliamentary sovereignty.  This is important as 
popular demand alone within the regions cannot secure devolution, the national 
parliament at Westminster must also accept and promote this.  What this tells us 
about the United Kingdom as a union state is that it works as a half-way house 
between unity and separation.  For Colin Kidd, one way to ensure that Britishness 
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and devolution continue to work together is to change the format of the House of 
Lords to a ‘House of Nations’ similar to the US Senate (2008).  This design would 
allow each region to have equal say over matters of legislation governing the union 
state, whilst also allowing each region to continue to govern its own day-to-day 
affairs through devolution, hence promoting an increased sense of unity between 
the nations of the United Kingdom.  Within Northern Ireland these questions of 
statehood and devolution were played out alongside the violence experienced by 
Northern Ireland during the ethno-national conflict of the Troubles.  The 
constitutional question was key to this conflict, with Unionists seeking to maintain 
the connection to Great Britain whilst nationalists argued for the reunification of 
Ireland.  Rose (1971) believed that the understanding of the views and opinions of 
Unionists from Northern Ireland was vital to contributing to the knowledge of 
British politics.  As Rose observed (1971: 206), ‘An Ulster Protestant may describe 
himself as British, but doing this does not necessarily mean he thinks himself as 
English, Scottish and Welsh people do when the identify themselves thus.  For the 
residents of Great Britain, this label supplements their primary nationality.  For the 
Ulsterman, it is a substitute for it’.  Rose’s approach outlined the importance of 
British identity both as a social identity, but also as a means of Ulster Unionists 
electing to be a part of the United Kingdom.  This point is also significant when 
looked at alongside Kearney’s statement that although the United Kingdom is a 
multi-national state, the distinctions between ethnic and civic identity within the 
Union have long been overlooked (2000: 16).   
 
National identity within the United Kingdom is a complex system, rather like an 
iceberg.  The part that people see above water is the overarching civic national 
identity of Britishness.  Yet below the surface is a much larger body of identity that 
makes up this national identity.  Regional and ethnic identities across the four 
regions of the United Kingdom have merged together from the first Act of Union in 
1536 between England and Wales to create the Britishness that one can see today.  
British identity is not a standalone concept that was created from thin air.  Instead 
it is a complex blend of multiple identities created to solidify a complex multi-
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national state.  What is interesting now is that the territorial question of the United 
Kingdom is once again central to British politics following the Scottish 
independence referendum of 2014.  When taken as a case study, the position of 
Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom raises interesting questions about 
identity and allegiance, nationhood and belonging and solidarity within the Union.  
All of these are themes that will be discussed at length throughout the thesis. 
 
While devolution can be viewed as a method of securing the idea of the United 
Kingdom as a multi-national state, it also raises concerns about the potential break-
up of the Union (Aughey, 2007b).  It has been noted previously that devolution can 
act as a half-way house of both self and shared rule, yet for many political thinkers 
such as Nairn it can be portrayed as a half-way house towards the disintegration of 
the Union.  This concept almost came to fruition on the 18th September 2014 when 
the Scottish electorate took part in a referendum to decide if Scotland should 
become an independent nation.  The result was that 55% of the Scottish population 
voted to remain within the Union.  This may not have been a large enough victory 
for the No campaign to put questions of Scotland’s future within the Union to rest 
for a generation, yet it has proven that the union state still holds relevance for 
those who live within it.  Even if the Union remains for the moment secure, 
questions are still raised over how this affects understandings of identity within the 
United Kingdom.   
 
For Andrews and Mycock, devolution has created a new territorial aspect to British 
politics which makes it increasingly hard for politicians to speak of the United 
Kingdom and British national identity as a whole (2008, 141; Brown, 2007).  When it 
comes to teaching citizenship within the United Kingdom there are conflicting 
narratives over national and multiple identities and how to reconcile the 
differences between the two.  What this thesis will argue in Chapter Four through 
the framework of elective affinity is that - within a union state - concepts of nation 
and multiple identities do not have to be conflicting but can exist simultaneously 
and enhance each other within the Union, creating a structure of national unity 
31 
 
through regional diversity.  As with the questions asked by Boyce previously, Pocock 
(1975) also distinguished the importance of diversity in unity, stating that each 
region has played a core part within the history of the United Kingdom and that this 
should be incorporated within British history.  This move towards a more multi-
national approach to the history of the United Kingdom was further developed by 
Hugh Kearney in his 1989 book The British Isles: A History of Four Nations.  What 
Kearney was attempting was to create was a history that not only focused on 
England, but brought in the experiences of all regions of the Union together.  As 
Kearney (2006: 1) observed: 
‘To concentrate upon a single “national” history, which is based upon the 
political arrangements of the present, is to run the risk of being imprisoned 
within a cage of partial assumptions which lead to the perpetuation of 
nationalist myths and legends.’   
 
The British constitution is currently in a state of flux.  With no codified constitution 
it can be hard to understand how the United Kingdom is supposed to meet these 
challenges of separate national identities within a union state.  For Bogdanor 
(2009), the core of the British constitution is political representation and the 
continuation of this.  Political representation has been achieved in the United 
Kingdom through the use of multiple levels of government, such as devolved 
institutions and the continuation of a national parliament with representation from 
all four nations.  Whilst at first it may seem that devolution would be detrimental to 
the structure of the United Kingdom it must be acknowledged that it has potentially 
saved the Union as currently the majority of individuals within the Union wish for it 
to remain (Hazell, 2009: 101).  Without devolution, Northern Ireland, Scotland and 
Wales would not have the power to legislate for themselves or to promote their 
own regional identities.  Yet rather than this giving them a taste for further 
devolution or even independence, it has served to provide them with more security 
within the United Kingdom (Jeffrey and Wincott, 2006; Curtice, 2006).  With the 
constitutional aspect of the United Kingdom having changed – from the first of 
Boyce’s definitions to the second - how then does this impact upon national 
identity within the Union? 
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2.3: The Britishness paradox 
Discussions of Britishness are not straightforward.  It is not a concept that can 
succinctly be reduced to sound bites within a political speech (Colls, 2011: 574).  
Identity within a union state, as discussed above, is somewhat more complex as it 
contains both multi-national and multi-cultural aspects.  Each of the four nations is 
different, each with different identities and cultures.  The problem of British 
identity is not the creation of one overarching umbrella identity that is forced upon 
all of the nations of the United Kingdom, rather a British identity that acknowledges 
and celebrates difference (Dicey and Rait, 1920; Barker, 1947).  The study of British 
identity has struggled with this problem, particularly when trying to reconcile ethnic 
(national identities such as Englishness) and civic (more inclusive) concepts of 
identity within this island nation (Kearney, 2000: 20; Britishness and Belonging 
study, 2005).  Yet it is vital during this time of constitutional unrest that questions 
of identity are answered as it is the social glue through which the nations of the 
United Kingdom are connected (Smith and Jarkko, 1998).  At the core of these 
questions of ethnic and civic identity is devolution.  While political theorists since 
the 1970s have viewed devolution as the means by which the Union will end, in 
identity terms one can argue that devolution has ensured that the regions are now 
more a part of the United Kingdom than they have been previously (Colls, 2011: 
577).  For historians such as Colley, the loss of the Empire followed by a waning of 
Protestantism and industrialism has triggered a slow decline within British national 
identity, yet Britishness still exists (1992).  Nationhood, as observed by Jacobson, is 
a process, not an entity (2002: 189).  It is ever evolving and changing, meaning that 
change does not have to herald the end of the Union (Ward, 2004; Robbins, 2005: 
488).  Pocock (2000) has been critical of Nairn’s view of Britishness, arguing that his 
ideas surrounding class and the monarchy are outdated. 
 
If British identity has changed, why and how has this happened?  Andreouli and 
Howarth through research on immigration and British identity, found that identity 
also refers to how individuals felt they are treated by state policies (2013, 378).  
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This is an interesting finding as it can be referred to discussions surrounding 
devolution and political representation.  Barker, as examined in section 2.2, states 
that political representation is necessary to create a sense of belonging within the 
United Kingdom.  This can explain in part why devolution has not led to further 
dissolution of the Union as while regional policies are created within the devolved 
institutions issues of national importance are still discussed at the national 
parliament, a body that continues to contain representatives from each nation of 
the United Kingdom.  Therefore, diversity in this scenario has led to the potential 
paradox of greater unity in the union state.  By contrast Heath et al argue that the 
nation is a cultural rather than a legal concept (1999: 157).  When observed in 
cultural terms, Britishness can be seen to be going through a process of change.  In 
2010, Bradbury and Andrews compared the responses on identity in the British 
Social Attitudes survey from 1996 to 2005 to discover any changing patterns in 
identity.  They found that 52% of respondents in 1996 described themselves as 
British, while this number dropped to 44% in 2005 (Bradbury and Andrews, 2010: 
229-230).  This number rose to 47% in the 2013 British Social Attitudes survey.  One 
reason for the decrease in Britishness since the 1990s is due to ‘evidence that 
devolution elsewhere in the UK has sharpened people’s appreciation’ of the 
differences between Britishness and other national identities within the United 
Kingdom (British Social Attitudes, 2014).  These figures are concerning for the 
British state when one addresses state legitimacy through national identity (Vebra, 
1965). 
 
If British identity is losing support, why is this the case?  For political scientists such 
as Beck (2000) and Barber (2003), national identity is being made redundant 
through globalisation as our world becomes increasingly smaller and more 
connected, particularly when one looks at the supra-national union of the European 
Union.  From another perspective, immigration has also been stated as a cause for 
the decline of Britishness as the ethnic landscape of the United Kingdom is 
pluralising (Gilroy, 1997; Parekh, 2006).  For Tilley and Heath (2007: 663), decline in 
British identity is a result of three factors: societal changes, ‘period’ specific changes 
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such as devolution and a change in attitudes through the generations.  Within the 
last few decades of the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century there 
has been an increasing rise in regional identities and a decrease in Britishness 
(Heath and Roberts, 2006: 2).  When observing changing attitudes in regards to 
identity in the Scottish and British Social Attitudes Surveys, Bechhoffer and 
McCrone found that there was a marked difference when individuals were forced 
to choose one national identity compared to allowing them a multiple choice.  In 
their study they found that while 52 individuals choose British as part of a multiple 
choice answer on identity, only 14 choose Britishness as a forced choice (Bechhofer 
and McCrone, 2007: 254).  This was even more marked in Scotland when looking at 
the contrast between Scottish and British identity.  In 1974, 65 individuals stated 
Scottish as a forced choice identity and 31 choose British, while in 2005 76 
individuals choose Scottish identity and only 15 stated Britishness (Bechhofer and 
McCrone, 2007: 254).  This is interesting as these findings show a clear rise in 
support for Scottish national identity following Scottish devolution, with the year 
2000 showing the largest support for Scottish identity with 80 participants stating it 
as their forced choice national identity compared to 13 British (Bechhofer and 
McCrone, 2007: 254).  What this shows is that there is clear support for devolution 
within Scotland and that this has helped to promote and to strengthen Scottish 
national identity. 
 
Research is increasingly finding that the Anglo-centric version of British identity is 
fast losing its appeal, not just among the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish, but 
also among the English, the very demographic whom it is most likely to apply to and 
hold meaning for (Rojek, 2007: 8-9).  Therefore, as national cultural identities 
prevail, is Britishness in terminal decline?  This has led to a revised attitude to how 
identity within the UK should be perceived.  Within a modern context, this can be 
understood via Millar and Ali’s (2014: 253) example that: 
‘Someone with a strong Scottish national identity may well favour 
independence for Scotland … The same person may also be unwilling to 
assert that she would rather be a citizen of Britain than of any other country 
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– since what she would like most is to be a citizen of Scotland’. (Millar and 
Ali, 2014: 253).   
 
Even with such measures, whether Britishness can be maintained as the 
constitutional identity of the United Kingdom is open to debate.   Quite possibly this 
is a matter of too little, too late in regards to retaining British identity as the 
overarching sense of affinity and solidarity that binds the Union together, as too 
often the owl of Minerva spreads its wings at dusk.  Yet it may not be too late for 
the United Kingdom.  Three years ago the risk of an independent Scotland still felt 
very real.  Unfortunately for Scottish separatists the European referendum of 2016 
has pushed concerns over this to one side.  Yet it must be noted, as it has been by 
Preston (2008), that the arguments that were made by Scottish nationalist 
surrounding independence are not irrational.  These views cannot simply be 
ignored.  The temporising ‘no’ given by Prime Minister Theresa May (Stewart et al, 
2017) in denying the Scottish a second independence referendum may have put 
this fear to rest for the time being, but using the authority of the national 
parliament to prevent the people of Scotland having another say on their 
constitutional position may further weaken the frameworks which bind Scotland to 
the rest of the United Kingdom. 
 
Difference between groups is a core trigger when it comes to an individual’s 
awareness of their identity (Britishness and Belonging survey, 2005: 45).  Culturally 
and socially the nations of the United Kingdom are different from each other, such 
as the cultural significance of the 12th July commemorations to Ulster Unionists in 
Northern Ireland, and this may trigger a rise in regional identities.  Yet often these 
identities can be held simultaneously with Britishness.  In recent decades the 
United Kingdom has witnessed both a cultural resurgence of Britishness through 
the success of events such as the 2012 Olympics and an increased prevalence of 
regional national identities.  To maintain the monopoly of identity which has 
historically been held by Britishness within the United Kingdom is an increasingly 
difficult task.  Previous Prime Minister David Cameron stated that Britain is founded 
upon a ‘historically constituted identity’ (Daddow, 2015: 83).  If this is the case, why 
36 
 
has the trend in recent years been to return to the individual history of each region 
rather than promoting a common nationwide history of identity?  Langlands (1999: 
54) synopsised, ‘is Britishness a political and territorial identity or does it operate on 
civic and ethnic levels at the same time?’  He further outlined this in his statement 
that ‘the nation is an historically recent artefact arising out of specific modern 
conditions’, purporting that the history used to promote Britishness across the 
United Kingdom is socially constructed and is construed specifically towards the 
goal of endorsing British national identity as the metanarrative of identity within 
the Union (Langlands, 1999: 54).  As observed by Lynch (1999: 3), no matter how 
hard the political centre has tried in recent years to promote Britishness within the 
Union, ‘the enduring ethnic, cultural and political facets of old allegiances were 
never far below the surface of British identity’.  This departure to traditional 
regional identities signified a move back from the progression of the Union as a 
coherent political entity, to a quasi-federal system of political engagement.  
According to Cohen (1994: 255), it is traditional for identity to be ‘transmitted as an 
oral tradition within entire communities’, alluding that the restitution to regional 
identities could portray a return to smaller more inclusive identities.  Kimberlee 
(2002: 95) argued this also has an effect on the political engagement of young 
people by distorting support for the traditional three big parties while increasing 
support for regional nationalist parties.  
 
Why should regional and national identities within the United Kingdom be in 
competition with each other?  Regional identities are a core part of the British 
identity and without them it would look very different.  Therefore, regional and 
national identity within the United Kingdom should be visualised as a train track 
approach as it is a concept of identity in parallel (Jacobson, 1997: 196).  Both are 
needed to contribute to Britishness as we know it.  Hitchens (2008: 44) contends 
that: 
‘Most of us were born yesterday, to all intents and purposes.  The lore of 
our tribe, the stories of our ancestors, the memories which our parents held 
in common, have simply ceased to be’.   
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In other words as society progresses the historical, political and cultural bonds 
which in the past tied people to a common sense of British identity are breaking, 
resulting in a revival of more insular regional identities.  Yet even with the studies 
discussed in this section showing that Britishness is on the decrease as a first choice 
identity, it still remains a vital element of people’s identity when they have been 
allowed to choose it alongside other identities.  If postmodernity teaches us that 
metanarratives are collapsing and that individuals are taking a more pick and mix 
approach to concepts such as religion and identity, why can Britishness not 
conceivably be viewed as a ‘moveable feast’, the flexibility of which is its key 
strength (Hall, 1992: 309)?  Unique national identities are not a crucial aspect of a 
nation as history, culture and politics do not affect all members of a nation equally 
(Cophen 1994: 192).  When using Northern Ireland as an example one can observe 
that different ethnic groups have different historical, cultural and political 
backgrounds that are not representative of everyone within the nation.  While 
members of the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community celebrate the 12th July 
annually in commemoration of the 1690 Battle of the Boyne, many members of the 
Catholic/Nationalist/Republican community see this as an attack on their own 
history and culture.  Therefore, a one size fits all approach to shared history and 
culture does not exist within Northern Ireland.  The situation is more complex and 
as a result so is national identity.    
 
Within Scotland and Wales there is a clear duality of identity in that an individual 
can be both Scottish or Welsh and British; can the same be said of the English? 
(Osmond, 1988: 26.  Or does the Anglicisation of Britishness mean that to be English 
and British are viewed as one and the same?  As observed by Kearney (1989: 2), 
historians, particularly those of an English background, tend to use the terms British 
and English interchangeably.  This nation-based perception of British history can be 
misleading as not only does it promote England as the dominant power within the 
union at the expense of the other nations, it also fails to acknowledge the 
contribution that other nations have had towards building the British national 
identity.  The impact of the interchangeable use of British and English in regards to 
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national history was further examined by Robbins (1998: 284) who stated that 
many institutions such as galleries and museums in England are described as either 
‘British’ or ‘National’ and are subsequently taken by England to represent the 
nation (Mcleod, 2013: 650).  The same however cannot be said for their 
counterparts in Scotland and Wales, where national institutions are taken to mean 
of that nation and not of Britain as a whole. 
 
The perceived weakening of British national identity was an area of concern for 
New Labour since the 1990s.  The Labour Party believed that Britain needed to 
recognise ethnic minorities and to create more social inclusion and that this could 
be achieved through national identity and as a result Labour put citizenship on the 
national curriculum in England (Haesly, 2005: 66; Crick, 2002: 493). Devolution itself 
was an attempt by the Labour Party to modernise Britain by allowing regions to 
have political and cultural autonomy over themselves (Haesly, 2005: 65).  
Britishness as a concept has so many dimensions.  It is simultaneously a political, 
legal, social and emotional question (Grube, 2011: 628).  Trying to applying 
Britishness to the whole of the United Kingdom as a method of enhancing social 
cohesion is a somewhat difficult task, but one that Gordon Brown attempted in 
2006 during a speech at the Fabian Future of Britishness conference.  Brown stated 
that a promotion of shared values could be used to increase national pride in 
Britain and to create a sense of belonging within individuals towards the United 
Kingdom (2006).  Nairn is not an advocate of Brown’s views on Britishness, arguing 
that Britishness is merely a remnant from the days of the Empire (2006: 37).  
Perryman (2008: 8) believes Brown’s perception of identity to be ‘the most 
backward, defensive and narrow version’ of Britishness.  His views conjure images 
of primordial displays of Unionism and Britishness, of union flags and shared values.  
Is this truly representative of the Britishness of the United Kingdom?  In Northern 
Ireland maybe, these critics argued, but not in Great Britain.  Brown asked the 
questions of identity which should be asked, yet does his answer fit the bill?  To 
state that shared values can result in a sense of belonging and national pride is only 
answering a small section of the question.  If one where to look at Britishness as 
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being both civic and ethnic as observed by Parekh (2000), then a celebration of 
shared values is simply not enough to create cohesion.  National identity is partisan, 
as values emerge from traditions and history, yet belonging does not always mean 
sharing the same views or sense of history (Parekh, 2000: 7:8).  For example, many 
within Northern Ireland do not share the same perception of certain historical 
events with others within the United Kingdom.  One may change political 
community, but cannot change their ethnic belonging (Parekh, 2002: 304).  
Therefore answers to the identity question must be achieved in a way that is 
inclusive to all within the union state.  As Shaw has stated, now is the time to ask 
people what Britishness is, not to theorise about it (2008: 596). 
 
It must be acknowledged that without careful contemplation, conversations 
surrounding British identity can quickly develop into debates concerning ‘not 
national identity as such, but commitment to the Union – a very different matter’ 
(Millar and Ali, 2014: 253).  While identity within the United Kingdom has changed, 
the imagined community that is Britain has not yet disappeared (Haesly, 2005: 81).  
Identity is not a fixed concept, hence it is described within this thesis as a paradox.  
It is neither fixed or fluid, but a blend of both aspects (Parekh, 2000: 5).  Britishness 
can be examined in different forms of thinking, particularly in regards to the aspects 
of constitutional, social and economic unions which together form a whole. 
 
2.4: British questions 
In order to fully address the issues of Britishness, the future of the Union and the 
relationship between Ulster Unionism and the United Kingdom, a more detailed 
approach to examining Britishness must be applied.  Three key distinctions can be 
made: the constitutional union, the social union and the economic union.  Each 
refers to an important aspect of both the Union and Britishness which have 
traditionally been viewed in the paradoxical terms of allegiance and identity, 
contract and solidarity, and instrumentalism and non-instrumentalism.  The 
conceptual framework of elective affinity will be used to re-imagine these 
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paradoxes into a concept of Britishness, one  which will be proposed as an all-
encompassing approach to understanding the nature of Britishness within Northern 
Ireland and which will be tested empirically in the responses of Unionist 
representatives in Part Two of this thesis. 
 
2.4.1: The constitutional union of the United Kingdom 
The constitutional union can be addressed using the framework of allegiance and 
identity (Aughey, 2010c).  At its most basic level, a constitution is a set of 
institutions.  In the case of the United Kingdom this refers to the British parliament 
at Westminster.  Vernon Bogdanor (2009) observed that the constitution at this 
base level refers to having political representation at Westminster (see Chapter 
Two, section 2.2).  This was also outlined by the Royal Commission in 1973 which 
recommended that the number of Northern Irish Members of Parliament should 
increase to ensure that it is in line with the rest of the United Kingdom 
(MacKintosh, 1974: 122).  While at first this may seem overly simplistic, it can in fact 
be seen in practice.  This understanding would explain why representatives from 
Sinn Fein refuse to take their seats in Westminster, as to do so would be seen as 
not only acknowledging Britishness as an identity but also acknowledging allegiance 
to, and legitimacy of, the United Kingdom.  Bogdanor’s view can also explain why 
the Scottish Nationalist Party aims to replace allegiance to the Crown at 
Westminster with allegiance to (the Crown at) Holyrood, integrating political 
allegiance and Scottish national identity in an independent Scotland.  However, the 
term constitution can also be understood as having an identification with a set of 
values, in this case those of Britishness. Gordon Brown was a strong advocate of 
defining Britishness as a set of values, for example in a speech at the 
Commonwealth Club in London the importance of British identity.  According to 
Brown British identity can be viewed in two ways, both as the institutions like the 
monarchy, but also through British values such as ‘British tolerance, the British 
belief in liberty and the British sense of fair play’ (2006).  What Brown is saying in 
this speech is that the allegiance aspect is not enough, one also needs to promote a 
41 
 
sense of common and shared identity to bring a nation together.  What the 
allegiance/identity framework allows is that the Northern Irish, the Scottish and the 
Welsh retain their own unique regional identity culturally while also maintaining 
their allegiance to the United Kingdom politically and together, politically and 
culturally, there is a clear set of shared values.  Colin Kidd argued this point within 
the Scottish context, ironically arguing that Unionism can be used a method of 
protecting regional identities within the United Kingdom against English influence, 
and not as a means of English imperialism imposed upon the regions as Nairn has 
argued (2008; 1977). 
 
Traditionally, the British constitution has been positively understood as a revered, 
almost mythical, entity that is almost globally unique in that it is an unwritten 
document, or at least historically it has been.  Allegiance to the Union has been 
traditionally achieved through the political obligation to the state (Aughey, 2010c: 
337).  Like nationalism, the British constitution appears as a conversation between 
the ages, a noble ideal like a living creature, evolving and adapting depending on 
the political climate.  One development from this lack of constitutional clarity is the 
surprising amount of flexibility that this has allowed the separate nations when it 
came to their own identities.  As Colley (2014: 90) explained, ‘The fact that this was 
a flexible and in many respects only a partial union helps to explain why it has 
endured for so long’.  Elazar’s balance between ‘self rule’ and ‘shared rule’ provides 
a perfect introduction to devolution and the impact that this has had on both the 
United Kingdom and British national identity.  According to Gordon Brown in 1992, 
devolution would strengthen both the United Kingdom politically and Britishness 
culturally by creating ‘a community of citizens with common needs, mutual 
interests, shared objectives, related goals and most of all linked destinies.’  What 
this means in practice is that political allegiance within the three devolved regions is 
split: the regions are now both allegiant to their own devolved assemblies or 
parliaments, whilst also retaining allegiance to the national parliament at 
Westminster.  This concept of simultaneous allegiance is beneficial to the United 
Kingdom as it cements the Union as a multi-national state and strengthens it 
through the continued elected support of its constituent member parts.  These 
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allegiances now supplement a feeling of affinity towards the Parliament at 
Westminster.  In the case of devolution and the United Kingdom this allows 
regional identities to grow and flourish whilst also maintaining the over-arching 
identity of Britishness. 
 
The intention of devolution was to create the space for conversations surrounding 
identity and belonging to be discussed on a more public and multi-national 
platform.  It also brings to the fore questions surrounding elective affinity (see 
Chapter Four, section 4.3).  It is not enough to elect to be a part of the Union as the 
people of Scotland have discovered recently.  The regions must also want the Union 
to continue.  This is where allegiance and identity plays a huge role in the 
continuation of the United Kingdom.  As observed by Aughey, allegiance and 
identity may be different in many ways, but they are not unrelated (2010c, 342). 
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, section 2.2, there has been a fear within British 
political elites that devolution could, by contrast, result in a breakup of the United 
Kingdom (Lynch, 1999: 112).  This theory is not new and can trace its roots back to 
political thinkers such as Tom Nairn in the 1970s.  Despite the decades spent 
pondering this ‘inevitability’, the Union remains. The theory was almost proven 
during the 2014 Scottish independence referendum, when 45% of the Scottish 
population voted to remove Scotland from the United Kingdom.  However, with a 
‘No’ vote of 55% this did not materialise, yet the relatively close result showed that 
the debate has not been settled definitely.  Territorial politics will continue to frame 
academic discussions of Britishness and the Union for the foreseeable future 
(Bradbury and Andrews, 2010: 247).  The referendum also had the impact of 
conveying to politicians across the United Kingdom that the stability of the Union 
was more fragile than imagined, and that a delicate political and cultural balance is 
required to maintain the threads which bind the regions together.  The changing 
structure and increasingly diverse nature of the United Kingdom as a whole must 
also be considered in regards to what is meant by Britishness and how this is 
maintained in civic and political life. 
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If one looks at devolution through the lens of the allegiant/identity framework 
devolution’s function is to reconcile both allegiance and identity within the United 
Kingdom.  Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales all now have their own devolved 
parliament or assembly.  This allows them a degree of political and financial self-
governance, political recognition of their own distinctive regional identities yet 
maintaining overall allegiance to the polity of the United Kingdom through 
representation at Westminster.  In the case of the union state of the United 
Kingdom, both regional devolution and the continuation of political representation 
at the national parliament may be the best method to achieve this within a 
framework of multi-national identities.  The key political purpose of devolution was 
the accommodation - by democratic containment - of claims to popular sovereignty 
and the establishment of institutional bounds to separatist tendencies (Aughey, 
2007b: 140). 
 
When researching ideas of constitutional impacts on British identity, it is impossible 
not to mention the role of the monarchy.  As outlined by Colley (2014: 43), the term 
‘The United Kingdom’ itself highlights the core place of the monarchy within the 
Union.  Throughout the history of the United Kingdom, the monarchy has played a 
central role in both British national identity and national allegiance – as Rose (1982) 
argued the Crown is the closest that the United Kingdom comes to a theory of the 
state.  According to Bogdanor (1995: 307), the monarchy plays many roles within 
the United Kingdom, from being a pillar of the British constitution, to being a 
symbol of the nation.  The influence of the monarchy regarding British national 
identity was examined by Stevenson and Abell in their 2011 study.  In response 
participants stated that the 2002 Jubilee had highlighted the importance of the 
monarchy as a component of British national identity (Stevenson and Abell, 2011: 
135).  The monarchy also plays an important role in the promotion of Britishness 
outside of the United Kingdom.  While British influence across the world declined 
after the end of the Empire, the profile of the British monarchy is still high 
(Osmond, 1988: 23; Cannadine, 1983: 102). 
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The symbolic importance of the monarchy not just among the English, but also to 
those in the devolved institutions was evident in First Minister of Scotland Alex 
Salmond’s statement that even if the referendum resulted in a “Yes” vote, that it 
was his wish for the Royal family to continue as the monarchs of Scotland.  What 
the Scottish National Party wished to do through independence was to split the 
constitutional allegiance of the United Kingdom away from political identity by 
ending their representation at Westminster, yet at the same time they actively 
wished to retain formal allegiance to the Crown.  By removing their allegiance from 
the United Kingdom to Scotland, Scottish Nationalists were aiming to provide 
legitimacy for their newly independent state.  This would be in tandem with, but 
distinct from, their role as head of state of the rest of the United Kingdom (Colley, 
2014: 51).  For the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) it was political, as a means of 
appealing beyond the natural base of nationalist support, to retain the Queen as 
the head of state and thus attracting the potential support of those (Unionists) for 
whom the monarchy was part of their social and cultural Scottish identity. It would 
ease the break from the UK constitutionally if the identity of Scottish would remain 
linked still to allegiance to the Crown. 
 
While the European Union impacts upon the British constitutional union, it differs 
from the United Kingdom in numerous ways.  First, it is a union of very distinctive 
nations that came together through trade agreements and beneficial shared policy.  
There is a component of elective affinity to the European Union in that member 
states choose to become members via popular democracy such as referendums.  
For the United Kingdom, this referendum took place in 1975 when the electorate 
where asked for their opinion on staying within the then European Economic 
Community.  Yet while the elective component exists, has the European Union 
succeeded in including the affinity component as well?  The European Union has 
never succeeded in developing a supranational sense of European identity.  
According to Shore (2004) the European Union has grossly underestimated the 
ingrained sense of belonging that develops from national identities by making the 
mistake of thinking that they are created unnaturally and could therefore be 
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replaced with a European identity.  This is a major way in how the European Union 
and the United Kingdom differ (see Chapter Seven for a fuller examination of these 
differences in Ulster Unionism etc).  The European Union has never fully developed 
this sense of affinity within its member states and as a result, the United Kingdom 
voted to leave the European Union on the 26th June 2016.  This other union will be 
discussed within Chapter Seven.   
 
2.4.2: The social union of the United Kingdom 
When looking for a conceptual link to tie a discussion of the social union into this 
thesis, nothing fits quite so well as the themes of contract and solidarity as without 
a shared sense of solidarity between the regions of the United Kingdom the implied 
constitutional contracts which form the Union would not survive for long (Aughey, 
2001a).  For example, if one were to look at the Scottish Nationalist Party’s policies 
during the independence referendum campaign, one would observe that it wished 
to break the contractual connections to the Union (elective/allegiant) whilst 
maintaining the social, cultural and economic connections (affinity/solidarity). Like 
the object of retaining the monarchy, the concern of the SNP with the ’social union’ 
but not ‘political union’ was a means of softening the break with the UK, a practical 
affinity to make the transition from part of the Union to an independent state 
easier for the people of Scotland.  However, as this thesis has argued, it identified 
the great contradiction in the strategy of the independence campaign which was 
never resolved and which continued to dog the arguments for a second 
referendum.   
 
The relationships between the regions of the United Kingdom contain elements of 
contract.  This can be observed through the principle of consent in Northern Ireland 
and by the decision of 55% of the Scottish electorate to remain a part of the United 
Kingdom (Aughey, 2001a: 476).  When looking at academic discussions of the 
contract and solidarity framework of the Union, Aughey stated in 2010 that 
46 
 
Scotland would be the test of this.  This did indeed happen in 2014 with the Scottish 
independence referendum.  For this contract to work it must be more than a mere 
bargain. The Union to survive must be rather like Hegel’s idea of marriage - ‘a 
contract to transcend the point of contract’ (cited Avineri, 2002: 139).  According to 
Clarke (1990: 32), national identity is influenced more by shared history than by 
economics.  This endows British identity with a solid foundation within history and 
shared cultural experiences, whilst helping to promote a common bond within all 
the regions of the United Kingdom.  British identity, therefore, can be further 
understood as being an ‘allegiance to common institutions, a shared history and a 
political culture which fosters common values’ (Lynch, 1999: 5).  Rather than 
remain stagnant, union states must provide a sense of belonging to those who live 
within them.  Conversely, nationalist movements within the United Kingdom aim to 
promote their cause by using history.  By constantly reasserting their history as 
separate events from the rest of the United Kingdom, nationalist movements 
reinvigorate previously less dominant identities such as Scottishness or Welshness 
into larger self-defining identities that become primary to those who live in the 
regions.  Hastings (1997: 3) outlined this by stating that those who live within states 
are not simply ‘subjects’, but are actually an integral part of the state.  This grants 
the people of a nation the opportunity to influence and adapt their own national 
identity, depending on the current historical, cultural and political situation.  Clarke 
(1990: 32) has asked the question, ‘Is Britain special?’  Perhaps a more fitting 
question would be: Is British identity special enough to survive?  Whether this 
flexibility can continue to promote and preserve British national identity is yet 
unanswered.   
 
However, this flexible nature of Britishness can also be viewed as a weakness.  The 
United Kingdom, as described previously in this chapter, does not have a codified 
constitution.  What this means in practice is that the contractual bonds which 
connect the Union are heavily reliant on feelings of solidarity and affinity to hold 
them together, what Brown tried to re-define as values.  As there is no clear 
constitutional grounding for much of what Britishness is, it depends on a sense of 
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solidarity to connect the regions and to promote sharing of resources and 
opportunities, the very economic ‘values’ which Brown spoke of.  This is difficult to 
achieve whenever one looks at the diversity and unity components of the United 
Kingdom.  Each region has a diverse idea of what it means to be British, therefore 
how can Britishness be used to promote solidarity?  This theme will be examined in 
more detail in Chapter Six of this thesis when it looks at the responses of Ulster 
Unionists on Britishness and their connection to the Union. 
 
During the establishment of the United Kingdom and the creation of a shared 
national identity, religion has played a significant role in bringing the four nations 
together under a common identity.  The influence of religion within the structure of 
national identity is best understood when examined through a sociological 
perspective.  Emile Durkheim, the influential French sociologist, outlined the role 
religion had to play in the forming of national identities.  For Durkheim, the major 
function of religion was to bind individuals in a society (Giddens, 1972: 219).  This 
was achieved through outlining what behaviours are acceptable in society and how 
to interact with others.  As Harrison (2013: 533) argued, the principles of protestant 
Christianity allowed people to feel for others.  This ability to connect acts as the 
social glue that fastens the United Kingdom.  As argued by Bellah, civic religion also 
plays a major role within national identities.  This is evident in the United States of 
America, where religious elements can be observed within public culture (Storm, 
2011: 830).  Cultural events in the United Kingdom also promote this sense of civic 
religion.  Hervieu-Léger (2000: 157) further contributed to this area by introducing 
the concept of ‘ethnic religion’ (Storm, 2011: 831).   
 
According to Pocock (1993: 8), the Protestant Revolution of 1688-1689 allowed for 
the unification of the church, monarchy and parliament.  This in turn allowed for 
the union of the predominantly Protestant nations of England, Wales and Scotland 
over time; a union that was cemented with the establishment of the Anglican 
Church in England and Wales and the Presbyterian Church in Scotland (Bryant, 
2006: 34).  It was also conceived as a shared interest and a common bond between 
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the three regions that would make an overall national identity entrenched in 
Protestantism easier to promote above the traditional regional identities.   
 
Yet religion has also played a divisive role within the United Kingdom.  For most of 
the history the United Kingdom this has taken the shape of non-conformity versus 
Anglicanism, a debate that was only replaced within the 20th century by the 
emergence of class politics.  The relationship between Ireland and the United 
Kingdom has always been characterised as a contest between competing religious 
outlooks and led in 1921 to the creation of the Irish Free State and Northern 
Ireland.  Within Northern Ireland there is still conflict between minority 
communities and the United Kingdom over religion.  Unlike with the rest of the 
regions, the role played by religion in the 1800 Act of Union with Ireland was 
different.  Although Ireland contained a minority Protestant population, the main 
reason for bringing it into the Union was a strategic move in regards to the defence 
of the nation.  Many commentators, such as Colley and Storm, have stated that 
Protestantism within the Union was an important way of separating the identity of 
the nation from Catholic Europe and Ireland (Colley, 1992: 316; Storm, 2011: 830).  
At this time, Great Britain was vulnerable to attack and invasion from its close 
proximity to mainland Catholic Europe, a position which left Great Britain’s rulers 
and military leaders under constant fear of attack.  Being an island nation could not 
even prevent Great Britain from invasion, as previous British history has 
documented on numerous occasions.  For any possible invasion from Europe, 
Ireland was the perfect side door into Great Britain for two reasons.  First, as a 
Catholic nation Ireland was sympathetic to Europe and would be inclined to help as 
a base in attacking Great Britain.  Second, the close proximity to Great Britain made 
Ireland an excellent base from which attacking forces from Europe could invade.  
Therefore the 1800 Act of Union was as much about protecting Great Britain and 
British self-interests as it was about further promoting the expansion of Britishness 
that was on-going at this time. 
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2.4.3: The economic union of the United Kingdom 
When examining the economic union between the regions of the United Kingdom it 
may at first seem like a purely instrumental agreement.  However, the United 
Kingdom cannot be viewed in only instrumental terms as this does not look 
favourably upon the future of the Union (Aughey, 2010a).  Instrumental terms can 
be broken so long as the Union no longer holds any benefits for the nations 
involved, but once a non-instrumental component is added belonging within the 
United Kingdom it becomes a much more primordial aspect with individuals 
wanting to remain within it because they feel a sense of innate belonging. 
 
The real ‘nitty gritty’ aspects of the economic union, such as the calculation and 
distribution of the Barnett Formula, the use of shared currency through the pound 
sterling and United Kingdom wide trade agreements are all instrumental in that the 
regions enter into these contracts for the economic stability and benefits which 
they provide.  Yet the economic union also contains strong non-instrumental 
elements as well.  The pooling of resources across the United Kingdom can only be 
done through the legitimacy of the Union.  This legitimacy is provided through the 
shared sense of belonging and affinity which the regions feel towards the Union – 
as in the ‘social union’.  The structure of the United Kingdom provides financial 
security to each of the four regions.  The present method of distributing finance 
around the United Kingdom was developed by Joel Barnett in 1978 and his formula 
was named after him (Bryant, 2006: 54).  The Barnett Formula has come under 
increasing fire in recent years due to the amount of public spending per capita that 
is given to the devolved regions of the United Kingdom at the expense of England.  
Figures from 2012/2013 show public spending per head throughout the United 
Kingdom as such: England £8,529; Scotland £10,152; Wales £9,709 and Northern 
Ireland £10,876 (Shepherd, 2014).  This in itself causes much discontent among 
those in England who believe they are getting a poorer deal.  During the Scottish 
independence referendum, much discussion was held around the perceived 
inequality of this financial arrangement.  The financial position of Scotland is now 
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worse than that of the United Kingdom as a whole, with a deficit of 9.5% compared 
to the United Kingdom’s 4% (Mahoney, 2016).  The situation is such that ‘Scotland 
now receives £1,200 per head more in spending while raising £400 per head less in 
revenues’, weakening any arguments that Scotland is economically strong enough 
to become independent (Mahoney, 2016). 
 
One of the most perceptible benefits of the Union is that of the system of welfare 
that has been developed within the United Kingdom.  The United Kingdom has 
always been proud of its National Health Service, the means by which individuals 
are entitled to free health care.  This is an extremely costly policy for the 
government, with the National Health Service in England alone costing an estimate 
of £115.4 billion for the year 2015/2016 (NHS, 2015).  As stated by Budge et al 
(2007: 596), the British government is under constant pressure to reform these 
services.   
 
Recent proposed changes to the welfare system have also caused disparities 
between the Westminster government and the devolved regions.  In England, the 
Welfare Reform Act (formally Bill) was passed by the then Conservative/Liberal 
Democrat coalition in 2012.  However, this Act met with political unease in 
Northern Ireland.  Since it was first introduced to the Stormont Assembly, the 
Welfare Reform Act has been a divisive issue between Sinn Fein and the Democratic 
Unionist Party, the two largest parties.  The Sinn Fein position is that the proposed 
cuts to the welfare system are ‘totally unacceptable’ (Sinn Fein, 2015: 10).  The 
Democratic Unionist Party, however, takes a different approach to welfare reform, 
arguing that the Conservative cuts do need to be implemented, but that this does 
not necessarily mean that the Act should be implemented without change.  Already 
this debate has put strain on the relationship between Northern Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, with discussions being held to deliberate the possibility of 
removing devolved powers over welfare away from Stormont and placed back into 
the care of Westminster.  This was an interesting political situation from the 
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position of the instrument and non-instrumental framework within which this 
section on the economic union is framed.  The proposed changes to the Welfare Act 
can be viewed in terms of an instrumental agreement that would be imposed by 
the national government.  Nationalists do not want this agreement, nor do they feel 
any non-instrumental reasons as to why they should.  For Unionists on the other 
hand, the instrumental reason behind the Welfare Act were important and should 
be implemented, but not in their entirety and not without change.  What is 
interesting is that even though Unionists accept that some of the changes must be 
introduced for instrumental reasons, the social and cultural scenario in Northern 
Ireland is different from that of mainland Great Britain and therefore Northern 
Ireland would need an adapted form of the Welfare Act.  Once again, this is a case 
of unity in diversity.  The Welfare Act may be different across the regions of the 
United Kingdom, but the very distribution of expenditure and the substance of the 
welfare state itself relies on a sense of commonality and equity which is non-
instrumental. 
 
2.5: Conclusion 
What this current period of rapid constitutional change offers academia is a unique 
opportunity to study the effects of complex constitutional and political change on a 
complex social identity such as Britishness.  If times have changed it is therefore 
appropriate to revisit Ulster Unionism as its concerns are no longer at the ‘edge of 
the Union’ (Bruce, 1994) but at the centre of it due to the recent rise in identity 
politics within the United Kingdom and through the Conservative/Democratic 
Unionist Party deal of 2017.  The position of Ulster Unionists within the United 
Kingdom at this time allows for a fascinating and in-depth case study of this 
phenomenon.  It is an intriguing and contradictory position which Ulster Unionists 
now find themselves in within the United Kingdom.  They are simultaneously more 
involved with central British politics than they have been in years, whilst also once 
again finding themselves distinctly at the edge of the Union.  The deal between the 
Democratic Unionist Party and the Conservative government following the snap 
election of 2017 has placed a level of political influence on Ulster Unionism that has 
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significantly raised its profile and power within the central political institutions of 
the United Kingdom.  This a case of the central British political institutions accepting 
Northern Ireland and Ulster Unionists as a core component of the Union, as Theresa 
May made the following statement on the 13th July 2016 after she had become 
Prime Minister:  
‘we believe in the Union: the precious, precious bond between England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. But it means something else that is 
just as important; it means we believe in a union not just between the 
nations of the United Kingdom but between all of our citizens, every one of 
us, whoever we are and wherever we’re from’ (May, 2016). 
 
Yet Ulster Unionism is also once again caught in a position of being distinctive from 
the rest of the United Kingdom because of the territorial issues surrounding 
Northern Ireland as a contested region.  This can be observed through the ongoing 
concerns surrounding the role of Northern Ireland in a post-Brexit United Kingdom 
and conversations about the role of the Irish government in the affairs of Northern 
Ireland.  British identity within Ulster Unionism is a complex and often contradictory 
identity and it is the argument of this thesis that its character has been understood 
in contradictory ways but that these ‘contradictions’ can be resolved (at least 
partially) by a more synthetic approach. Aspects of any complex identity can be 
distinctive and particular (Ulster Unionism) and other aspects of it representative of 
a larger whole (Britishness).  
 
Doing justice to what is both distinctive and representative is a challenge when 
addressing any identity. For example, criticisms made of Gordon Brown’s attempt 
to define ‘Britishness’ a decade ago were twofold. On the one hand, his definition 
of British values were too generic to be specific and on the other hand, his 
definition was actually too distinctive – that these were not British examples but 
English values (Brown, 2007).  It is one of the themes of this thesis that much of the 
literature on Ulster Unionism has been concerned with what is distinctive about its 
character rather than what is also representative of wider British values or 
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experience.  This thesis will demonstrate the substance of this claim through the 
conceptual framework of elective affinity and by the analysis of data gathered from 
interviews with Unionist politicians. What differentiates this research from others is 
that is it observing British identity and Unionism at a time when Northern Ireland is 
no longer the biggest threat to the continuation of the Union.  The political conflicts 
of Unionism versus Nationalism are no longer the property of Northern Ireland, but 
are currently being played out within Scotland following the 2014 Scottish 
independence referendum and its aftermath.  When it comes to issues of identity, 
nationhood and the future of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland is no longer on 
the peripheral of these questions but central.   
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Chapter Three 
Paradoxes of Unionism 
3.1: Introduction 
The previous chapter has examined the general nature of Britishness in the United 
Kingdom.  This was achieved by addressing the questions of ‘What is Britishness?’, 
and how it relates to the spheres of constitutional, social and economic union.  
Discussion has been given to the changing nature of British politics as the 
traditional model of class politics has been significantly modified by the re-
emergence of the ‘territorial dimension’ and questions of identity (see Chapter 
Two, section 2.2; Walker, 2010: 236; Mandler, 2006: 283).  While the history of 
Great Britain has been predominantly concerned with Pulzer’s (1967) famous 
statement that ‘Class is the basis of British party politics; all else is embellishment 
and detail’, it is true that the same cannot be said for Northern Ireland.  The 
territorial dimension which was first raised by Richard Rose and other theorists 40 
years ago raises important questions of nation, identity and belonging within the 
United Kingdom.  One thing though is for certain: ‘Britain was not invented; it 
developed’ through a combination of both allegiance and identity towards the 
union state (Clarke, 2000: 275).  To fully understand the nature of Britishness in the 
twenty-first century United Kingdom it is necessary to move away from the general 
towards the particular, the particular in this case study being Northern Ireland.  
Does Northern Ireland disprove the common rules of Britishness and is Ulster 
Unionism an exception to the rule?  Or does Northern Ireland illustrate how 
Britishness and Unionism involve logical affinities?  The question of identity has 
been of core constitutional, social and economic importance in Northern Ireland 
since its creation in 1921 (McCrone, 2002: 316).  From being considered by 
generations of scholars to be marginal to British politics, Northern Ireland, and in 
particular Ulster Unionism, has now found itself front and centre of British politics.  
This will be examined through a discussion of the paradoxical positions of allegiance 
and identity in the academic literature on Britishness and Unionism.  From this 
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literature, key questions will be abstracted for further examination later in the 
thesis. 
 
3.2: The paradoxes of allegiance 
The study of Unionism is one that can be described through the paradox of 
allegiance to the United Kingdom.  This will be addressed via a comparison of both 
political and historical theories of Unionism and allegiance to the Union.  On the 
one hand, theorists such as Miller argue that Ulster Unionism does not belong to 
the traditional concept of Britishness (1978).  McLean and McMillan also state that 
Ulster Unionism is an exception to Britishness, yet ironically they argue that this is 
because it is too British, making the point that Northern Ireland being ‘more British 
than Finchley’ reveals how un-British it really is (2005).  In contrast to this, John 
Bew provides a historical argument as to why Northern Ireland is in fact 
representative of British allegiance.  An examination will also be provided of 
Richard Rose’s thesis ‘Is the United Kingdom a State?’ in order to gain further 
insight into the questions of Northern Ireland, Ulster Unionism, statehood and 
allegiance. 
 
When examining literature on Ulster Unionism, it is interesting to observe that 
there are contrasting interpretative lenses through which Unionism in Northern 
Ireland - and British allegiance - can be observed (Rose, 1971; Miller, 1978; 
O’Malley, 1983; Todd, 1987).  For Miller in Queen’s Rebels (1978), Unionists from 
Northern Ireland are distinctive from the rest of the United Kingdom and do not fit 
into traditional templates of British politics or what it means to be British.  Basically, 
Unionists from Northern Ireland are not truly British enough to deserve the title of 
British.  Miller looks at Northern Irish Unionism from a historical viewpoint and 
makes the interesting observation that Ulster Unionism can be viewed as a form of 
nationalism that developed as a result of Unionist fears surrounding Home Rule.  
What Miller is arguing in Queen’s Rebels is that Ulster Unionism is a paradox.  It is 
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both loyal to the Crown and to itself, ‘A substantial section of the Protestant 
population often seems to be loudly proclaiming its loyalty to the Queen while 
simultaneously declining to submit to her government’ (Miller, 1978: 1).  This 
perceived paradox of British identity in Ulster Unionism I suggest can be reconciled 
by the concept of elective affinity and which can explain the seemingly 
irreconcilable contradictions which exist in the relationship between Ulster 
Unionism and the United Kingdom (see Chapter Four, section 4.3).  Britishness 
within Ulster Unionism can remain distinctive, but Unionism still elects to be a part 
of the Union and more so, it believes itself to be a part of the Union, socially, 
economically as well as constitutionally.  Britishness in Northern Ireland is viewed 
as a means of supporting the Union, but can it also be more than this? (McCrone, 
2002: 310). 
 
For Miller, Ulster Protestantism becomes particularly interesting when ones tries to 
observe it through the frameworks of ‘one-nation’ and ‘two-nations’ (1978: 44).  It 
is through this framing that Miller outlines the main paradoxes between Ulster 
Protestants and the rest of the United Kingdom, stating: 
‘Are they saying that Protestant Ulster is a distinct nation like Scotland and 
Wales within a multi-national community, the United Kingdom?  Or are they 
saying that the human community embraced by the United Kingdom is a 
“nation”, of which Ulster Protestants consider themselves members?’ (1978: 
45-46). 
To put this within the language of this thesis, are Unionists British, or do they just 
think that they are British?  To Miller, neither of these explanations quite describes 
this relationship.  To see each region of the United Kingdom as distinctive, yet 
united is a core belief within this thesis, yet for Miller Ulster Protestantism does not 
fit within this.  Rather, he notes that: 
‘The Ulster Protestant community is like Scotland (before the recent rise of 
nationalist separatism in Scotland) in that it has exhibited no clear 
determination to be politically separated from the United Kingdom.  On the 
other hand, it is unlike Scotland in that whereas Scottish national feeling has 
until recently been fully compatible with a sense of “British” nationality 
legitimising the Westminster regime, the Ulster Protestant community has 
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evoked a kind of group loyalty incompatible with acceptance of the full 
implications of British nationality’ (1978: 46). 
Therefore, as they are not unconditionally loyal to Westminster, they cannot truly 
be seen as being British. 
 
When writing the introduction for the second edition of Queen’s Rebels, Bew noted 
that Miller made the argument that a lack of Nationalism within Ulster Unionism is 
what has led to its problems over identity and belonging within the United Kingdom 
(2007: xiv).  Yet was this lack of Nationalism based upon a lack of national identity, 
or a crisis of identity?  Both of these possibilities will be examined in Chapter Three, 
section 3.4 and Chapter Four.  He also noted: 
‘Why were Ulster loyalists unable to articulate their position in a way that 
people outside Northern Ireland, particularly in the rest of the United 
Kingdom, could fully comprehend, let alone sympathise with?’ (Bew, 2007, 
ix). 
This will be addressed within this thesis.  Why are Unionists and their Britishness 
seen as different within the United Kingdom, even though they themselves believe 
that they truly are British?  As Bew stated in his conclusion, now is the time to re-
evaluate Miller’s arguments (2007: xxii).   
 
Southern is sceptical of Miller’s reading that Ulster Unionism lacks ‘a genuine 
feeling of co-nationality with the British people’, stating that this portrays a ‘cold-
blooded alliance between Ulster Protestants and the mainland British’ that shows 
little to no emotional attachment towards the Union (2007: 83).  What this view of 
Ulster Unionism does is degrade the importance of the connection with Great 
Britain.  While Unionists do view the Union pragmatically as providing financially 
and political stability for Northern Ireland, it would be overly simplistic to argue 
that there is not also an emotional dimension to this.  If that were truly the case 
then surely Ulster Unionists would not campaign as hard over issues of culture and 
identity?  If Ulster Unionists truly have no emotional ties to the Union, why did 
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Northern Ireland erupt in violent protests and civil unrest over the decision of 
Belfast City Council to only fly the Union Flag on designated days?  As outlined in 
Chapter Two, instrumental connects are not enough to hold a union state together.  
For it to truly thrive, a sense of belonging must also exist in order to bind the 
nations together. That being said, could Miller’s view that Ulster Unionists are not 
British enough to belong really be the case?  This theory will be discussed further in 
the third section of this thesis and will be put to the test through the questioning of 
Ulster Unionist participants in Part Two of this thesis. 
 
While Miller (1978: 2-3) may argue that Ulster Unionists are not British enough due 
to their refusal to give their loyalty to Westminster and hence undermining the 
representative component which binds the United Kingdom, McLean and McMillan 
believe it to be the opposite of this: that Ulster Unionists are too British to truly 
belong.  Although Northern Irish Unionists see themselves and their country as 
inherently British, a school of thought exists that states that Northern Ireland 
cannot truly claim the identity of Britishness.  As argued by McLean and McMillan 
(2005: 2), British should not technically apply to Northern Ireland as it is not a part 
of Great Britain.  Indeed, even the understanding of what it means to be a British 
Unionist holds different meanings depending on what region of the United Kingdom 
one is in.  The Britishness that can be experienced in Northern Ireland may look 
strange to some political thinkers as it does not fit into the traditional English 
definitions of British identity.  As argued by McLean and McMillan (2006: 35), 
Northern Irish Unionism and its perception of British identity has more in common 
with Scotland than it does with England as ‘Northern Ireland was the true home of 
primordial Unionism, an ideology which English politicians never understood but 
sometimes exploited’.  The Protestant connection within Ulster Scots is perhaps the 
biggest influence on the social and cultural similarities between Northern Ireland 
and Scotland (McLean and McMillan, 2006: 35; Walker, 2010: 248).   
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McLean and McMillan stated that (2005: 153), ‘Primordial Unionism lives on in 
Ulster.  In Britain, it is no more’, but just what is Britain?  If we look at it in terms of 
the instrumental and primordial, the argument made by McLean and McMillan 
becomes clearer.  The primordial Unionism that they mention is Britishness as an 
end in and of itself.  This refers to cultural and social Britishness, or the contract and 
identity tropes which have been explored within this thesis.  If one were to look at 
the ‘primordial unionism’ that McLean and McMillan observe in Ulster, such as 
Orange Order Parades and the symbols and emblems that go with this, it could then 
be argued that this type of Unionism does only exist in Ulster.  If primordial 
Unionism no longer exists in Britain, what then do McLean and McMillan argue 
holds the United Kingdom together?  For them, it is a purely instrumental Unionism 
that now binds the Union.  As long as the Union is the best deal for all of the actors 
involved it will remain in existence.  If it should ever no longer provide benefits for 
its members, the elective contracts can either be renegotiated or broken.  What 
this means is that the identity of the United Kingdom is no longer stable or 
sustainable.   
 
Yet this theory of not belonging because Unionists are too British is itself a paradox.  
How can something not belong by being too much of the thing which it wishes to 
belong to?  An enthusiastic football fan who buys every kit, both home and away, 
for their team and never misses a single match may appear to border on the 
obsessive by someone observing this behaviour from the outside.  Compared to a 
fan who is less ostentatious in their support this behaviour may seem over the top, 
yet it does not make this individual any less, or arguably, any more of a fan than 
their less enthusiastic counterpart.  The same can also be said of Ulster Unionists 
and Britishness.  Chapter Four of this thesis outlines a theoretical approach to how 
Britishness in Northern Ireland can be viewed as a simulacrum of British identity 
and which helps to explain the assumptions of McLean and McMillan.  As the 
discussion of Miller and McLean and McMillan has shown, theories surrounding 
Ulster Unionism and allegiance are paradoxical, being perceived at one and the 
same time as not British enough and as too British.   
60 
 
 
The counter argument to this debate is that Northern Ireland is not an exception to 
the rule of British allegiance, but that it is representative of it.  Bew believes that 
the relationship between Ireland and Great Britain cannot be simplified into terms 
of colonialism (2009: xvi).  This view of the relationship is both narrow and 
damaging.  It fails to take into account the role which Ireland has played throughout 
British history since the 1800 Act of Union.  In terms of allegiance, this Act 
integrated Ireland into the United Kingdom through both a constitutional 
arrangement and political representation at Parliament (Bew, 2009: 3-4; 99).  
However, as has been observed previously, a union cannot be sustained through 
allegiance alone.  There must also be a shared sense of affinity to ensure the 
strength of the purely political connections (Bew 2009: 17).  As observed by 
Crawford, ‘Ireland was not a colony but a central cog in the United Kingdom’ (Bew, 
2009: 116).  In a modern context it undermines Ulster Unionism to state that they 
do not truly belong to the United Kingdom, given the level of their allegiance to this 
Union.  Historically Ulster Unionism began its life as Irish Unionism, an attempt to 
keep the whole island of Ireland within the United Kingdom.  However, this did not 
work and as a consequence only six counties of Ireland remained within the Union.  
Often it is too easy and convenient to leave Northern Ireland (or Ireland in a 
historical context) out of debates surrounding the nature of Britishness.  For 
example, Gordon Brown’s attempt to try to create a version of Britishness and 
Unionism during his 2006 Fabian Society speech failed to include Ulster Unionists 
and the significant role which they play within British national identity (Bew, 2009: 
xii). 
 
Bew’s argument is similar to Colin Kidd’s concept of ‘representative distinctiveness’ 
within Scottish Unionism.  The relationship between Ulster Unionism and the Union 
can be viewed as a strictly instrumental arrangement, with Northern Ireland 
maintaining its allegiance to the United Kingdom in order to keep enjoying the 
economic benefits which they received from this constitutional connection (McCall, 
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1998: 392).  However, this view is far too simplistic, indeed nationalistically 
partisan, and fails to take into account the identity which also serves to connect 
Ulster Unionists to their neighbours across the Irish Sea.  As mentioned within the 
discussion of McLean and McMillan, there are similarities between Scotland and 
Northern Ireland.  Kidd (2002: 1175), draws distinctions between the ways in which 
the Covenanting traditions in both Northern Ireland and Scotland have influenced 
politics by highlighting that both have a very conditional concept of British identity 
that can results in distain towards Parliament at Westminster and in particular to 
the conventions of English social order.  This can be observed in the case of Ulster 
Unionists by how they have historically been sceptical of Westminster governments 
and their intervention within Northern Ireland during the timeframe of the 
Troubles.  During this time, particularly around the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973, 
Ulster Unionists feared that there was a lack of commitment from Westminster 
towards ensuring that Northern Ireland remained within the Union.  However, the 
Unionist commitment notwithstanding is that Northern Ireland should remain in 
the Union, although Westminster has often viewed it somewhat of a problem child. 
 
British identity, in both Scotland and Northern Ireland, is often rewritten by 
Nationalists in order to dissolve the Union by appealing to regional identities in 
terms of a critique of British imperialism (Kidd, 2002: 1153).  What is interesting 
about Scottish Unionism is just how nationalist (but not separatist) it is in nature.  
As observed by Ichijo (2012: 24), Scottish Unionists see Scotland as its own nation, 
but that it still has a commitment to the Union and that this has been strengthened 
through devolution, or ‘Home Rule all round’ as it has been described by Kendle 
(1968: 332).  For Kidd Unionism and Nationalism in Scotland are not mutually 
exclusive concepts.  According to Kidd, ‘Unionism was not the opposite of Scottish 
nationalism, but a way of allowing Scotland to be Scotland within a British 
framework of institutions’ (2012: 6).  Ulster Unionism can also be expressed as a 
variation of Nationalism – indeed some has understood Unionism as a form of 
Ulster nationalism.  As with Scottish Unionism, Ulster Unionism allows Northern 
Ireland to retain a distinctive identity, yet also remain as a part of the United 
62 
 
Kingdom.  Devolution has further helped to reinforce the ideal of representative 
distinctiveness.  Each nation within the United Kingdom is unique and as such needs 
its own political institutions, yet they are still connected by political representation 
at nation level at Westminster.  This allows regional differences to flourish, whilst 
still maintaining a sense of affinity and solidarity to the Union and British identity.  
According to Farrington and Walker, to compare Northern Ireland and Scotland 
through British identity shows that there is more to Unionism than either 
instrumental or ethnic self-interest and that politically Unionism is ‘an ideological 
project committed to the Union’ (2009: 136).  To say that Northern Ireland does not 
belong in the United Kingdom because it is different from the other regions is a 
moot point.  If this were the case, then the United Kingdom should cease to exist as 
each nation in it is different, yet connected by the ties which bind the union state 
together.  This is what is meant by representative distinctiveness.  This 
distinctiveness is traditionally held to be good for the United Kingdom.  Diversity 
within unity have played a huge role within the United Kingdom (see Chapter Two).  
Ulster Unionists were not happy to be left out of Brown’s speech on Britishness 
(Walker, 2010: 248).  However, it must be noted when discussing the ties which 
bind the Union that historians such as Colley argue that this approach is weak due 
to the fact that each of the four regions has been connected to the Union in 
different ways and with differing success (1992: 314).  Wales, Scotland and Ireland 
were all joined to England at different points in history and through different Acts 
of Unions.   
 
According to Finlay, devolution has dissolved the Union of 1707 by legitimizing 
Scottish Nationalism (2001: 385).  What he argues is that the United Kingdom is 
now bound by a different Union to the old Acts of Unions, one that simultaneously 
binds the nations of the United Kingdom together, but also allows them to develop 
their own sense of nationhood and identity, hence allowing representative 
distinctiveness to create unity through diversity within the Union. 
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Unionism has always been politically quick to act when the Union is threatened 
(McCall, 1998: 396).  Yet Ulster Unionists were oddly quiet during the weeks leading 
up to the Scottish independence referendum.  This was possibly a smart move on 
behalf of Ulster Unionists as this decision was for Scotland alone to make.  Whilst 
Alex Salmond wanted to break the Union through Scottish independence, he still 
held the idea that a newly independent Scotland would continue to have a 
connection to the United Kingdom through the continuation of the Pound Sterling 
as the currency of Scotland and the retention of the House of Windsor as the royal 
family.  While maintaining a social union whilst breaking the constitutional union 
may sound good in theory, a social union needs more that currency and a common 
head of state to secure it (Kidd, 2012: 10).  
 
Richard Rose divided Ulster Unionism into two distinctive strands: that of allegiant 
Unionism and Ultra Unionism (Rose, 1971: 33).  Within these categories, allegiant 
Unionism refers to members of the Unionist community in Northern Ireland who 
are fully loyal to the Union without any conditionality (Rose, 1971: 33).  In this 
sense, allegiant Unionists view the Union between Northern Ireland and the rest of 
the United Kingdom as a good in and of itself.  This is not only due to the financial 
and political benefits that Northern Ireland gains through being a member of the 
United Kingdom which far outweigh any negatives which might occur; but also 
those who identify as allegiant Unionists, the continuation of traditions and 
institutions which bind the United Kingdom together are to the benefit of Northern 
Ireland in particular and of the United Kingdom as a whole.  Ultra Unionism is the 
other side of this argument.  While allegiant Unionists fully support the Union, the 
loyalty which is given by the Ultra Unionist community is more conditional in 
nature.  Unlike allegiant Unionism, Ultra Unionism is less dependent upon the 
bonds of tradition which tie the United Kingdom together (Rose, 1971: 210).  
Instead, the Ultra position is predominantly concerned with maintaining the status 
quo within Northern Ireland, even at the possible expense of the Union.  This 
conditional loyalty is mainly connected to the Protestant British monarchy and the 
continuation and promotion of this traditional institution.  If perchance the British 
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monarchy was ever to pass to a catholic successor, then this loyalty would be 
withdrawn.   
 
Rose (1976: 9) has explained the problem in Northern Ireland succinctly as 
‘Northern Ireland is neither a nation nor a state.  In law, it is a subordinate part of 
the United Kingdom’.  He then appended that, ‘Northern Ireland is an insubordinate 
part of the United Kingdom – governed without consensus when it is governed at 
all.  This is the Northern Ireland problem’ (Rose, 1976: 9).  As outlined by Arthur and 
Jeffery (1988: 1), there is little public knowledge in Great Britain about the political 
situation of Northern Ireland although it was, and continues to be, a core problem 
within British politics.  Although Northern Ireland presented the British government 
with countless political problems, the fact remained that it is still an integral 
component of the United Kingdom.  Rose (1976: 2-3) argued that a United Kingdom 
without Northern Ireland would not be a United Kingdom.  Not only is Northern 
Ireland vital to the definition of ‘United Kingdom’ in terms of territory, it is also a 
core component of it.  Northern Irish politicians serve at the national parliament 
and its economy, whilst not massive, contributes in part to the wider economy of 
the United Kingdom.  British identity within Northern Ireland has always been 
associated as a form of state-belonging (Muldoon et al, 2007: 94).  It shows a 
connection to the United Kingdom and seeks to highlight Ulster’s position within 
the Union.  The importance of this sense of belonging to Northern Ireland along 
with British statehood cannot be overlooked.  Hayward et al found in a recent study 
that four out of five of their participants felt that they had a sense of belonging to 
Northern Ireland (2014: 4).  According to Hayward et al (2014: 3). ‘Social capital and 
a “sense of belonging” are understood to foster civic engagement in modern 
society’, a core component to the stability and continuation of a union state.  
 
In 1982 Rose observed that, ‘Whether the United Kingdom exists as a state today is 
an important question’ (1982: 102).  In 2017 we are still asking this question.  For 
Rose, the understanding of the views and opinions of Unionists from Northern 
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Ireland is vital to understanding what is meant by the British state.  As observed by 
Rose (1971: 206): 
‘An Ulster Protestant may describe himself as British, but doing this does not 
necessarily mean he thinks himself as English, Scottish and Welsh people do 
when the identify themselves thus.  For the residents of Great Britain, this 
label supplements their primary nationality.  For the Ulsterman, it is a 
substitute for it’.  
 
 Rose’s approach outlines the importance of British identity both as a social 
identity, but also as a means of Ulster Unionists electing to be a part of the United 
Kingdom.  It is this approach of Rose that the thesis most clearly draws inspiration 
from as British identity within Ulster Unionists is not just an affinity, it is also an 
elected choice (see Chapter Four, section 4.3).  Academic debate on Ulster 
Unionism failed to acknowledge and to appreciate the relationship between 
distinctive identity and political allegiance and that the two could be compatible 
(Miller 1978, Nelson 1984 and O’Malley 1983).  Tonge et al (2014: 110-128), briefly 
discussed this issue within the book The Democratic Unionist Party: From Protest to 
Power, yet by only designating nineteen pages to this topic and by focusing on one 
party.  In that book, Tonge et al, observe that for the Democratic Unionist Party, 
‘the essence of the relationship with other parts of the UK has been encapsulated 
by robust claims to British identity and expressed through the values of cultural 
unionism, celebrating the virtues of Protestantism and the Union within a discrete 
ethnic identity.’ (2014: 112).  However, while providing a detailed look at cultural 
Unionism, this fails to take into account the elective and instrumental components 
which also tie Ulster Unionism to the Union.  This concept of allegiance will be 
returned to in section 3.4 of this chapter, but first this thesis will discuss another 
paradox: that of Ulster Unionist identity. 
 
3.3: The paradox of identity 
According to Rose (1971: 17), overt displays of flags, both the Union Flag and the 
Tricolour, highlight the insecurity of national identity in both ethno-national 
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communities within Northern Ireland.  This reinforces the popular idea in political 
and historical literature that Ulster Unionists are suffering from a crisis of identity 
(Aughey, 1989: 12).  Much of the literature surrounding this crisis of identity 
focuses on a fear of not belonging.  This fear - that Unionists may not actually 
belong within the United Kingdom - will be further examined within Chapter Four 
but it is important to mention it here as it does play a role within Unionist identity.  
For John Hume this fear is ‘primarily psychological’, reflecting internal Unionist 
doubt about their place within the Union and at odds with the sentiment of the 
majority of the people of Britain (cited Aughey, 2015: 107).  Unionists do not only 
belong within the Union, but can also be understood a vital part within it as work by 
Bew and Rose has shown.  Yet questions over the changing nature of allegiance 
within the United Kingdom fail to note that allegiances can vary but that this does 
not have to mean that the end of the Union is near (Aughey, 2010c: 336).  As 
observed by Aughey (2010c: 350), the United Kingdom ‘involves a sense of 
distinctive national identities tempered by the habit of allegiance to legitimate 
(British) government’ (see also Crick, 1998: 111).  Regional identities may rise 
resulting in Britishness becoming secondary, but so long as the nations of the 
United Kingdom retain their allegiance to the Union, this will not affect the 
continuation of the union state.  To re-state, it is perhaps the Unionists who do not 
have a crisis of identity and that the crisis lies with the failure of the rest of the 
United Kingdom to either embrace or accept it.  As Parekh argued (2000), the 
intellectual debate on Britishness has generally been disappointing and the ‘Ulster 
lacuna’ (I suggest) is a very good example of that disappointing debate (see also 
Heyck 1998: 192). 
 
There are two key paradoxes of British identity within Ulster Unionism that will be 
addressed in this thesis.  First, that Ulster Unionists believe that they are British but 
that they do not behave as though they are British.  Second, that Ulster Unionists 
identify with Britishness, but that they are not accepted as such by the British, who 
consequently view them as Irish.  These two paradoxes will be discussed in the 
following section. 
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3.3.1: British, yet different  
Our first identity paradox is that of Ulster Unionists being British, yet not behaving 
as though they are British.  Cultural identity as a social construct - such as 
Britishness or Ulsterness - is intriguing in that it promotes strong links and 
connections within certain demographics by establishing a group history based on 
more than just religion or class (although historically Protestantism has played a 
huge role within Ulster Unionism (Griffin, 2000)).  Smith (2001: 19) has argued that 
these cultural groupings are ‘persistent and binding’ as they are often more stable 
in nature than the oral histories, symbols and traditions that create them.  Within 
Ulster Unionism, the sense of group identity gained from Britishness is 
immeasurable.  For Brown, the fact that Ulster Unionists are a small minority within 
the island of Ireland provides an important context to how necessary the Union is in 
that it provides a sense of belonging and affinity which Ulster Unionists cannot get 
from the Republic of Ireland due to the cultural and social differences (2003: 42).  
The geographical position of Northern Ireland and the fact that it is separated from 
Great Britain by the Irish Sea can in part explain the difference in British identity 
which is expressed within Ulster Unionism.  As observed by Boal et al (1991: 125-
126), ‘the Ulster Protestant identity is unquestionably British.  It is however British, 
not in an English but in a decidedly Ulster mould’.  What this means is that although 
England is the largest and culturally most significant region of the United Kingdom, 
Northern Irish Britishness does not conform to that English ideal of identity - it is 
something unique, yet still British in its overall shape and appearance.   
 
However, this does not mean that Northern Ireland stands alone among the regions 
of the United Kingdom.  As expressed by McLean and McMillan (2006: 35), 
Northern Irish Unionism and its perception of British identity has more in common 
with Scotland than it does with England (see Chapter Three, section 3.2).  The 
United Kingdom is in a unique situation in that although the four regions are tied 
together by one ‘overarching identity’ of Britishness, the regions have also been 
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able to adapt and develop their own unique identities and concepts of Britishness 
(McBride, 1996: 4).  Devolution, as suggested by MacGinty, has provided Northern 
Ireland and the other nations of the United Kingdom with the opportunity to retain 
allegiance within the United Kingdom, but to promote and maintain a separate 
regional identity (2004: 95).   
 
Yet Kearney (1991) notes an importance paradox within the Britishness of Ulster 
Unionists.  For the majority of people within England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland, 
their primary identity will be the regional identity of that area.  However, for Ulster 
Unionists this changes to stating Britishness first, before a regional identity is 
considered (Kearney, 1991: 4).  This is in part an aspect of the fear of not belonging 
trope that will be discussed at length within Chapter Four (see section 4.3).  The 
British identity that is to be found in Northern Ireland is not similar to that which 
may be found in England, but is somewhat more unique to the situation in Ulster.  
Northern Irish Prime Minister Brookeborough once stated that ‘Since I’ve become 
an Ulsterman I hate the English rather more’ (cited in Van Voris, 1975: 4).  This is 
due in part to the perceived lack of enthusiasm that is given from England towards 
Northern Ireland.  As argued by Patterson and Kaufmann (2007: 7) this insecurity 
about their belonging within the Union shaped Britishness within Ulster Unionism 
into the distinctive form that it holds today.  Another reason for this is that the 
cultural Britishness expressed in Northern Ireland is alien to that experienced within 
the rest of the United Kingdom (Gallagher, 2008: 106).  Issues such as flags and 
emblems are used to portray cultural and political identity in Northern Ireland more 
than in any other region of the United Kingdom.  Flags in Northern Ireland are used 
to distinguish identity and act as a means through which one can publicly show 
their allegiances and state loyalty (Bryson and McCartney, 1994: 9).  However, 
Bryson and McCartney (1994: 130) have argued that these traditional outlets of 
culture may be waning as people within Northern Ireland become more 
economically stable and upwardly mobile and no longer choose the erection of 
flags as an outlet for their cultural identity.  Yet this has not been the case as the 
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cultural aspect of British identity can be viewed as a close link between Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain.  
 
According to Todd, the Ulster British strand of Unionism in Northern Ireland is: 
‘secular and liberal in nature, this version of Unionism articulated a sense of 
connection with the wider environs of the UK and centred upon the rituals 
and practices of the British state’ (cited Coulter, 2013: 419).   
Within Northern Ireland, concepts of identity can be briefly summarised into the 
statement that in Northern Ireland groups clearly defining what they are not, is 
almost, if not exactly, as important as defining what they are (NicCraith, 2003: 6).  
As George Santayana argued, persuasively being against something is also a form of 
self-assertion.  It is a means of marking a group as different from another group 
within society.  This is most obviously seen in the fact that by stating Northern 
Ireland to be British, Ulster Unionists are also stating that they are not-Irish with the 
effect of making it more difficult for Irish Nationalists to create a United Ireland 
(Southern, 2007: 71).  In this regard, cultural symbols such as flags and parades may 
be argued as creating identity in Northern Ireland, and not as a subsequence of 
identity (Bloch, 1996: 216).  Hearty (2014: 5-6) outlined this in the statement, 
‘Ethno-nationalist identity in a region divided along lines of ethnonationalism can at 
one level then become reduced to how one differs from the ‘other’ and their flags, 
symbols, etc. PUL [Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist] communities have such 
attachment to the flag as they are, in their belief, British and not Irish’. Within 
Northern Ireland at least the ‘British way of life’ is one that is still worth fighting for 
(McAuley, 2004: 524).  One of the problems which has resulted from the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland is that political commentators developed the argument that Ulster 
Unionists had little or no experience of the ‘British way’ of behaving, but they still 
assumed a sense of support for the expression of their ‘distinctive’ British identity.  
For Nelson (1984: 96) Ulster Unionist allegiance to the Union has merely been a 
tactical method to ensure the protection of their own identity rather than a 
demonstration of their abiding common Britishness, a viewpoint that can also be 
observed within the work of Miller (1978) and McLean and McMillan (2005).  Yet 
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this fails to take into account the significance of social and cultural connections 
which most feel between Northern Ireland and Great Britain (Rose, 1971). 
 
In his 2007 article Britishness, “Ulsterness” and Unionist Identity in Northern Ireland, 
Neil Southern interviewed Democratic Unionist Party MLAs to ascertain what their 
perceptions are of British identity. For example, after interviewing Nigel Dodds, 
Southern (2007: 83) concludes that ‘he views his Unionism as ultimately being 
grounded in a “natural affinity” with Scotland/United Kingdom. He believes this 
gives rise to an emotional Britishness and hence confirms his bona fide attachment 
to the United Kingdom’.  This viewpoint was further expressed by Sammy Wilson in 
his statement that: 
 ‘I think there’s diversity within the United Kingdom anyway and I suppose it 
would be no different from people who would live in Scotland who say that 
they’re British but Scottish. I mean it’s different because first of all there are 
cultural things which are unique to Northern Ireland. There are historical 
things which are unique to Northern Ireland … There’s part of our history 
which is important to us which maybe people in other parts of the United 
Kingdom don’t consider an awful lot’ (cited Southern, 2007: 86). 
The article also noted that unlike traditional concepts of Unionism, Dodds 
‘considers his national identity to depend upon historical and cultural factors rather 
than being based upon the less emotionally strong sense of constitutionality, with 
its current legal provisions for British citizenship’ (Southern, 2007: 83). This is an 
insight which will be developed in the thesis and tested by the empirical evidence in 
Part Two. 
 
In stating that Ulster Unionists do not behave as though they are British, it is 
possible to acknowledge that Northern Ireland may perhaps hold its own unique 
identity.  According to Jackson (1989: 14), the Britishness of Ulster Unionists is 
blended with both Irishness and Ulsterness due to the nature of Northern Ireland.  
This Ulster identity, is a style of British identity merged with aspects of Irishness 
which is unique to Northern Ireland.  This reworking of British national identity into 
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a concept most fitting to the Northern Ireland context is not out of keeping with the 
overall development of Britishness in contemporary society.  In relation to the 
increasing amalgamation of Britishness with the cultural backgrounds of migrants, 
Parekh (2008: 97) stated: 
‘British identity is increasingly being expressed in a plurality of images, and it 
is capacious and heterogeneous enough to allow its different communities 
and regions to find their representation in it.  This makes it easier for them 
to take ownership of it and build common emotional bonds with each 
other’.   
The Northern Ireland version of British identity, therefore, is merely another 
modernised and constructed strand of Britishness. 
 
3.3.2: Unionists identify with Britishness but they are not accepted by the British 
who think they are Irish  
Although Northern Irish Unionists see themselves and their country as inherently 
British, a school of thought states that Ulster Unionism cannot truly claim the 
identity of Britishness.  The term British itself really only applied to the people of 
Great Britain, yet Ulster Unionists claim the right to use it (McLean and McMillan, 
2005: 2).  Indeed, even the understanding of what it means to be a British Unionist 
holds different meanings depending on what region of the United Kingdom one is 
in.  According to Todd, British Unionism in Great Britain is separate from that which 
is prevalent in Northern Ireland, priding itself on tolerance and other core British 
values (Todd, 1987: 14; Byrne and O’Malley, 2013: 132).  The real British cannot 
empathise with Ulster Unionism, perhaps because they themselves have never felt 
their own identity sufficiently threatened (Aughey, 1991: 2).  This could explain why 
Gordon Brown left Northern Ireland out of his speech on British values at the 
Commonwealth Club in London in 2007.  Weight (2002: 532) summarised this view 
of Ulster Unionism and Britishness in the statement that: 
‘It was the intensity of Northern Irish patriotism as much as its archaic roots 
which alienated the mainland. Practices such as painting pavement kerbs 
red, white and blue and the annual Orange parades were once respected as 
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British traditions, even promoted to attract tourists. Now they seemed to be 
an immodest, intolerant and therefore un-British form of patriotism’.   
 
In relation to traditional Unionist rhetoric, ‘Northern Ireland is constantly 
introduced as an integral part of the United Kingdom.  In fact it never has been, but 
whether from guilt or indifference the constitutional myth is rarely challenged’ 
(Crick, 1991: 73-74).  Nelson observes that the majority of British people from Great 
Britain did not realise that Northern Ireland was a part of the United Kingdom 
during the Troubles (1984: 94).  If Great Britain does not view Northern Ireland as 
part of the United Kingdom and if the British do not see Ulster Unionists as 
belonging with them, how then does this affect Britishness in Northern Ireland? 
(Gallagher, 1995: 722).  McLean and McMillan explain it (2006: 43) by arguing that 
British governments do not wish to force Northern Ireland to remain within the 
Union and that the Principle of Consent will be adhered to.  One suggestion as to 
why this may be the case is that devolution in the United Kingdom is seen by many 
in England to benefit the regions while impacting negatively upon English 
constituents.  Hazell (2006: 1) discussed this in the statement that the English feel 
that they are missing out on the political representation that members of the three 
smaller regions experiencing through devolution.  It is therefore not unreasonable 
to suggest that the reason why it would appear that many within the United 
Kingdom would prefer that Northern Ireland was no longer a member is due to the 
reason that as a whole Northern Ireland is more trouble than it is worth both 
politically and economically (O’Malley, 1983: 143).  To put it another way: it is not 
Ulster Unionists whose loyalty is conditional, but that of the electorate of Great 
Britain.  It is in this theory that one can observe the reversal of Miller’s thesis and 
this will be further discussed within Chapter Four, section 4.2. 
If Northern Ireland is not British in the conventional sense, does this necessarily 
mean that it is Irish?  The speculation that Northern Ireland is becoming 
increasingly Irish in both its culture and identity has been gaining ground in recent 
years.  As observed by Bradley (2007: 3), the peace process has brought with it a 
growing support for Irishness.  Yet for Ulster Unionists there is still an opposition 
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towards the Irish language.  This can be seen in the response of the Democratic 
Unionist Party to the Irish Language Act (Emerson, 2017a; BBC News, 2017a).  This 
may be due in part to the delicate political situation that has been experienced by 
Northern Ireland, and the fragmented and often uneasy nature of the social divide 
between Protestants and Catholics.  Jenkins (1975: 13) discerned that the political 
situation in Northern Ireland is unique within the United Kingdom as:  
‘it is ultimately much more an Irish than a characteristically British situation.  
This is so despite the fact that it has repercussions for British life and despite 
the ostentatious loyalty of the Ulster Unionists to the British Crown’.   
This is due to the Irish dimension within Northern Ireland and its shared border 
with the Republic of Ireland.  Alternatively, the unique sense of Britishness that is 
experienced in Northern Ireland may be so far removed from what Britishness 
means to the rest of the United Kingdom because it has developed as a mechanism 
to withhold the tide of Irish nationalism and the political campaign for a United 
Ireland.  O’Malley highlights an interesting paradox in this concept as Ulster 
Unionists have constantly based their arguments around not becoming a part of a 
United Ireland than they have for remaining a part of the United Kingdom (1983: 
139).  Whilst there may be truth behind this it is also reminiscent of the negative 
interpretation of Ulster Unionism that doubts their Britishness (see Chapter Four, 
section 4.2).  Either way, it has often been surveyed that ‘In nationality terms, 
Westminster and Dublin were agreed that Ulster was not British’ yet this is too 
simplistic to fully describe the complexities of British identity within Northern 
Ireland (Miller, 1978: 158).  
 
Evidence to support these paradoxes of Ulster Unionism and Britishness will be 
examined and tested through the interview stage of this thesis (see Part Two).  Is 
there a part of the British identity which Ulster Unionists lack, or is British identity 
an example of unity through diversity?  The theoretical concept of elective affinity 
may hold the answers for the answers for these questions and is explored in depth 
in Chapter Four. 
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3.4: Unionist questions 
From the examination of academic literature in Chapter Two and Three, five key 
questions have emerged for further consideration in Part Two of this thesis.  These 
questions will be introduced here in order to provide the context for that later 
examination.  These questions which have emerged from the literature will be 
tested in Part Two through analysis of data gathered from interviews with Unionist 
MLAs to gain an insight into how these paradoxes of identity and belonging are felt 
by Unionist political elites during a time of constitutional unrest across the United 
Kingdom. 
 
The first question which will be addressed is: What does it mean to be a ‘British 
citizen’ – and do Ulster Unionists fit this description?  This question refers to the 
Unionist paradox of belonging as described through the historical approaches of 
both Miller and Bew.  What is core to this question is the Unionist fear of not 
belonging within the Union (see Chapter Four, section: 4.2).  Four decades on from 
Miller’s seminal research, are Ulster Unionists still left out in the cold, deemed to be 
not British enough to belong within the United Kingdom?  Or was Bew accurate to 
refer to Ulster Unionism as being in many ways representative of Britishness? 
 
What does it mean to have a ‘British identity’ – and do Ulster Unionists fit within 
this ideal?  Are Ulster Unionists too British to truly be accepted as having a British 
identity, as McLean and McMillan argued in 2005, or are Ulster Unionists an ideal 
case study of what it truly means to be British? (see Chapter Three, section 3.2).  
Can there even be a definition of Britishness which applies across the United 
Kingdom?  Or are regional identities too distinctive within the United Kingdom to 
allow a one-size-fits-all approach to national identity? 
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The next question that has emerged is that of: Is there an ‘essential/core’ 
Britishness? Or is identity/allegiance much more complex?  Is the concept of 
allegiance and identity as clear cut as it has been presented within the past?  The 
two have traditionally been thought of as distinctive strands within Unionism, yet in 
truth they are more accurately described as two halves of a whole.  Allegiance on 
its own may be a fragile basis for sustaining the Union without expressing a 
cohesive sense of identity.  As outlined in Chapter Two, the two must be present 
together in order to form a bond strong enough to last.  This will be addressed in 
Chapter Four, section 4.3, when the framework of elective affinity is fully 
introduced to answer the questions surrounding the paradoxes of Ulster Unionism 
and Britishness.  
 
Whether Ulster Unionists are suffering from a crisis of identity will be examined by 
the question: Is it sensible to propose that Ulster Unionists are ‘confused’ about 
their identity?  Chapter Four will outline the theoretical explanations as to why 
Unionists have traditionally been described as confused about their identity, before 
looking at some of the underlying issues behind this.  Using Richard Rose’s 1971 
study of identity within Northern Ireland as a baseline and data gathered from 
Northern Ireland Life and Times Surveys, participants of this thesis will be asked 
what, if any, changes within Ulster Unionist identity have taken place in the past 
four decades. 
 
Last to be addressed will be the question: Can it still be argued persuasively that 
Ulster Unionist concerns are marginal to the United Kingdom political mainstream?  
From 1921 to the outbreak of the Troubles Northern Ireland was generally ignored 
in British politics, yet this is not the case anymore.  The recent decision of the 
United Kingdom as a whole to leave the European Union has brought Northern 
Ireland to the forefront of the negotiations due to its land border with the Republic 
of Ireland.  The 2017 deal between the Conservative Party and the Democratic 
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Unionist Party at Westminster has now provided Ulster Unionists with a serious 
platform in the heart of the national government.  
 
Many of these questions have arisen recently during the Democratic Unionist 
Party/Conservative deal of 2017.  This deal raises serious questions about the 
nature of British politics, nationhood and territory in the twenty-first century.  What 
is perhaps most notable about this deal was the manner in which it was received by 
the British public.  What is interesting when looking at the role which the 
Democratic Unionist Party plays within British politics is the statement by McAuley 
and Tonge (2007: 47) that the Democratic Unionist Party may be the ‘means by 
which the political, cultural, and religious forms of Protestant-Britishness can best 
be articulated and their core political values protected.’  The 
Conservative/Democratic Unionist Party deal suddenly brought those values 
through the front door of Number Ten Downing Street and brought those political, 
cultural, and religious forms of Protestant-Britishness to the immediate attention of 
opinion-makers and public.  Almost overnight, the policies and moral positions of 
the Democratic Unionist Party were cross-examined and deemed to be at the best 
archaic and at the worst blatant religious extremism.  Yet this public outrage was 
viewed with something akin to humour in Northern Ireland.  Policies which have 
been controversial and subject to much discussion in Northern Ireland were only 
being addressed now in Great Britain when it seemed that they could begin to 
affect mainstream British politics.  The degree of public outcry, whilst not universal, 
was such that one could be forgiven for believing that Theresa May had managed to 
make a political deal with the Devil himself.  It must be noted that Ulster Unionists 
working with the Conservative Party at Westminster is nothing new.  Northern Irish 
Unionists have helped to support Westminster governments in the past, mainly up 
until the 1970s (Caterall, 2017).  This relationship weakened after the 1973 
Sunningdale Agreement when Unionists disagreed with the Conservative Party ‘due 
to the guaranteed role it gave Dublin in the affairs of the Province’ (Newsletter, 
2013). 
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The stance of the Democratic Unionist Party on social issues such as abortion and 
LGBT rights has been a major area of concern among the political parties at 
Westminster (Irish Times, 2017; Cramb, 2017).  It must be noted that the 
Conservative Party are not endorsing the policies of the Democratic Unionist Party 
through this deal as they do not see eye-to-eye on certain social issues such as LGBT 
rights (BBC, 2017a).  For them it is a practical decision in order to ensure that they 
have a majority within Parliament for key votes because Mrs May’s electoral 
gamble failed to return the expected large majority.  Even with this, some within 
the Conservative Party are still uneasy with this deal (Peck, 2017a). Others, such as 
the then Liberal Democrat leader Tim Farron and Plaid Cymru leader Leanne Woods 
have expressed scepticism over the deal, stating that the deal and the £1 billion 
pound price tag are little more than an attempt at bribery on Theresa May’s part in 
order to try and maintain power at Westminster (BBC News, 2017c; BBC News, 
2017d).  Yet not everyone shares the same opinions on this deal.  Whilst it has been 
argued by both Arlene Foster and Theresa May that this deal will be beneficial for 
the United Kingdom, Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn has disputed this claim (BBC 
News, 2017b; BBC News, 2017d).  It is also important to note that although the deal 
with the Conservatives saw the Democratic Unionist Party take home an impressive 
£1 billion pounds for Northern Ireland, the money has not bought May the 
unquestioning support of the Party.  On the 13th September 2017, the Democratic 
Unionist Party voted against the Conservative Party on the issues of NHS pay 
increases and raises to tuition fees (Mason and McDonald, 2017).  Does this raise 
the old questions of Ulster Unionists conditionally loyalty to Westminster?  One 
thing is for sure: the deal with the Democratic Unionist Party will keep the 
Conservatives on their toes. 
 
The media criticism of the Conservative Party/Democratic Unionist Party deal (see 
Chapter Five, section 5.3 for more information) has failed to take into account the 
British values of liberalism, tolerance and support for multi-culturalism (Pasha-
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Robinson, 2017; Mann, 2017).  The Democratic Unionist Party is not alone within 
the United Kingdom, or even in this political pact, in not supporting same-sex 
marriage or abortion.  Yet the media backlash would have us believe that the 
Democratic Unionist Party and Unionism in general are somehow un-British in their 
views.  This is interesting as it does not take into account the difference in views 
that exist within the Conservative Party or the British population at large.  
Somehow, Northern Irish Unionism is excluded from the narratives of tolerance and 
multi-culturalism.  What is it about Unionist culture that is so distasteful to the 
British establishment?  To provide an answer to this within the framework of this 
thesis, the views of Unionism are not tolerated because they are simply not viewed 
as being British (see section 3.3.2).   
 
Despite this invitation into the arena of the British political elite, Ulster Unionism 
continues to act as though its very existence is threatened.  For example, in the 
2017 Assembly Election, the Democratic Unionist Party fought the election on the 
basis that if they were not voted in as the largest party, that Northern Ireland would 
come under the control of Sinn Fein.  This argument failed to recognise the joint 
status and authority of the First and Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland.  Why 
then, do Unionists still appear to fear that they do not belong within the Union?  
Why does Britishness in Northern Ireland still need to go up against an ‘other’ in 
order to be electorally successful?  These are core questions to understanding the 
psyche of Ulster Unionists.  This will be addressed within a theoretical context in 
Chapter Four, and through the experiences of Unionist politicians in Chapter Five.  
 
British identity of Ulster Unionism is complex and often contradictory - I have called 
it intrinsically paradoxical - and it is the argument of this thesis that its character 
still requires a more subtle form of understanding. Aspects of any complex identity 
can be distinctive and particular (Ulster Unionism) and other aspects of it 
representative of a larger whole (Britishness). Doing justice to what is both 
distinctive and representative is a challenge when addressing any identity. For 
79 
 
example, Gordon Brown’s attempt to define ‘Britishness’ a decade ago (also 
discussed above) were twofold. On the one hand, that his definition was too 
generic to properly capture what is distinct about British values (2007) and on the 
other hand, that his definition was actually too distinctive – that these were not 
British examples but English values.  If British values are truly the most important 
aspect of British national identity, who should decide upon what they are: the 
politicians or the judges (Bellamy and Whitebrook, 1981: 743)?  What is interesting 
about the Democratic Unionist Party/Conservative deal is how the Democratic 
Unionist Party is viewed as being against the core British value of tolerance (Bush, 
2017a).  It is one of the themes of this thesis that much of the literature on Ulster 
Unionism has been concerned with what is distinctive about its character rather 
than what is also - and necessarily - representative of wider British values or 
experience.    
 
According to Farrington and Walker (2009: 136), ‘In this context Unionism is crucial, 
as it is the rationale for these identities across the constituent nations of the United 
Kingdom. Considering the importance of Unionism, in political rhetoric at the very 
least, it is surprising that it has not been widely studied outside of Northern 
Ireland.’  It is therefore vital that this study of Unionism is expanded to include the 
United Kingdom as a whole.  Particularly following the Scottish independence 
referendum of 2014 and the European referendum of 2017, questions surrounding 
Unionism and the constitutional union of the United Kingdom need to be 
addressed.  All of these questions will be addressed within Part Two. 
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3.5: Conclusion 
As was once noted by Kumar, the United Kingdom is often taken for granted until 
discussion is raised about the possibility of it breaking-up (2000: 575).  British 
national identity within Northern Ireland can be viewed as varied and ever adapting 
and a good example of Kumar’s general thesis.  For Robbins, issues surrounding the 
nature of British national identity result from the fact that ‘“Britishness” is a 
capacious concept’ (cited Crozier, 1990:14).  Should one speak of Britishness as a 
definite thing?  Is this even possible as each region within the United Kingdom has a 
distinctive political aspect and a distinctive regional identity within Britishness 
(Hechter, 1973: 324-324)?  This distinctive unionist form of Britishness cannot be 
found within the rest of the United Kingdom and has been created locally through 
the merger of British, Irish and Ulster perspectives of identity.   
 
The mixed elements of Unionist identity and allegiance were well-captured by Boal 
et al (1991: 128): ‘the great majority express both a strong sense of Britishness, and 
an equally great desire to further sharpen that self-designation by incorporating an 
Ulster gloss: they are also as certain that mainland Britons see them as in some 
sense Irish’ Although the Northern Irish identity is a patch-work quilt of British, 
Ulster and Irish identities which seems at times alien and incomprehensible to 
many in Great Britain, it is perhaps not too far from representing British Unionism 
in its most traditional form.  The impact of outside events cannot be 
underestimated within studies of national identity and devolution has played a 
massive role in shaping the identity of the United Kingdom (Benner, 1997: 203; 
Ichijo, 2012: 34).  Britishness, in its most basic form, is a belonging with others in 
the United Kingdom based upon shared history, culture and affinities (Newman, 
1996: 126-127).  The questions of Ulster Unionist belonging which were raised in 
this chapter will be further examined within a more theoretical framework in 
Chapter Four.  The concept of elective affinity will be used to suggest a way to 
reconcile the paradoxes of Ulster Unionism and British identity, alongside a 
tripartite theoretical approach to understanding the Unionist fear of not belonging.    
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Chapter Four 
Paradoxes of Unionist Britishness 
 
4.1: Introduction 
This chapter re-examines the paradoxes of the previous two chapters within the 
distinctive theoretical frameworks which can be used to provide contrasting 
interpretations on the character of these paradoxes of Ulster Britishness.  One may 
begin by noting a key question about the nature of the United Kingdom at the time 
of the Irish Home Rule question, one which associates nation, identity and state. It 
was put succinctly by George Boyce: ‘was the United Kingdom inhabited by a single 
nation however much regional or even patriotic differences might distinguish its 
component parts’ or was it ‘one whose national distinctions made it essential that 
they should be given some constitutional recognition?’ (1988: 8-9).  Those 
alternatives are important in terms of understanding both the constitutional make-
up of the United Kingdom and of the questions which surround the nature of British 
national identity within this union state.   
 
Since the end of the twentieth century questions have been raised concerning 
devolution and the impact this has subsequently had upon what it means to be 
British (Elazar, 1987; Nairn, 1977; Aughey, 2007b; Kidd, 2008; Trench, 2008).  The 
idea of Britishness introduced by New Labour’s constitutional changes after 1997 
was not new. Devolution represented a switch from the first to the second of the 
alternatives which Boyce identified to be at the heart of the Irish Home Rule crisis. 
However, it did not settle the political question which the second alternative raised: 
was the United Kingdom capable of sustaining its unity if constitutional recognition 
is given to national distinctions, interesting questions in other words about unity 
and diversity within the United Kingdom (Wright and Gamble, 2000).  It is also 
important to note that it may be argued that unity within diversity was already a 
core component factor of Britishness before devolution.  As a union state, the 
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United Kingdom has always been host to a variety of regional and national 
identities, yet these have co-existed reasonably harmoniously (Ireland apart) under 
the overarching umbrella identity of Britishness.  Today, across the United 
Kingdom, questions of national identity are more prominent in British politics.  
Constitutional uncertainty surrounding recent political events such as the Scottish 
independence referendum and the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the 
European Union have brought what Rose and Madgwick (1982) called the territorial 
dimension of British politics back to the centre of political debate.  There are also 
questions surrounding the nature of ethnic and civic nationalism and how both of 
these concepts shape identity within the United Kingdom (Langlands, 1999: 54; 
Kearney, 2000, 16; Parekh, 2006; Heath and Roberts, 2006: 2).  As described within 
Chapter Two, section 2.4, the United Kingdom can be understood by separating it 
into three distinctive sets of relations: the constitutional, social and economic 
unions.  Together these three unions interact to bind the four nations of the United 
Kingdom together.  These unions outline the interconnectivity of the United 
Kingdom and how each component nation relates to the whole. 
 
In Chapter Three the thesis narrowed its focus from examining the paradoxes of 
Britishness to the paradoxes of Ulster Unionism.  This was done through an 
examination of the allegiance versus identity trope prevalent in academic research 
on Ulster Unionism and identity.  Concerns over Ulster Unionism and Britishness 
stem from the idea that Ulster Unionism is currently (and has been for some time) 
undergoing a crisis of identity (Aughey, 1989: 12).  From an allegiance viewpoint, 
the relationship between Ulster Unionism and the British state is often referred to 
as a result of Unionist insecurities about their constitutional position.  In Ireland 
they are only a small minority, but within the United Kingdom Ulster Unionists can 
find historical, cultural and social connections which provide a sense of belonging 
and affinity not shared with the rest of Ireland (Rose, 1971; Aughey, 2010a; 
Southern, 2007; Gallagher, 2008).  What the observation of Unionist identity in 
Chapter Three can be reduced to is this version of the Boyce alternatives: are Ulster 
Unionists British, but do not behave as though they are; or are they British, but not 
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accepted as such by the rest of the United Kingdom who view them as Irish?  The 
claim that Ulster Unionists are not perceived to be British by their neighbours in 
Great Britain relates to the differences in culture, geography and political situation 
that can be found within Northern Ireland (Miller, 1978; McLean and McMillan, 
2005; Jenkins, 1975; Todd, 1987).  The purpose of this chapter is to highlight these 
questions: What does it mean to be a British citizen and do Unionists fit the 
description?  Is there an ideal British identity?  Are the concepts of allegiance and 
identity more complex and interconnected than previously thought?  Is there really 
a crisis of identity in Ulster Unionism or has it simply been misinterpreted? 
 
The remit of this chapter is to attempt a synthesis of the paradoxes of Britishness 
and Ulster Unionism of Chapters Two and Three in an examination of the paradoxes 
of Unionist Britishness.  In order to observe and critique how these paradoxes have 
traditionally been viewed in the academic literature, this chapter will explore some 
interpretations of Unionism and Britishness, interpretations which tend to highlight 
the contradictions of identity that exist between the alternatives set out above: are 
Ulster Unionists British, but do not behave as though they are; or are they British, 
but not accepted as such by the rest of the United Kingdom who view them as 
Irish? This theoretical approach to understanding the idea of the Ulster Unionist 
fear of belonging will consist of interdisciplinary theories highlighting the role of 
doubt and insecurity in Ulster Unionist identity – in other words, that the Unionist 
fear of not belonging means that Ulster Unionism is not really British and that it is 
undergoing a ‘crisis of identity’. This familiar understanding of Ulster Unionism, 
then, takes a negative view of Unionist identity: essentially, that it defines itself 
against Irishness rather than positively for Britishness (Miller, 1978).  What is often 
ignored is the variety of British identity across the United Kingdom.  Scotland and 
Wales are also different to England and to each other, yet why is it only Northern 
Ireland that is viewed as being either too British, or not British enough, to justify its 
place within the Union?  The chapter takes the idea of ‘elective affinity’ and uses it 
to explain positively those paradoxical aspects of Unionist Britishness so commonly 
noted to constitute a negative crisis of identity.   
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4.2: The paradox of belonging  
As discussed in section 4.1 of this chapter, the paradoxes of Unionist Britishness can 
be separated into both critical and sympathetic interpretations.  The first of these 
theoretical underpinnings will examine the fear of not belonging that has 
traditionally been considered a core aspect of Unionist identity and will discuss the 
impact which this has had upon readings of Unionist Britishness.  To address this 
matter, the chapter takes three separate theories to provide a unique 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of identity theory applied to Ulster 
Unionism.  The three theories are: Schrödinger’s thought experiment (1935), 
Descartes concept of cogito, ergo sum (Ayer, 1967), and Baudrillard’s theory of 
simulation (1994).  These theories are here not explored in philosophical depth and 
the thesis is not trying to make a final statement as to their intellectual truth. In an 
academic magpie sense, it is appropriating their suggestiveness to provide novel 
avenues of insightfulness, new angles of vision, into Unionist identity in order to 
help explain the complex and apparently contradictory nature of Unionist identity 
in Northern Ireland.  Separately each avenue of insight or angle of vision provides a 
perspective on familiar claims of Unionist ‘not-belonging’. Triangulated (to use a 
New Labour term), they also provide a fresh perspective on what otherwise is taken 
to be the fatal lack of substance in Unionist identity, a lack of substance which can 
be taken to mean: not British, really Irish, a form of political and cultural ‘false 
consciousness’. The following sections examine each of these perspectives in turn, 
providing a summary of how they connect the themes of the previous two chapters 
and how they may be captured by ‘elective affinity’. 
 
4.2.1: Schrödinger’s Unionists – what’s in the box? 
While the idea of using a theoretical thought experiment - created to explain the 
Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics - to explain the paradoxes of 
Ulster Unionist identity may seem farfetched, it is in reality intellectually insightful 
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and academically suggestive.  Schrödinger’s 1935 hypothetical experiment was 
imagined to explain quantum mechanics - this being the theory that objects can 
have numerous properties, but that observation reduces these properties (Bohr, 
1952; Heisenberg, 1959).  In it, a cat is placed within a sealed box containing a vial 
of radioactive material. If this material leaks and is detected within the box, the vial 
is automatically broken and the radioactive material released, subsequently killing 
the cat.  Yet the core component of this theory is that the box is sealed, meaning 
that the events within it cannot be observed from the outside.  Without the option 
of observation, the outcome of an event can be understood via a series of 
probabilities (Gribbin, 1984: 2).  Therefore, based upon the Copenhagen 
interpretation, the cat simultaneously has the properties of being both dead and 
alive until the box is opened and one of the two states is observed (Breinig, 2009: 
688; Gribbin, 1984: 2-3).   
 
How does this theory of quantum mechanics relate to understanding the 
Britishness of Unionism in Northern Ireland?  To put it succinctly: it is to do with a 
state of political and cultural being in which two realities exist at one and the same 
time.  In the traditional application of this theory the core finding is that the cat is 
both dead and alive when unobserved.  When using this theory to observe identity 
within Unionism the core finding becomes that Unionists are simultaneously British 
and not British.  To explain this, Schrödinger’s experiment changes to suit the 
context.  Instead of a box, Northern Ireland becomes the sealed container of our 
thought experiment while Ulster Unionists take the place of the theoretical cat. The 
radioactive source changes to become a source of instability, such as the Unionist 
fear of not belonging in the United Kingdom. In other words, Ulster Unionists can be 
viewed as being British and not British, the paradox of allegiance outlined in 
Chapter Two, section 2.2 (Miller, 1978; McLean and McMillan, 2005; Rose, 1971; 
Bew, 2009).  Here is the fatal and tragic uncertainty principle in Unionist identity. 
Their own sense of themselves (as British) changes when they are observed by 
others, especially those with whom they think they naturally belong – their own 
fellow British citizens (who do not think of them as British). This simultaneous 
belonging and not-belonging is the core of Unionism’s ‘crisis of identity’ and, for 
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most nationalists (Aughey, 2015), it is the real cause of the Irish division. Unionists 
need to release themselves from their sealed illusions of being British, their 
consequent uncertainty and embrace their Irishness. 
 
The recent event of the political deal between the Democratic Unionist Party (the 
largest Unionist party in Northern Ireland) and the minority Conservative 
government following the 2017 General Election provide an illustration of this 
Schrodinger’s act – Unionists being simultaneously British and not British.  The 
Democratic Unionist Party is a British political party and the majority of its members 
perceive themselves to be British (Tonge et al, 2014).  The reality of their deal to 
prop up the minority Conservative government may work to further cement their 
Britishness (see Chapter Three, section 3.4).  Yet simultaneously they are perceived 
to be not British due to factors such as the contested nature of Northern Ireland as 
a state and the fact that the Democratic Unionist Party does not support the 
implementation of certain British policies in Northern Ireland such as the 1967 
Abortion Act and the decision to legalise same-sex marriage (Syal, 2017).  Of course, 
this interpretation is ideological in that it pitches an idea of Britishness against a 
caricature of Unionism. Not everyone in Great Britain favours abortion or same-sex 
marriage and not every Unionist opposes them. Implicit in the identification of the 
fatal incoherence of Schrödinger’s Unionism is identity as a complete subscription 
package of values. But this is an error. To be British does not mean to be the same 
as everyone else. To be Irish does not mean to be the same as everyone else. How 
the apparent illogic of Schrödinger’s Unionism may be addressed is dealt with 
below in section 4.3. 
 
4.2.2: Descartes: identity and the importance of self-awareness 
Descartes concept of cogito, ergo sum, the statement of self-awareness that 
exclaims that ‘I think, therefore I am’, adds an intriguing dynamic to the academic 
understanding of complex identities (Gombay, 1972: 71; Ayer, 1967: 80; Scruton, 
2003: 29).  Doubt often appears as a key component of complex identities and of 
this Ulster Unionism is no exception.  A philosophical concept, cogito, ergo sum 
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relates to the effect of doubt upon an individual’s understanding of self.  For 
Descartes, his doubt was the doubt of self-existence.  The very act of doubting 
one’s existence proves beyond doubt that one does in fact exist because the ability 
to doubt through rational thought proves existence (Scruton, 2003: 31; Williams, 
1978: 73-74; Descartes, 1969: 26-27).  According to Williams (1978: 73-74) and 
other theorists (Scruton, 2003: 31) the ability to think and its relation to one’s self 
cannot be easily separated within Descartes concept of the Cogito, as: 
‘…they both have another property which is closely related to their 
incorrigibility, and contributes to it: each of them is self-verifying, in the 
sense that if anyone asserts the proposition, then that assertion must be 
true.’ 
 
How does a concept of acknowledging one’s own existence help to provide an 
understanding of Britishness within Unionism in Northern Ireland?  For Pearl (1977: 
77), there are only a few real world scenarios in which this concept could actually 
be used to prove the existence of one’s self:  
‘Imagine, in an automobile accident, a man flying out of his car and 
immediately after landing on the ground, saying, “Do I exist or do I not 
exist”; and then with a sigh of relief exclaiming, “But of course I exist, I am 
thinking.”’   
To adapt this concept to the theoretical understanding of Unionist identity the 
statement I think, therefore I am changes to: I think I am British, therefore I am 
British.  The existence this relates to is that of the existence of their British identity 
and not of their physical self.  Instead of a man involved in a car crash, a Unionist 
from Northern Ireland would be in a state of doubt resulting from trauma, but not 
from a car crash.  Instead, the setting would be against a political backdrop of 
constant flux: the Northern Irish Troubles; the aftermath of the Scottish 
independence referendum and current calls for a second one; the European 
referendum and the unknown surrounding the triggering of Article 50; the 2017 
snap Assembly Election and the increase in nationalist support; and finally, the 
renewed possibility of a border poll and of a move closer towards a United Ireland.  
During these political events, the Unionist may doubt her or his identity because of 
the fear of not or no longer belonging to the United Kingdom as she or he imagines 
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it to be.  In asking ‘Am I British or am I not British?’ Ulster Unionists are 
acknowledging the doubt that exists already –are they really British? – but because 
they think that they are British, then they are in fact really British. 
 
Rephrasing this idea in relation to the concerns of this thesis, self-doubt is inferred 
by others and assumed to be the existential condition of all Unionists.  Britishness 
in Northern Ireland is a contested identity. Most of the 
Catholic/Nationalist/Republican community do not view Northern Ireland nationally 
as part of the United Kingdom, but rather as a part of Ireland and as such perceive 
themselves as Irish.  Most members of the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community 
perceive themselves to be British as they are part of the Union.  Both are self-aware 
of their identities.  Yet when doubt is added to the equation this conviction of 
identity can be shaken.  This doubt differs from the original Cogito, ergo sum 
argument in that our hypothetical Unionist does not doubt his own existence; 
rather that it is doubted on their behalf by others which is a different condition 
altogether.  If he or she is told by Irish Nationalists and other citizens in the rest of 
the United Kingdom that Unionists are not British, this doubt leads to a possible 
fear of not belonging.  Let us take the recent European referendum as an example.  
The actual referendum itself reinforced the Britishness of Ulster Unionists by 
showing them to be of a similar mind-set of the majority of the United Kingdom by 
voting for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. Yet the aftermath may 
in fact have the opposite effect.  The majority of the electorate in Northern Ireland 
voted to remain in the European Union and the outcome of this is that Northern 
Ireland’s place within a post-Brexit United Kingdom is potentially uncertain.  The 
recent rise in the success of political Nationalism and increased talk of a border poll 
introduces an element of fear of belonging within the United Kingdom into the 
identity of Unionists.  Violent republicanism or assertive Irish nationalism does not 
weaken Britishness in Northern Ireland.  Unionists – as an existential rule of thumb 
– do not doubt themselves but they do doubt that both British public opinion and 
British policy makers see them as part of the United Kingdom.  This fear, or doubt, 
has traditionally been observed through the rhetoric of ‘the mainland does not 
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want us’.  Or, as reworded within Chapter Three of this thesis, ‘the people of the 
mainland do not view us as British’.  The fear of not belonging has always been 
problematic for Ulster Unionists, the fear that their loyalty to the Crown and to 
British institutions is one sided and not be reciprocated despite the evidence that 
Westminster supported partition in 1921, committed substantial resources to 
defeat the IRA in the recent Troubles and has defended the principle of sovereignty 
(by consent) hitherto.  
 
The argument is that ‘one act of immediate perception’ can be used to make a 
profound realisation of one’s self, yet within the ever changing context of British 
politics this may be too simplistic an idea to grasp the complexities of allegiance 
and identity within a time of political tempests (Grayeff, 1977: 17).  This weakness 
of using the Cogito is only one of the problems of this critical reading of Ulster 
Unionism.  The core weakness from the perspective of this thesis is of the picture it 
paints of Ulster Unionists as constantly living in ‘fear of not belonging’ to the United 
Kingdom.  Yet all the evidence suggests that they do belong in the United Kingdom 
even if individuals in Great Britain see them as Irish rather than British because they 
elect to be a part of the United Kingdom. They do not elect to be part of a United 
Ireland.  This is a conscious choice and one that is real and not imagined. And it is 
underpinned constitutionally, legally and politically – for now, at least. The political 
representation of Ulster Unionists at Westminster, their allegiance to the Crown, 
the constitutional agreements which created Northern Ireland all clearly prove the 
existence of Ulster Unionists as a part of the United Kingdom and as British citizens.  
Even in terms of identity, Ulster Unionists are not so fragile as to be concerned with 
being different from their neighbours across the Irish Sea.  Nevertheless, one can 
imagine – especially if one is unsympathetic to Unionism – that one consequence of 
the ‘fearful’ mind-set will be to over-compensate for doubt over whether they truly 
belong in the United Kingdom and this leads into the next proposition. 
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4.2.3: Baudrillard and the hyperreality of Unionist Britishness  
For Jean Baudrillard, understanding the hyperreal is key to understanding how 
contemporary society has become a simulation of reality.  Baudrillard outlines the 
process through which reality becomes a simulation.  He argues that we now live in 
a society which has replaced reality with a simulation of reality.  Cultural symbolic 
values are redeveloped as simulacra to promote the simulation of identity.  
Simulacra are the created copies of objects/things that either never had an original 
or no longer have an original.  Simulation is how this process is achieved.  The 
process, according to Baudrillard, can be separated into separate component 
stages.  First, a true copy is produced of an original cultural symbol.  However, 
society does not accept this copy as true, leading to the copy of the original trying 
to appear more like the original.  Finally, this attempt by the copy to become more 
like the original has the opposite effect, meaning that the copy is now nothing like 
the original – it has become a simulacra and is now perceived to be more real than 
the original from which it was initially copied.  The effect that this has on society is 
that it can no longer discern the real from its simulacra, hence the expression 
hyperreality (Poster, 2001: 6). 
 
To connect this theory to the study of identity is to consider the possibility that a 
collective identity can become hyperreal.  Britishness in Northern Ireland has 
undergone this process of simulation and as a result is now a hyperreal version of 
the British identity that can be observed in other regions of the United Kingdom.  
Baudrillard’s process of simulation can be easily be adapted to show how Unionist 
identity can be affected by it.  First, the Britishness that can be found in Northern 
Ireland is a mere copy of the Britishness of the United Kingdom.  This copy of 
Britishness is not viewed as being truly British by the ‘real’ British, leading to 
Britishness in Northern Ireland attempting to become British through the use of 
cultural displays – hence a high level of dependence placed on symbols of identity 
as a public show of its true Britishness.  As a result, British identity within Northern 
Ireland becomes a simulacrum of Britishness – it is hyperreal.  An example of this is 
the 2012 flag protests and the way in which the removal of the union flag from 
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Belfast City Hall except on designated days was viewed by many within the 
Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community as an attack on Britishness in Northern 
Ireland, even though this policy brings it more in line with the flag policy in Great 
Britain (McDonald, 2013).   
 
The polarising nature of the Northern Irish troubles and the perceived threat which 
the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican community appeared to pose to Unionist 
culture and identity led to the process of simulation in order to protect Britishness 
in Northern Ireland.  Baudrillard observed that, ‘As long as it was historically 
threatened by the real, power risked deterrence and simulation, disintegrating 
every contradiction by means of the production of equivalent signs.  When it is 
threatened today by simulation … power risks the real, risks crisis, it gambles on 
remanufacturing artificial, social, economic, political stakes’ (in Poster, 2001: 183).  
In order to protect and maintain Unionist Britishness, it must become somehow 
more authentic than the original.  An example of this process of simulation in action 
can be provided by examining the 2011 flag protests.  During this period, members 
of the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community in Northern Ireland protested at the 
decision of Belfast City Council to only fly the Union flag on designated days.  The 
irony of this situation is that the flying of the flag on designated days only was seen 
as a threat to their Britishness, while this is in fact the policy that is in place across 
Great Britain.  Therefore, Britishness in Northern Ireland is seen as being more 
British – and to require more symbolic Britishness - than anywhere else in the 
United Kingdom.  Yet, at the same time Britishness in Northern Ireland is also 
viewed as being less British than that which can be found on the mainland as they 
do not adhere to certain policies, such as those regarding the flag (see 4.2).  During 
an interview with Philippe Petit, Baudrillard was asked ‘When small nations fight for 
their existence, how is that a dispossession?’, to which he provided the answer: 
‘They are in the ebbing of identity.  They are no longer in a battle for an 
ascending identity, for a sovereignty.  They are fighting with their backs to 
the wall and for a cause which is not glorious, because identity is a weak 
value, a neutral value.  They are simply fighting to prove that they exist, or 
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sometimes even, like the Armenians, to prove they no longer exist, that they 
have been massacred’ (in Poster, 2001: 286).   
Whilst this answer was broadly speaking of nationalism in general, it can be seen 
how his theory can be used to provide an understanding of Unionism in Northern 
Ireland. 
 
Each of these three critical propositions – which challenge the very substance of 
Unionist identity - can be merged in order to provide an overall observation of 
identity within Ulster Unionism.  Schrödinger’s experiment suggests the importance 
of outside forces on identity.  These outside forces of attention and observation 
cause doubt which is experienced through Descartes cogito principle, leading the 
individual to believe that their identity is doubted.  The fact that the identity is 
doubted connects to Baudrillard.  By doubting their existence, Unionists create a 
hyperreal version of Britishness to remove any possibility of doubt. The question for 
this thesis is simple. It has tried to show how (especially) nationalist critique of 
Unionism fosters the idea that it ‘lacks’ a real identity because its real identity 
should be Irish.  The question is: have the aspects of doubt and not belonging 
within Ulster Unionism (some of which are not just fantasies but historically and 
existentially grounded) resulted in an identity that is both fragile and heavily reliant 
upon the whims of outside forces, such as the Westminster Government?  The 
answer which the next section tries to show is: no. The critical reading fails to take 
into account the fact that each region of the United Kingdom is unique and has its 
own regional identities.  It also fails to take into account the principle of consent in 
Northern Ireland.  The next section will look at the paradoxes of Unionist 
Britishness from a more sympathetic interpretation which will examine how 
diversity within the Union is actually a positive force.  Through an in-depth 
examination of elective affinity, this thesis will shed new light on the paradoxes 
mentioned within Chapter Two and Chapter Three.  Rather than containing only 
fatal contradictions it is argued, Unionist Britishness may shed light on the nature of 
British identity elsewhere in the United Kingdom.  
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4.3: The paradox of elective affinity 
All of the themes raised in this chapter as well as the two previous chapters will be 
tested in Part Two of the thesis.  The interviews with Unionist designated politicians 
will be reflected upon to understand if any evidence for these paradoxes is obvious 
in the data collected and if Unionist participants themselves believe there is 
something unique in Ulster Unionism which distinguishes and differentiates it from 
the rest of the United Kingdom.  What these findings will show is whether this crisis 
of identity within Ulster Unionism does in fact exist, to what depth and seriousness 
or if it is simply a misinterpretation by others of the paradoxes of Ulster Unionist 
identity. 
 
The thesis proposes that ‘elective affinity’ can be deployed as a way to make sense 
of the complexity and apparent contradictions of Ulster Unionism.  The term can be 
traced to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe in his 1809 novel Elective Affinities.  The 
political sociology of elective affinity was first developed by Max Weber and can 
provide an explanation of the relationship between Northern Ireland and Great 
Britain both in terms of identity and political engagement (Howe, 1978: 366).  For 
Weber, elective affinity was best utilised when it was ‘connecting interests and 
ideas’, particularly through a sociological lens of understanding (McKinnon, 2010: 
109).  As argued by Aughey (2015) ‘It takes the form of shared institutions, formal 
and informal arrangements, similar policy objectives and common commitments, all 
of which involve a sense of “election”’.  Elective affinity can be separated into two 
components, instrumental and non-instrumental.  Within the context of the thesis, 
instrumentality refers to the decision of Unionists in Northern Ireland to elect to 
remain part of the United Kingdom for financial and political stability, while non-
instrumental affinity describes cultural connections, such as historical ties and 
loyalty to the Crown.  As with the negative interpretation of Unionist Britishness 
developed from the theories of Schrödinger, Descartes and Baudrillard, elective 
affinity also provides understanding to observed behaviour (Runciman, 2005: 183).  
As observed by Jost et al (2009: 308): 
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‘Goethe’s (1809/1966) Enlightenment-era novel, Elective Affinities, invites 
the reader to consider parallels between the law-governed manner in which 
chemical elements combine and separate and the forces of attraction and 
repulsion in human social relationships.’   
What this concept does is help explain the way in which relationships exist and 
interact.  It accurately explains the connection between ideas and interests within 
relationships (Jost et al, 2009: 308). 
 
According to Jost et al (2009: 320) ‘elective affinity exists between psychological 
needs to minimize threat—including threat arising from death anxiety—and 
conservative ideology.’  Boundaries create collective identities and this is a similar 
idea to that of in groups and out groups in society (Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995: 
74).  Within terms of nationhood, this refers to Smith’s concept of the nation as a 
defined territory.  This matter is complicated within Northern Ireland due to the 
ethno-national background that is only experienced within Northern Ireland and no 
other region of the United Kingdom.  Primordialism leads to collective identity, 
something that has been discussed in this thesis in Chapters Two and Three 
(Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995: 77).  As observed in Chapter Three, section 3.2, 
Richard Rose proposed that British identity in Northern Ireland is a means of 
electing to remain a part of the United Kingdom by publicly expressing Unionist 
connection to the United Kingdom (1971: 206).  It is both a means of minimising 
threat from those who doubt their Britishness and a way of proving their place 
within the Union.  Without a written constitution, the United Kingdom has allowed 
a more fluid and organic approach to national identity and to national belonging.  
This, it can be argued, works well as it allows Britishness to adapt to political events 
without major upset to legal or constitutional frameworks.  In 2008 Lord Goldsmith 
was commissioned to write a report of citizenship within the United Kingdom and 
what it means to be a British citizen.  Yet this has somewhat muddied the waters 
for some, with Howe arguing that this report actually restricts definitions of what it 
means to be a British citizen, rather than clarifying it (2008). 
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Elective affinity complements the dual nature of typologies of Unionism.  As with 
the above typologies, elective affinity portrays Unionists as being both primordial 
and instrumental, to use the categories of McLean and McMillan (2005) for 
example.  Elective affinity in this regard ‘proposes that different nationalities elect 
to stay in constitutional relation with one another and that this relationship 
constitutes an affinity giving meaning to the term British’ (Aughey, 2013: 226; Rose, 
1971: 206; Bew, 2009: 17).  What this reveals about the British question is the 
nature by which regions, and in this specific case Unionists in Northern Ireland, 
choose to reinforce their connection to the Union but which they also assume – as 
far as their identity is concerned – not to be ‘invented’ or ‘forged’ to use 
respectively Hobsbawm and Ranger’s and Colley’s terms, but to be ‘natural’ 
(who/what we are).  The elective aspect of Britishness refers to collectivities and 
individuals choosing to be, or to remain, as a part of the United Kingdom through 
elections and referendums.  Affinity, on the other hand, relates to the shared ties 
and experiences which both enable and strengthen the elective act.  Elective 
affinity in its most basic form implies that it is not enough for people only to elect to 
be a part of the United Kingdom: they must also feel that they belong to the United 
Kingdom.  According to Bew, there must be a shared affinity for democratic politics 
to work (2009: 17).  One cannot exist without the other.  A 2016(b) article by 
political commentator Newton Emerson in The Irish Times perhaps provides the 
best explanation of elective affinity and Ulster Unionism without discussing it in 
those terms.  While there is a clear affinity between Ulster Unionists and the rest of 
the United Kingdom, it may be the case that this affinity is not reciprocated 
(Aughey, 2017).  As with the critical interpretation of Unionist Britishness discussed 
above, this lack of reciprocation leads to a fear of not belonging.  As observed by 
Aughey (2017), any definition of Britishness should include Ulster Unionists and if it 
does not it should be redefined to include it.  This is important as without Northern 
Ireland, there technically would not be a United Kingdom (Bew, 2009: xii; Rose, 
1976; 2-3).  
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Elective affinity as a concept is not based upon personalities, but relationships (Jost, 
2009: 137).  This is particularly the case with Unionist Britishness.  In this case it 
refers to the intricate ties which connect Northern Ireland to the rest of the United 
Kingdom.  These ties take the shape of the constitutional, social and economic 
unions discussed in Chapter Two.  The contract that forms the United Kingdom is 
nothing without the sense of solidarity to promote it.  This is equally true of the 
concepts of allegiance and identity, and of instrumental and non-instrumental.  
There is always an elective component that is connected to feelings of affinity with 
the Union.  Elective affinity challenges the assumptions and categories of traditional 
typologies, especially those predicated on a generic crisis of identity and especially 
those nationalist arguments predicated on the notion of false consciousness 
(Ruarai, 2012).  These typologies have tended to view Unionist identity as either 
instrumental or non-instrumental, meaning that it either elects to be a part of the 
Union or that it feels that it is a part of the Union through a sense of shared 
belonging.  As elective affinity shows us, Ulster Unionism and Britishness can only 
be understood once these two parts are combined.  It is also important to note that 
elective affinity allows the United Kingdom to be viewed under the ‘unity in 
diversity’ trope.  The regions elect to remain within the United Kingdom and feel an 
affinity to it, but they also hold and promote their own individual political 
institutions and identities (Rose, 1982: 118).  This is important as often nationalism 
struggles with how to reconcile regional identities with national identities within 
the United Kingdom. As Kidd observes, Scottish Unionism is in fact a version of 
Nationalism –insofar as it asserts an identity other than English while not 
disavowing the value of sharing with England the common values of being British 
(Kidd, 2002: 1153; Kidd, 2012: 6; Bew, 2009: xiv).  In regards to the Ulster Unionist 
Party, Arthur Aughey and Cathy Gormley-Hennan (2015: 433) have described this 
relationship thus: ‘its idea was British but that its interest was Ulster.’ 
 
If elective affinity is about relationships both chosen and ingrained, it is necessary 
to look at not just national identity, but also at the political relationships that exist 
between Northern Ireland and Westminster.  For Aughey and Gormley-Heenan, the 
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relationship between Ulster Unionism and Conservatism can be described in two 
different ways.  First, that ‘affinity precedes the elective both logically and 
historically, for example affinity determining the elective constitution of the state’; 
or secondly that it is simply a political marriage of convenience that has very little 
mutual affinity underpinning it (2015: 435; 436).  What is key to both these readings 
is not the elective component, but the perceived role that affinity has within each.  
Is affinity between Ulster Unionists and Westminster natural or is it one that merely 
and conveniently serves a particular political need?  This question is vital to this 
thesis in that it ties into the questions of identity which were raised by a reading of 
the existing literature on this topic: are Ulster Unionists British, but do not act like 
it; or are they British, but are viewed as Irish by those within Great Britain?  Affinity 
is vital to answering these questions.  It is the hypothesis of this thesis that affinities 
between Northern Ireland and Great Britain are real; that ‘there is ‘‘substance’’ to 
Ulster Unionist Britishness’; but that outside forces cannot acknowledge or admit 
these affinities involved in the ‘choice’ to remain British because they are distracted 
by the hyperversion of British which exists within Northern Ireland (Aughey and 
Gormley-Heenan, 2015: 439).  This will be tested within Part Two of the thesis.  To 
say these relationships are sustained by mere convenience and by nothing else, the 
thesis argues, does not do justice to the subject of Ulster Unionism (Aughey and 
Gormley-Heenan, 2015: 438). 
 
Unionists are now part of a consociational arrangement with membership of both 
the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist and Catholic/Nationalist/Republican communities. 
O’Brien previously observed that this relationship can be described as one of 
‘getting on with the business of governing’ but unfortunately relationships have 
entered a cold spell with the devolved assembly at Stormont having collapsed on 
the 16th January 2017 (2010: 598; BBC News, 2017c).  As of the time of writing this 
thesis, the institutions are still not up and running again.  These constitutional 
issues provide Unionism with opportunities as well as difficulties. According to 
Greer (2015: 51): 
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‘A re-engagement with unionist history highlights the continuity and strong 
structural roots of old mindsets, but it also points to the potential for Ulster 
Protestants to move beyond the default settings when facing challenges of a 
rapidly changing world.’   
 
Nineteen years on from the Good Friday Agreement it is necessary to reconsider 
assumptions about Northern Ireland Unionism. Perhaps old assumptions are no 
longer as certain as they once appeared. The past after all is a foreign country that 
we are prone to reflect upon with nostalgia enhanced by the rose tinted glasses of 
time (Heynen, 2006: 298).  At the time of writing, Unionism is in a strange place: the 
Democratic Unionist Party is the largest party in the Stormont Assembly; the same 
party helps sustain in office the Conservative Government of Mrs May; Northern 
Ireland’s place within the Union could be said to be as secure as it has ever been; 
and recent opinion polls do not show much public support for the prospect of a 
United Ireland, with only 3.8% in 2013 in support of it (BBC 2017; Clarke, 2013).  
However, a LucidTalk opinion poll in 2017 found that ‘overall 62% of NI would like a 
Border poll within 10 years.’ 
 
However, Unionism continues to act as though its very existence is threatened.  For 
example, in the 2017 Assembly Election, the Democratic Unionist Party fought the 
election on the basis that if they were not voted in as the largest party, then 
Northern Ireland would come under the control of Sinn Féin.  This argument failed 
to recognise the joint status and authority of the First and Deputy First Minister in 
Northern Ireland.  The concept of elective affinities is an important means of 
connecting individuals to belief systems, such as religion, but this is also applicable 
when considering how national identity is created and promoted (Jost, 2009: 133).  
As a concept, elective affinity is both ‘important and cryptic’ in that it is equally 
descriptive of our understanding of Unionist Britishness, yet also provides a level of 
ambiguity about the concept which it seeks to explain (Thomas, 1985: 52; 
McKinnon, 2010: 110; Sahri, 1996: 2).  That would appear to be true to the subject 
as well as to the political condition in which it finds itself. 
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4.4: Questions of Unionist Britishness 
In Part One of this thesis the many paradoxes of Britishness and Ulster Unionism 
have been raised. The thesis identified five questions of Unionist Britishness in 
Chapter Three that seek answers to the nature of Unionist Britishness within the 
United Kingdom during a time of rapid political and constitutional change.  In this 
chapter, two distinctive theoretical frameworks were discussed, one negative and 
one positive, in order to provide possible answers to these questions.  This section 
will bring together the main findings of Part One and to match the questions as 
they have emerged to the answers which have been drawn from theory.  These 
questions are: What does it mean to be a British citizen and do Ulster Unionists fit 
this description?; What does it mean to have a ‘British identity’ and do Ulster 
Unionists fit within this ideal?; Is there an ‘essential/core’ Britishness? Or is 
identity/allegiance much more complex?; Is it sensible to propose that Ulster 
Unionists are ‘confused’ about their identity; and Can it still be argued persuasively 
that Ulster Unionist concerns are marginal to the United Kingdom political 
mainstream?  It is necessary to note that at this stage these findings are only 
suggestive.  Until the questions of Unionist Britishness have been tested in Part Two 
of the thesis they remain only that.  Yet conceptual answers can still provide us with 
an insight into Unionist Britishness.  Let us then assess where we have got to. 
 
As outlined in Chapter Two, there are a number of academic answers to this 
question.  For Miller (1978), Ulster Unionists are not British enough to deserve this 
title.  Mclean and McMillan (2005) on the other hand argue that Ulster Unionists 
are not British citizens as they are in fact too British and that this has led to the 
creation of an identity that cannot be called British.  Nevertheless, simply stated, 
Northern Ireland is a part of the United Kingdom, bound through constitutional, 
social and economic unions.  Since its creation in 1921 Northern Ireland has been 
one of the four regions that make up the United Kingdom.  Even the campaign of 
the IRA during the recent Troubles could not dissolve the bonds of citizenship that 
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tied Northern Ireland Unionists to neighbours across the Irish Sea.  Ulster Unionists 
are British and are entitled to hold British passports, a clear sign of British 
citizenship (Good Friday Agreement, 1998).  If Ulster Unionists were not British 
citizens they would not be entitled to political representation at Westminster 
which, as Chapter Two argued, is the core component of national allegiance (Dicey 
and Rait, 1920; Barker, 1947).  To argue otherwise ignores the constitutional, 
political and cultural affinities which bind Northern Ireland and Great Britain.  
However, this question becomes more difficult to answer when identity rather than 
citizenship is up for debate.  
 
When asking whether there is an essential/core Britishness, or whether the 
identity/allegiance trope is much more complex than this would suggest, it is 
necessary to note that there is no one size fits all approach to understanding British 
national identity.  Whilst academic literature has tended to focus on Unionist 
Britishness as being either too British, or not British enough to deserve the title, it 
has failed to do the same for Britishness within Scotland, Wales and England itself.  
Each region of the United Kingdom has its own unique regional identity that has 
existed since before the Acts of Union. Devolution has only added to this, creating a 
union state in which regional variations on Britishness are allowed, and encouraged 
to flourish politically and constitutionally (Elcock and Keating, 2013: 201).  Why 
then is Britishness in Northern Ireland viewed as something that is problematic 
whenever it has developed along a similar path to that which has been created 
across the Union?  One argument is not that Unionist identity is the issue, but that 
the issue is the way in which it has been framed within Great Britain.  In section 4.2 
of this chapter, the critical interpretations of Unionist identity were examined, 
highlighting that outside forces create negative readings of Unionist Britishness.  If 
Scotland, Wales and England are allowed to have their own regional identities 
which comes before Britishness, why then can Ulster Unionists not have a regional 
variation of Britishness that is also accepted?  Unionist Britishness is different in 
some counts to the Britishness that can be found elsewhere in Great Britain.  It is a 
simulacra of the Britishness of Great Britain (see section 4.2).  For example, there is 
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an overtly heavy reliance placed upon the importance of flags, emblems and 
symbols in Northern Ireland that is somewhat alien to others within the Union 
(Gallagher, 2008; McLean and McMillan, 2005).  Yet this was only developed as a 
defence mechanism during the Troubles to ensure that Westminster could not 
doubt the Britishness of Northern Ireland in order to try to prevent it from turning 
its back on Ulster Unionists in their time of need.   
 
In regards to allegiance, it is nearly impossible to doubt the Britishness of Ulster 
Unionists.  They hold political representation at Westminster, the centre of British 
politics.  They also give their allegiance to the British Monarchy, albeit with more 
loyalty than they have traditionally given to Westminster governments (Miller, 
1978).  Under the Principle of Consent that was developed under the Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998, only the people of Northern Ireland themselves can withdraw 
their allegiance to the United Kingdom, and as this has not yet happened, it is 
therefore not a huge leap to state that Northern Ireland is British, at least for the 
time being.  Much of this comes down to the economic benefits of being part of the 
United Kingdom.  Northern Ireland receives generous financial contributions from 
Westminster, something which could not be matched within a United Ireland.  
Devolution also had the consequence of levelling the playing field for the smaller 
regions of the United Kingdom, allowing regional differences in identity to flourish 
whilst also maintaining allegiance to the political centre at Westminster.  It is in 
regards to identity that the Britishness of Ulster Unionists becomes more complex 
and paradoxical.  As with the take here on Schrödinger’s (1935) thought 
experiment, Ulster Unionists can be simultaneously viewed as both British and not 
British.  Yet does this have to mean that Ulster Unionists are unsure of their own 
identity?  Elective affinity would suggest not.  Rather, it suggests that they are 
British, but within a distinctive Ulster framework, much as an individual from 
Scotland can be described as having a British identity within a distinctive Scottish 
frame. 
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Are Ulster Unionists confused about their identity?  As this chapter has noted it is 
easy to see how this idea of a crisis of identity has influenced academic 
understanding.  However, it is also clear from this interpretation that any crisis of 
identity does not come from within Ulster Unionism but generally from without. 
These outside forces project doubts upon Ulster Unionists by arguing that they are 
Irish rather than British, in the hope that Ulster Unionists will then ‘see the light’ 
and accept that they are in fact Irish and that their Britishness is merely an illusion.  
However, this is not the case.  Whilst it is true that Unionism started life as Irish 
Unionism, this was nothing to do with Irishness as separatism but with trying to 
keep Ireland as a whole with the United Kingdom.  After the creation of the 
Northern Ireland in 1921 Unionism took on a distinctively Ulster feel due to the 
constitutional and political situation within which it found itself to exist.  The role of 
flags, emblems and symbols within Northern Ireland does not have to mean that 
Ulster Unionists are experiencing a crisis of identity.  Rather, it acts as both a means 
of marking identity and as a way of publically promoting Britishness.  This is 
important in terms of Ulster Unionists ensuring that those in mainland Great Britain 
know that Northern Ireland is, and will remain, a part of the Union.  As elective 
affinity proposes, both allegiance and identity are necessary to ensure the existence 
of the United Kingdom.  Northern Ireland elects to remain as a part of the United 
Kingdom by continuing to elect Members of Parliament and through the principle of 
consent.  Yet without a sense of shared affinity to Great Britain to strengthen these 
ties, the allegiant components would prove brittle and would soon disintegrate.  
What identity does within the United Kingdom is to connect four different nations 
together and to ensure that they are all represented within the Union. 
 
Are Ulster Unionists truly British?  If not, what prevents Ulster Unionists from being 
British?  It may be they simply do not act according to British norms and that this 
leads others to assume that they are something else.  It may be that they are 
British, but that other members of the United Kingdom see them as Irish due to the 
fact that they are separated by the Irish Sea, or because a large minority of the 
people of Northern Ireland view themselves as being Irish rather than British.  If 
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Northern Ireland truly is an ‘outlier’ within British politics it is due in part to 
geography.  Whilst Scotland, Wales and England together form Great Britain and 
reside on the same island, Northern Ireland is separated by the Irish Sea and is the 
western most point of the United Kingdom.  It is therefore a place apart from the 
rest of the United Kingdom, small and easy to forget.  The politics of Northern 
Ireland has also set it apart from the rest of the United Kingdom.  While Great 
Britain traditionally concerned class politics and the struggles of the middle and 
working classes, the Northern Irish political system was built upon deeply divided 
ethno-national communities. 
 
However, one might argue that Northern Ireland is now more central to the politics 
of the United Kingdom than ever before.  The 2017 deal between the Conservative 
Party and the Democratic Unionist Party highlights the importance of Ulster 
Unionism in contemporary British politics.  Having lost out on a majority at the 2017 
General Election, the Conservative Party turned to the Democratic Unionist Party, 
offering them a financial deal of £1.5 billion in return for their support in votes 
within the House of Commons (Lister and Connolly, 2017).  This deal has raised the 
profile of the Democratic Unionist Party within British politics from somewhat of a 
laughing stock to a political ‘queen’ maker.   
 
Identity politics has also become central to British politics (Miller, 2014).  It is not 
only the politics of class that informs British politics, but also concerns about 
identity and nationhood.  Whilst the Scottish independence referendum did not 
result in an independent Scotland, the close nature of the vote as well as the 
decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union means that talk of a 
second Scottish independence referendum is never far away.  There are also 
increasing concerns over English nationalism (English, 2011).  Many within England 
believe that they are getting a bad deal due to the fact that they do not have their 
own devolved institution and that they have to pay for the regional institutions.  
Whilst all of these concerns are relatively new in Great Britain, Northern Ireland has 
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been dealing within questions of political identity since it was first created in 1921.  
Ulster Unionists are familiar with these types of conversations.  Questions of 
belonging in the United Kingdom also help to cement Northern Ireland’s place 
within it.  As discussed previously with elective affinity, each region of the United 
Kingdom elects to stay within the Union through political and financial agreements, 
yet there is also a shared sense of belonging that is prevalent throughout the 
United Kingdom.  
 
The constitutional question in Northern Ireland remains secure.  Irish nationalism is 
more content with the Union than it has been in decades, perhaps finally accepting 
an instrumentalist approach to Northern Ireland’s place within the Union.  There is 
no overwhelming desire to hold a border poll to gauge public opinion on Northern 
Irelands place within the United Kingdom. With the United Kingdom voting as a 
majority to leave the European Union, this may result in questions being asked in 
Northern Ireland as to whether it would be better to join with the Republic of 
Ireland in order to remain a part of the European Union and subsequent free 
markets.  For Ulster Unionists the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the 
European Union is a massive positive and one that the Democratic Unionist Party 
helped to campaign for.  In this regard, the decision of the United Kingdom to vote 
to leave the European Union has helped once again to ensure that Northern Ireland 
Unionism is at the forefront of British politics.  
 
4.5: Conclusion  
The paradoxes of Unionist Britishness that have been discussed in this chapter acts 
as a conceptual bridge leading the way between Part One and Part Two of this 
thesis.  Part One examined the paradoxes of Britishness and Ulster Unionism and 
sought to provide answers to enhance our understanding of them, Part Two will 
test the answers suggested to assess if they do in fact provide an accurate 
interpretation of Unionist Britishness in the twenty-first century.  The questions of 
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British national identity and of Ulster Unionism that have been raised and 
addressed within Part One will be asked of Unionist designated politicians from 
Northern Ireland - in short, their views on issues such as identity, recent 
constitutional events and on the future of the Union through the use of semi-
structured one-on-one interviews.  The answers provided by the participants are 
analysed thematically against the questions of Ulster Britishness which have been 
developed within Part One.  This is done to assess if Unionists themselves have the 
answers to these questions and also to affirm or deny the traditional critical 
interpretations of Ulster Britishness explored in the previous three chapters.  Part 
Two of this thesis contributes an original contribution to knowledge that derives on 
the one hand from the examination of first-hand accounts of the state of 
Britishness within Ulster Unionism during a time of rapid constitutional unrest and 
on the other hand, the changing nature of the role of Ulster Unionism within 
current British politics.  The thesis now turns attention to these matters. 
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Part Two 
Investigating Paradox   
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Chapter Five 
Questions of belonging 
 
5.1: Introduction 
Throughout Part One of this thesis both Britishness and Unionism have been 
described through paradoxes, namely those of allegiance and identity, contract and 
solidarity and instrumentalism and non-instrumentalism.  Two theoretical 
frameworks were discussed to provide answers to the questions of Ulster 
Britishness.  The first was a critical reading of the paradoxes of Ulster Britishness by 
way of Schrödinger (1935), Descartes (Ayer, 1967) and Baudrillard (1994) to create 
a tripartite highlighting ‘fear of belonging’ and ‘doubt’ which has informed some 
academic and partisan literature on Unionism (see Chapter Four, section 4.2).  This 
implied either that Ulster Unionists are British, but do not act like they are; or 
second, that Ulster Unionists are British, but are not thought of as such by the 
British who think of them as Irish.  The second was a positive reading that used 
elective affinity as a framework through which the paradoxes of Ulster Britishness 
could be reconciled.  Both will be put to the test in Part Two of this thesis.  Data 
gathered from one-on-one semi-structured interviews with Unionist designated 
politicians in Northern Ireland will be used to answer the questions posed by the 
first part of this thesis.  This chapter will outline and discuss key findings which 
respond to one of the key research questions and objectives of the thesis, namely: 
is Unionism facing a crisis of identity?  As stated by Smith (1971:3), ‘Plainly, 
nationalism is important – both as a social and political phenomenon, and as an 
object of sociological investigation’ and by asking Unionist designated political elites 
to discuss their self-definitions of identity, valuable insights may be gathered into 
the nature of Britishness in Northern Ireland during a time of constitutional change 
in the Union - and what this, in turn, means for the future of Northern Ireland 
within the United Kingdom.  Northern Ireland has tended to be considered 
exceptional or an outlier when discussing British identity (Miller, 1978; McLean and 
McMillan, 2005) but as Rose (1982) argued a generation ago, Northern Ireland was 
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(and this thesis argues, it remains) something of a ‘test case’ (to use Rose’s own 
term) for the United Kingdom as a state.  By focusing on Unionist designated 
politicians, this part of the thesis addresses a very specific understanding of identity 
in Northern Ireland, namely that of the top-down dispersal of identity in society by 
those in positions of elected office.  The importance of identity for Unionist 
politicians has been partly addressed in recent years by Tonge et al, in their 2014 
study of the Democratic Unionist Party (110-132).  As insightful as their research 
was to this project, it does not go into sufficient detail to do justice to the complex 
issue that is the multi-faceted, and often competing, nature of identity in Unionism. 
 
5.2: Identity and Allegiance? 
 “Your political designation is Unionist, but how would you define your identity?” 
 
The interview question for this discussion was left open to allow the participants 
the opportunity to fully express their views on their identity in a qualitative and 
detailed manner.  From the start, it was acknowledged that the option of giving 
each participant a sheet of pre-defined identity options would not have worked for 
a number of reasons Participants interviewed for this study tended to agree that 
this was the better method of researching identity in Northern Ireland as it allowed 
them the freedom to express themselves as they wished albeit within constraints of 
the question.  As agreed by Interviewee 17 (2015), ‘There is no point handing 
anyone boxes in Northern Ireland because we all sit outside every box’.  Offering 
individuals boxes to tick their identity causes them to take a very narrow view of 
their own identity, making them feel they must choose from a pre-decided menu of 
options.  By allowing participants free rein over their identity choices they were 
more likely to state a multifaceted approach.  Perhaps most immediately obvious 
point about the findings here is that around half of the Unionist participants 
believed themselves to be British.  For them, this was a given ‘fact’ and not a 
‘choice’.  Those participants who stated that their primary identity was something 
other than Britishness did not feel this in anyway diluted or infringed upon their 
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Britishness.  And why shouldn’t this be the case?  All across the United Kingdom the 
debate is ongoing surrounding regional identities and their place within the United 
Kingdom.  Within Scotland, England and Wales regional identities coming before 
Britishness are viewed as the norm, yet in Northern Ireland, and in particular for 
Ulster Unionists, this is not necessarily the case.  As outlined within Chapter Four, a 
negative framing of Ulster Britishness is that they are constantly doubted in their 
Britishness by others.  This is also a disparity – inside/outside perception – which is 
evident here.  The participants were confident in their own identity, yet there is still 
a suggestion from others that they do not fully belong within the United Kingdom, 
whether that is because they are too British or that they are not British enough 
(McLean and McMillan, 2005; Miller, 1978).  The qualitative approach to asking this 
question was illuminating with regard to the answers on identity which had not 
been previously expected by the researcher.  For example, three participants 
mentioned that their Christian faith played a huge role in how they defined their 
identity (see Table 5.3).  These are interesting responses given the perception in 
Northern Ireland that Unionism has strong religious links, particularly in regards to 
social and moral issues.  For example, Ian Paisley founded both the Democratic 
Unionist Party and the Free Presbyterian Church, and for most of recent history 
linking closely religion and politics within his party. One participant viewed their 
identity as only Ulster-Scots due in part to a family connection to Scotland, but also 
due to the history of the Plantation of Ulster and of the strong Scottish influence 
that is present in Northern Ireland.  Identities such as these may not have been 
considered before the interview stage as having a major influence upon 
participants, but as these answers have shown the individualistic nature of identity 
means that an individual can hold different identities without in any way 
contradicting their allegiance to the United Kingdom.   
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Fig. 5.1: Breakdown of participant’s first preference identity 
 
 
The breakdown of the data provides an intriguing insight into the different 
combinations of identity which can exist among Unionist designated political elites.  
Eleven participants felt that only one identity represented them, with six being 
British, two Unionist, one Northern Irish, one Ulster-Scots and one Christian (see 
Table 5.3).  Twenty-five participants expressed two or more identities, with the 
combinations being numerous, particularly when in some cases up to five identities 
were discussed as being influential to the participant (see Tables 5.3 and 5.5).  From 
a social cohesion standpoint, it is interesting to see how participants described their 
identity and how strongly they adhere to it.  Social cohesion is the result of forces 
causing the members of a group to remain a part of that group (Festinger et al, 
1950: 274; Back, 1951: 9).  Therefore, the continued membership of an identity 
group can be perceived as an individual’s endorsement of that group.  This is a 
significant point in the research as it is anticipated that by providing the views of 
Unionist designated political elites on identity groups, this will provide a top-down 
elite theory approach to how Britishness and other identities are shaping relative to 
one another within the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community. 
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Table 5.1: Breakdown of participant’s identity by preference stated during 
interviews. 
Table outlining the different identities which were expressed by participants during 
the interview process. 
 British Northern 
Irish 
Irish Ulster Unionist Ulster-
Scots 
European Other 
1     1st     
2 2nd   3rd  1st      
3  1st        
4 2nd  1st  4th  3rd      
5 1st         
6 1st         
7 3rd   2nd  1st    4th   
8 4th   3rd  2nd  1st     
9 1st    2nd        
10         
11     1st     
12 1st         
13 2nd  1st        
14 2nd  1st        
15 1st     2nd     
16 4th  2nd  3rd  1st    5th    
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17 1st    4th  2nd  3rd    
18 1st  4th  2nd    3rd    
19 1st  2nd        
20 2nd   3rd  1st    4th   
21 1st      2nd    
22 1st         
23      1st    
24 1st    2nd   3rd   4th 
Evan. Prot 
25        1st  
Christian 
26 1st         
27 1st  2nd        
28 1st  2nd        
29     1st    2nd 
Presbyterian 
30 1st         
31 1st  2nd   3rd      
32 2nd  3rd  1st    
33 3rd  2nd  1st       
34 2nd  1st        
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The responses given by participants to the question on identity show the variety of 
identities which can be held simultaneously and without contradiction by members 
of the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community in Northern Ireland.  Even within 
political parties, the differences in how individual participants looked at identity 
was both complex and often contradictory.  Participants had generally a pragmatic 
sense that Northern Ireland can mean different things to different people, not only 
across Northern Ireland, but also within Unionism as an ethno-national community.  
It is interesting to compare and contrast the findings of this thesis with the ground-
breaking data gathered by Richard Rose for his 1968 study.  Although the two 
studies have different sample sizes and overall objectives, it is useful to examine 
both sets of data in order to ascertain if there have been any changes since the late 
1960s when the Troubles began.  For Rose (1971: 208), 39% of his Protestant 
participants viewed themselves as British, compared to the 18% of the participants 
interviewed for the research who viewed themselves as British only (see Table 4).   
 
Table 5.2: Number of participants with only one identity 
Table 5.2 categorises the participants who expressed only one identity into 
categories.  As can be observed, British was the most common identity expressed in 
this regard.  No participants viewed themselves as only Irish, Ulster or European. 
 
British 6 
Northern Irish 1 
Unionist 2 
Ulster-Scots 1 
Other 1 
 
This percentage rises rapidly to 50%, however, when looking at the identity of 
British with other identities (see Table 5.3; Fig.5.2).  What may be suggested to 
explain in 2017 the finding that there is a reduction in the number of ‘British only’ 
35 1st  2nd        
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responses?  One reason, as outlined within the conceptual theory of Unionist 
identity developed in Chapter Four, is that during the period of the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland identity became polarised.  To adapt to the constant threat and 
doubt, Britishness in a hyper format, became a dominant identity within Unionism 
to ensure continued connection to a Union that was under severe risk.  This is now 
no longer the case – or at least, since the end of the IRA campaign.  Yet as will be 
discussed in-depth in Chapters Seven and Eight, the Union is now once again in a 
time of constitutional flux and unrest, so why are Unionists not returning to an 
inflated sense of Britishness?  Perhaps the most basic answer to this question (at 
least, at the time when the interviews were conducted) is that Unionists no longer 
see their own position – and the constitutional position of Northern Ireland - as 
being either in direct threat or as being a threat to the integrity of the Union.  
Scotland, English nationalism and the European Union have now become 
alternative threats to the future of the Union and the interviewees exhibited a 
mood that, in United Kingdom terms, not only were they not alone but that the 
constitutional issues for so long thought exclusive to Northern Ireland were no 
longer so.  In short, they felt more connected to mainstream British politics if only 
because that mainstream had become a little more like Northern Ireland politics 
(Interviewee 25, 2016).  This can be summarised in the statement that ‘the reality is 
we are part of the United Kingdom’ (Interviewee 29, 2016).  When looking at these 
results on Britishness in relation to the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey of 
2015 (the most up-to-date statistics available at this time), Unionist politicians tend 
to look quite representative.  Although the questions asked in this survey are 
different, namely ‘Some people think of themselves first as British. Others may think 
of themselves first as Irish. Which, if any, of the following best describes how you 
see yourself?’, the answers given for ‘More British than Irish’ and ‘British not Irish’ 
equalled 43% of the overall result, showing that Britishness remains a strong 
identity within Northern Ireland as a whole. 
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Table 5.3: Identity by order stated by participants 
Table 5.3 further breaks down the results from Table 5.1 by succinctly categorising 
each identity into the preference it was given by participants.  For example, one can 
observe from this table that four participants viewed themselves as Northern Irish 
first, yet five felt that Northern Irishness was a secondary identity to them. 
 
 1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  
British 17 7 3 2 0 
Northern 
Irish 
5 7 0 1 0 
Irish 1 3 5 1 0 
Ulster 4 2 2 1 0 
Unionist 5 2 0 0 0 
Ulster-
Scots 
1 1 3 0 0 
European 0 0 0 2 1 
Other 1 1 0 1 0 
 
The other comparison that can be made between the research and that of Rose are 
in regards to the nature of Irish and Ulster identities.  In the 1968 study by Rose, 
20% of his Protestant participants gave their identity as Irish - compared to only one 
participant in this study who answered the same.  Participants were however 
willing to state that they had some component of Irishness, with eight saying that 
Irish was a part of their identity (see Table 5.1; Table 5.3).  Again, this change in 
attitude can be traced back to the nature of the Troubles.  Historically, as detailed 
in Chapter Three, Ulster Unionism began life as Irish Unionism during the campaigns 
to prevent Home Rule.  The original intent of Unionists was to maintain the whole 
Union, including Ireland.  This explains why in the past Irish was an acceptable 
identity if not a political allegiance and Dennis Kennedy has traced the ‘widening 
gulf’ between the two identities in the course of the 20th century (1988). 
Nevertheless, a geographical sense of distinctiveness as well as an Ulster local 
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patriotism informed Unionist politics and continues to do so. Rose’s study captured 
this well. Nowadays, due to the polarisation of identity that emerged during the 
Troubles, Irish is seen as being one and the same with Nationalism and there is a 
sense that to claim to be Irish as a Unionist would be contradictory and even 
perverse.  Similarly, just under a third of Rose’s Protestant participants viewed 
themselves as having an Ulster identity (1971: 208).  In this study, four participants 
claimed Ulster as their only identity while five claimed an Ulster identity as a 
component of their overall identity (see Table 5.3).  This is an interesting 
comparison on a number of levels.  Firstly, Ulster identity may be taken to show the 
influence that geography and territory has over identity.  Secondly, Ulster can be a 
term synonymous with Protestantism and Unionism, a further way of separating 
respondents from both the Irish Republic and Irish Nationalists.  Thirdly, it can be a 
way of designating oneself to be ‘Northern Irish’ – Irish, yes, but politically British 
and certainly not ‘nationalist’. Therefore, to state ones identity as Ulster can 
acknowledge both an Irish and a British component to one’s self that is cultural and 
geographical as well as political, though not (Irish) nationalist.  In short, it is 
complicated. Whether the identity of Ulster is stated as a defiance against Irishness, 
or as a means of suggesting a certain degree of Irishness, it is still a core component 
of Unionism in Northern Ireland. This is tabulated and discussed further below. 
 
Table 5.4: Identity by 1st and 2nd preference as stated by participants 
Table 5.4 shows in depth the complexity of the groupings of identity that were 
expressed by participants.  Column one shows first preference identity while the top 
row shows second preference. 
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 British  Northern 
Irish 
Irish Ulster Unionist Ulster-
Scots 
European Other 
British 6 5 2 1 2 1 0 0 
Northern 
Irish 
4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Irish 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ulster 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Unionist 1 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 
Ulster-
Scots 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
European 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
There has been some interest recently in the emergence of ‘Northern Irish’ as an 
identity of choice (Mac Ginty et al, 2007).  However, Northern Irish identity is not a 
new phenomenon.  Of the 32% of Protestant participants interviewed by Rose, one 
expects that some would have chosen Northern Irish if it was an option.  Could the 
use of Ulster as an identity in the past be taken in the same frame of thought as 
Northern Irish?  Both identities refer (by Unionists) to the six counties of Ulster that 
are not part of the Republic of Ireland.  What is also interesting is that both 
identities are overwhelmingly taken to be synonymous with Britishness, at least in 
Northern Ireland.  Ulster as an identity, as discussed previously, tends to highlight a 
clear separation from Irishness.  For some this identity may be more inclusive and a 
way of appealing to individuals from both ethno-national groupings in Northern 
Ireland.  The success of the Northern Irish football team has been instrumental in 
changing the public perception of what it means to be Northern Irish (Interviewee 
118 
 
13, 2015; Interviewee 14, 2015; Ringland, 2015; O’Neill cited White, 2016).  Even 
with this growth in identifiers, the survey data still shows that Northern Irish is still 
mostly considered to be a component of Britishness.  This would not be a new 
phenomenon across the Union.  Within England, Scotland and Wales, there is no 
perceived issue with individuals choosing to be defined by a regional identity.  For 
example, an individual in England may be British, English, or both.  They may see 
themselves as British first, or as English first.  Either way, this does not dilute or take 
away from the fact that they are a British citizen and that their allegiance is to the 
United Kingdom.  Since the creation of the United Kingdom, Britishness as Chapter 
Two argued has evolved and adapted by necessity in order to survive and to 
modernise.  One reason for the flexibility of Britishness is the unwritten nature of 
the British constitution that allows for this ability of Britishness to adapt when 
necessary. Each of the three nations of Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales) 
already held individually defined identities before the Acts of Union in 1546 (for 
Wales) and 1707 (for Scotland).  As Aughey has noted, ‘The growing sense of 
Britishness did not supplant and obliterate other identities’ (2001b: 17). Instead, 
Britishness became an overarching identity, encompassing all regions.   
‘Britishness involved an idea of the people and of its identity rather different 
from that of nationalism.  It proposed that the constitutional people is the 
sovereign people.  It was not Britishness as some peculiar spiritual substance 
which defined the United Kingdom.  Nor was it the acknowledgement of the 
legitimacy of the constitutional relationship.  Rather, the experience of a 
common loyalty to the constitution had created a new political persona’ 
(Aughey 2001b: 27).  
 
Within this one can see how the themes of allegiance and identity within 
Britishness can work together.  As addressed in Chapter Two, these two concepts 
cannot work separate from each other if the United Kingdom is to survive and 
thrive.  It is at this point that elective affinity can be seen in action.  To only have 
allegiance to the constitutional arrangement of the United Kingdom would create a 
brittle union in that the ties that connect the nations could be more easily broken.  
Without that shared sense of identity and belonging within a union state it is 
fragile.  When allegiance and identity are combined it provides a more flexible 
119 
 
approach to the continuation of the union state.  For example, devolution was a 
major constitutional change within the United Kingdom which could have led to the 
break-up of the United Kingdom as was nearly the case with Scotland.  The Union 
was not broken by devolution and that is because of the feeling of affinity that is 
shared by all of the regions of the United Kingdom.    
 
5.3: Contract and Solidarity? 
Table 5.5: Examples of explanations given by participants 
Table 5.5 provides a brief synopsis of the reasoning behind the answers which were 
given by participants when discussing which identities represents them. 
 
Participant Identity/identities  Explanation 
1 Unionist Where they grew up 
The impact of growing up during the Troubles 
2 Ulster 
Irish 
British 
Northern Ireland allows for a unique mix of 
identities due to its geography  
3 Northern Irish Northern Ireland is part of the United 
Kingdom 
4 Northern Irish 
British 
Ulster 
Irish 
An individual can be multifaceted  
Geography 
5 British Feel part of the United Kingdom (in regards to 
culture, sport, and nationality) 
6 British They are a British citizen 
7 Ulster 
Irish 
British 
John Hewitt approach 
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European 
8 Unionist 
Ulster 
Irish 
British 
Geography, starting local, then looking 
outward 
9 British 
Irish 
Northern Ireland is in a unique position that 
enables an individual to be both 
10   
11 Unionist Their political views 
12 British Being in the United Kingdom 
13 Northern Irish 
British 
Northern Ireland is now established as a 
country 
Football: Euro qualifiers  
14 Northern Irish 
British 
Geography 
Football: Euro qualifiers 
15 British 
Unionist 
Instrumental reasons (the most benefits) 
16 Ulster 
Northern Irish 
Irish 
British 
European 
John Hewitt approach 
Northern Ireland is unique in regards to 
identity 
17 British 
Unionist 
Ulster-Scots 
Ulster 
‘fundamentally British’ 
18 British 
Irish 
Ulster-Scots 
Northern Irish 
Geography  
Sport, football 
19 British Geography  
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Northern Irish Instrumental reasons (the most benefits)  
20 Ulster 
British 
Irish 
European 
John Hewitt approach 
Geography 
21 British 
Ulster-Scots 
Part of a nation 
Sport 
22 British ‘plain and simple’ 
23 Ulster-Scots Family connection/history 
24 British 
Ulster 
Ulster Scots 
Other  
(Evangelical 
Protestant) 
Britishness is overarching 
Ulster is regional 
Ulster-Scots is cultural 
25 Other (Christian) Their faith defines who they are 
26 British Where they were born 
They hold a British passport 
27 British 
Northern Irish 
‘proud to be from Northern Ireland as part of 
that United Kingdom’ 
28 British 
Northern Irish 
Between both identities and proud to be both 
29 Unionist 
Other 
(Presbyterian) 
Instrumental reasons (the most benefits) 
30 British Comfortable with this identity 
31 British 
Northern Irish 
Ulster 
They are part of the United Kingdom 
32 Unionist 
British 
From the United Kingdom 
Has lived all around the United Kingdom 
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Irish Part of United Kingdom culture 
33 Irish 
Northern Irish 
British 
Sees these identities co-existing in equal 
measures 
34 Northern Irish 
British 
Northern Irish culture 
Holds a British passport 
35 British 
Northern Irish  
From the United Kingdom 
 
 
Britishness, as was to be expected, emerged as the dominant identity amongst the 
thirty-four Unionist designated political elites interviewed for the research.  
Twenty-seven of the participants interviewed mentioned Britishness when asked to 
describe their personal identity.  Of these twenty-four, six participants defined 
themselves as British only.  For many of these participants, self-defining their 
identity as British was a more straightforward process than had been for others 
who expressed multiple or competing identities. 
 
‘Personally, I identify very comfortably with the terminology British.  I can 
see where other people around this area would consider themselves 
Northern Irish or what not in that sense as well, but certainly I feel very 
comfortable, ah, terming myself as British.  I have no problem with that at 
all’ (Interviewee 30, 2016).   
 
These deeply held feelings of belonging to Britishness are often seen as 
characteristics of primordial Unionism, and as observed by Poole (1999: 69), ‘The 
strength and inescapability of the feelings and commitments associated with 
national identity has tempted some theorists to see them as evidence of deep and 
primordial attachments’.   
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The traditional role of Unionism as a defender and a protector of Britishness in 
Northern Ireland was prevalent throughout the interview process.  As Interviewee 
21 (2015) described this role in the statement: 
‘Margaret Thatcher said that Northern Ireland, or Ulster, was more British 
than Finchley.  I would like to think it was.  It would certainly be my 
intention to keep it that way.’   
Whilst Thatcher never actually said this, this adage is seen as a sense of pride within 
Unionism, a justification of being.  Northern Ireland has often been viewed under 
this old adage of, more British than Finchley, but is this still the case?  Or 
alternatively, has this ever actually been the case?  The argument has been that the 
threat of dissident violence from groups such as the Irish Republican Army during 
their campaign for the unification of all thirty-six counties of Ireland created a more 
exaggerated form of Britishness in response to this perceived threat to their 
identity, constitutional position and very way of life.  As argued in Chapter Four, 
Britishness in Northern Ireland can be observed as a hyperreal version of that which 
can be perceived in other regions of the United Kingdom (1983).  Within the 
framing of this theory as developed by the thesis (see Chapter Four, section 3.4.5), 
a distinctively assertive version of Britishness emerged during the Troubles to bind 
Unionism together against the threat of Irish nationalism and to publically show 
their connection to the Union and status as a region of the United Kingdom, not the 
Republic of Ireland.  This hyper version of Britishness may be contrasted with the 
traditionally more banal versions of Britishness common within Great Britain, 
especially in England - though that too is changing (see Aughey 2007a).  According 
to Billig (1995: 8), ‘banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved 
with fevered passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building’, a 
concept that has proven difficult for many within Northern Ireland to accept.  The 
flag protest of 2011 is an example of the more extreme version of British nationality 
that can be experienced within Northern Ireland.  In 2011 members of the 
Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community took to the streets across the country to 
protest against the decision of Belfast City Council to only fly the Union Flag on 
designated days, rather than 365 days a year.  This is an interesting comparison of 
Britishness within Northern Ireland and Great Britain, as a similar policy to this has 
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become the acknowledged practice across most of Great Britain.  It is a complex yet 
fascinating paradox that within the majority of regions within the United Kingdom a 
policy on the national flag is accepted (and quite possibly not even considered) in 
England, Scotland and Wales, yet is seen as a threat and a dilution of Britishness in 
Northern Ireland, leading to the practice of a more British Britishness.  The history 
of Northern Ireland has included ‘Large numbers of people … prepared to make 
great personal sacrifices – up to and including life itself – in the struggles needed to 
achieve or defend the political sovereignty of their nation’ (Poole, 1999: 9).   
 
For the six participants who solely defined themselves as British, many kept rigidly 
to traditional lines of Britishness with little or no room for competing identities, ‘Oh 
British. Plain and simple. I’m not into all this other Northern Irish stuff. No, I’m 
British’ (Interviewee 22).  One explanation is that after four decades of ethno-
national conflict there is still a resounding feeling within the collective Unionist 
consciousness that to define as anything else other than British may lead to a 
slippery slope towards the promotion of a United Ireland over a United Kingdom.  
Poole attributes this in terms of identity through his statement, ‘Large numbers of 
people have been prepared to make great personal sacrifices – up to and including 
life itself – in the struggles needed to achieve or defend the political sovereignty of 
their nation’ (1999: 9).  As outlined by Interviewee 12 (2015): 
‘I always define myself as British.  Primarily British.  I know that there are 
many Unionists who would say right I come from Northern Ireland and I’m 
also British. I see myself first of all as British and as living in a part of the UK 
which is called Northern Ireland.  I don’t regard myself as Irish, Northern 
Irish or anything like that.’   
This feeling of doubt and mistrust of anything that appears to compromise British 
can be seen as confirmation of those arguments in Chapter Four about the fear of 
belonging. On the other hand, that bald statement can be taken to reveal no doubt 
and no fear of not belonging. The truth is a balance of the two. Much of this 
reluctance to acknowledge or to internalise identities other than that of Britishness 
may be down to socialisation and how society in Northern Ireland is still highly 
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segregated in terms of education and housing.  This lack of promotion of other 
identities can be seen in Interviewee 17’s statement that ‘I don’t actually think of 
myself as someone from Northern Ireland or Irish by any means’ (2015).   
 
For many of the participants who stated Britishness, geography had a huge role to 
play in their reasoning.  Traditionally British characteristics such as loyalty were 
often discussed by participants when stating their identity was British.  For 
Interviewee 12, being a member of the United Kingdom was more important than 
the fact that they live in a region of the United Kingdom.  Rose discussed the 
correlation of identity and place in the comment. ‘identity is connected to a 
particular place … by a feeling that you belong to that place’ (1990: 89).  For 
William: 
 ‘Symbols and representations are important in the production of identities.  
This is how we signal our identities to others and how we know which 
people we identify with and those who are distinguished as being different.  
How we speak, the clothes we wear, badges, scarves, uniforms or flags all 
offer symbols of identity’ (1986: 91).   
In this context, the larger geographical and constitutional identity of the United 
Kingdom has more power over individuals than that of Northern Ireland as a region 
by itself.  As Aughey argued ‘Identity and loyalty are thus one and the same’ 
(2001b: 24).  The reason given by Interviewee 12 is that they feel they owe their 
loyalty to the United Kingdom (2015).  As discussed within Chapter Two and 
Chapter Three, Ulster Unionists do owe their loyalty to the United Kingdom.  The 
question then is not that they do, but to whom or/and what do they give their 
loyalty?  Traditionally this loyalty has been given to the Monarchy for its role in 
protecting Protestantism across the United Kingdom along with loyalty to 
Westminster, but this is more accurately described as a loyalty to the British 
institutions rather than as loyalty to any British government in particular.  One of 
the reasons is that Ulster Unionists have felt that British governments have not 
done enough to secure Northern Ireland’s place within the United Kingdom.  This 
brings the conversation back to the fear of not belonging which Ulster Unionists 
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feel not from themselves, but from others within the United Kingdom.  This lack of 
acknowledgment by British governments is a source of insecurity which historically 
fostered the sort of self-reliant ‘banding’ about which Miller wrote. The concern – 
according to elective affinity – concerns both ‘choice’ and ‘identification’. Unless 
Unionists make clear their own commitment to the Union then Westminster might 
well choose to disengage. And because there is doubt about Westminster’s 
identification with Unionists as a people and culture, then the concern is 
compounded. Again, it is not Unionists who doubt their own identity, election and 
affinity. It is assumed to be others (even if the evidence of this is partial).  In short, 
without these feelings being reciprocated by Westminster Northern Ireland can feel 
like a very cold place within the United Kingdom.  This notion of loyalty is a very 
traditional and well researched concept within Unionist typologies, stating that 
loyalty to the British state and its institutions is an influential force within Unionism.  
The viewpoint expressed by Interviewee 12 supports Rose’s Ultra Unionist, and 
Todd’s British typologies of Unionism (Rose, 1971; Todd, 1987). 
 
The pride that Britishness can inspire amongst individuals can also be explained 
through other theoretical framings.  Interviewee 9 alluded to the pride which can 
be inspired by Britishness and the sense of belonging that comes from being a 
member of the United Kingdom in the statement, ‘I’m very proud of that British 
institution, whether it’s imagined or whatever.  You know, I do feel quite privileged 
to be able to stand under the Union flag’ (Interviewee 9, 2015).  This statement is 
interesting from a research point of view as the participant acknowledges that 
Britishness is imagined.  As outlined by Benedict Anderson in his book Imagined 
Communities, nationalism is created as a method of bringing together members of 
the same geographical and political area and binding them together under a 
common ideal that promotes the protection and continuation of the nation state 
(see Chapter Four).  As stated by Anderson, ‘Indeed, nation-ness is the most 
universally legitimate value in the political life of our time’ (2006: 3).  This sense of 
citizenship and belonging is important in forming strong bonds between the regions 
of the United Kingdom and giving citizens a higher sense of commonality.  This clear 
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use of elective affinity highlights the importance of ensuring that members of a 
union state feel not only that they belong within a state, but that equally they are 
seen in return as included.  The British passport is one example in which the 
Britishness of Ulster Unionists cannot be brought into doubt.  Interviewee 26 
(2016), expressed this in their statement: 
‘British [participant pauses], and you know, you start into analysis that and 
people ask you, “well, are you Northern Irish, are you Irish?”, and I’m a 
British citizen as somebody who lives in Northern Ireland as part of the 
United Kingdom.  I don’t try to delve anymore deeper into who I am in that 
sense because I think I was born in the United Kingdom, I hold a British 
passport, I am proud to be a person who is a member of the United 
Kingdom.  So, very simply, I would see myself as a British citizen.’   
The importance of the passport cannot be underestimated in discussions of 
identity.  According to Woodward, ‘To identify with a nation or group like this is to 
take up a collective identity.  However, only one UK identity is offered by the 
passport’ (2000: 10).  As observed in the remark by Interviewee 26, the British 
passport has symbolic importance.  It is a clear and physical sign of being a member 
of that imagined community that is the United Kingdom, and that physical proof is 
something that is held in high esteem due to the ethno-national conflict and threat 
of de-unification with Great Britain during the Troubles.  Mitchell has previously 
discussed this concept in a Northern Irish context, stating that: 
‘Communities are not entities in their own right, but rather live in the minds 
of groups of people who identify with them … [But] identities and 
communities do not just exist in our heads. They are also created by our 
actions’ (2006: 13).   
In the aftermath of the European referendum, Democratic Unionist Party politician 
Ian Paisley MP spoke out publically to say that everyone in Northern Ireland should 
apply for an Irish passport as this would make it easier for individuals to travel after 
the United Kingdom left the European Union.  What is interesting about this is the 
fact that for Paisley holding an Irish passport does not equate to being Irish.  What 
in this case is the distinction being made? It is the distinction between something 
which is purely instrumental (Irish passport) and something which is symbolic of 
deep identity (British passport). The latter is a statement of elective affinity; the 
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former a mere document of pure convenience for ease of movement when 
travelling.   
 
For participants such as Interviewee 15 (2015), being British is both about an 
affinity to the United Kingdom and about the elective choice they have made to be 
British: 
‘Well I feel I’m British. I feel I’m a Unionist and British first and foremost 
because I have a very strong identity with the United Kingdom and the 
British Commonwealth.  [I] Just feel that we’re much stronger being part of 
that bigger grouping of the Union as opposed to being in a smaller United 
Ireland or all Ireland economy, socially, economically I just feel it’s better 
being part of the union. It’s more so that than it is anything around I 
suppose, being the big flag carrying people, you know?  It’s more about who 
you belong to and I just feel that I’m more attached to the Union than I am 
to a united Ireland.’ 
Individuals both in Northern Ireland and in Great Britain may not see Northern 
Ireland as being particularly British, either because they see it as not British enough 
or as being too British to be truly considered as fitting with the national identity 
(Miller, 1978; McLean and McMillan, 2005).  Instead, Ulster Unionists view 
Northern Ireland as being a part of the United Kingdom as it is constitutionally a 
part of the Union.  Northern Ireland is tied to the United Kingdom through the Act 
of Union, the Government of Ireland Act and by the fact that Northern Ireland has 
political representation at Westminster.  Northern Ireland also elects to be a part of 
the United Kingdom through the Principle of Consent that was created through the 
Good Friday Agreement of 1998.  Due to this, neither the British nor the Irish 
government can remove Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom.  This can only 
be achieved if the people of Northern Ireland themselves wish to leave, supported 
through a border poll.  Therefore Ulster Unionists can be secure in the knowledge 
that only the people of Northern Ireland themselves can decide their fate within 
the Union.   
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An interesting point raised in Interviewee 15’s statement is the reference to the 
economic union with the United Kingdom and the importance of instrumental ties 
to the Union.  The United Kingdom has a larger economy than the Republic of 
Ireland and as a result can provide more financial benefits for Northern Ireland.  
The National Health Service is another core instrumental benefit of the United 
Kingdom and one that Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams has recently said he would 
extend to a United Ireland if that event ever happened.  If circumstances were ever 
to change so that the United Kingdom no longer benefited Northern Ireland, it 
could be argued that those who truly fit within the narrow black and white 
categories of Allegiant Unionist and British Unionist would therefore accept a move 
towards a United Ireland if this was to provide and create more positive outcomes 
for Northern Ireland.  This would make the relationship between Northern Ireland 
and the United Kingdom purely contractual and instrumental.  This view is often 
overly simplistic and does not necessarily take into account the influence of 
tradition and culture experienced by members of these groups.  While Allegiant 
Unionist and British Unionists may support the Union for some instrumental 
reasons, they are still affined to, and influenced by, British culture on a daily basis.  
It is not then merely a question of ‘Where is Northern Ireland’s interests best 
served?’, but rather a question of ‘Where are Northern Ireland’s interests best 
served within our imagined community?’  
 
If one were to place Unionists into a box in a similar manner to Schrödinger’s 
famous 1935 experiment, what would one see?  Are Unionists British?  They are 
part of the United Kingdom, they are governed by British laws, celebrate British 
culture, history and traditions.   Are Unionists not British?  Or are they Irish but do 
not accept it?  A hypothetical version of this scenario regarding Unionists was 
detailed in Chapter Four and outlined how one could apply this experiment to 
Britishness and Unionism on a theoretical level.  Northern Ireland is nearing the 
100th anniversary of its creation in 1921, the culture celebrated by Unionists is a 
hyper version of that experienced in Great Britain, and the Stormont Assembly has 
the power to make its own laws and to not implement most laws from Westminster 
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if it so chooses – which it was also able to do from 1921-1972.  But, why do 
Unionists in Northern Ireland need to be categorised as one or the other?  It is the 
argument of the thesis that Unionists are simultaneously British and not British, and 
that one side of this argument cannot be viewed in whole without the other to 
provide balance.  This is where the relationship between Northern Ireland and 
Great Britain has always experienced a degree of stress.  For Ulster Unionists, they 
are a part of the Union because they have an affinity towards the United Kingdom.  
They are British and therefore they belong within the Union.  Constitutional 
arrangements may enforce this, but it is the feeling of belonging that truly holds 
Ulster Unionists to the United Kingdom.  However, on the other side of this 
argument one could argue that Great Britain does not reciprocate these feelings of 
affinity and belonging and instead only sees the relationship it has with Northern 
Ireland as one that is contractual and without solidarity.  Not being British, in this 
scenario, refers to the idea outlined in Chapter Three, section 3.3, that the British 
truly view Northern Ireland as being Irish and as a result they do not felt as though 
they share a common identity or affinity.  How then can Ulster Unionists be viewed 
as not British?  If one were to argue that immigrants could not be British it would 
cause a public uproar.  Why then should it be any different for Ulster Unionists?  Is 
it that anti-Unionist bias is the last acceptable form of racism within British politics; 
that they are an out-group that should not be brought into the centre of British 
politics?  The most obvious example of this was in the political cartoons in response 
to the Conservative Party deal with the Democratic Unionist Party in 2017.  Within 
these, Ulster Unionist culture was portrayed as alien to the British electorate and 
more often than not left Ulster Unionism looking outside British norms. 
 
In Northern Ireland Unionism there is a feeling of being misunderstood by those 
who live in Great Britain.  This was articulated by Interviewee 14 (2015): ‘I get the 
feeling sometimes those over on the mainland think we’re something different 
when in actual fact we’re not.’  This feeling of being misunderstood in terms of their 
contribution to Britishness comes partly from the fact that Northern Ireland is 
geographically removed from the rest of the United Kingdom, with a channel of 
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water separating it.  Yet the role Northern Ireland plays within the United Kingdom 
cannot be forgotten.  Without Northern Ireland, there would be no United 
Kingdom.  The Troubles were a time of deep mistrust between ethno-national 
communities within Northern Ireland.  In times such as this, ethno-national 
identities take on a much more important meaning to individuals and become 
inherently more ingrained the more they are threatened.  This is one of the reasons 
why British national identity in Northern Ireland has developed along a tangent to 
that in Great Britain.  Decades of protecting and promoting Britishness has resulted 
in a hyper-version being created in Northern Ireland, a more British Britishness.  
What this means is there is a core within Britishness that endured despite the 
context in which it is in.  At the heart of Ulster Unionism is a core aspect of 
Britishness, but over the years this has evolved to reflect a distinctive Ulster aspect.  
This core for Ulster Unionists has two dimensions.  First, it is connected to choice 
and affinity.  They feel that they belong within the Union and this becomes a core 
of their Britishness.  Second, Unionists share culture, history, language and religion 
with Great Britain: it shares core aspects of Britishness such as these with the rest 
of the electorate of the United Kingdom.  This is by no means a new occurrence in 
the United Kingdom, as Britishness and regional identities vary depending on where 
it is examined within the Union.  But Northern Ireland is the only region of the 
United Kingdom that has had its Britishness challenged violently (in Scotland it was 
challenged constitutionally).  However, as this thesis has shown, the hyper version 
of Britishness expressed by Ulster Unionists has not been accepted by those within 
Great Britain and is seen as something of an anomaly.  Perhaps this says more 
about the attitudes of those in Great Britain than it does about Ulster Unionists.  
One of the biggest fears of Unionists in Northern Ireland is that the relationship 
with Great Britain has always felt conditional – not on their side – but on the other 
side.  While Unionists have maintained loyalty to the Union through ‘betrayals’ such 
as the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, often this loyalty has not been seen to have 
been reciprocated by Great Britain. 
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Yet difference does not have to impact negatively upon Britishness.  As observed by 
Oakeshott (1983: 67), one can argue that identity is maintained ‘not in spite of, but 
because of, differences and changes’.  What this means is that the differences 
which can be see within Britishness across the United Kingdom actually strengthen 
and build Britishness as we know it.  It is Oakeshott’s analogy of the dry stone wall 
of history, each stone is different in size and shape, but together in relation they 
create something stronger and larger (1983: 102), considered in this thesis as the 
relationship of diversity and unity (see Chapter Two).  An example of this in action 
can be observed through media reaction to the 2017 Conservative Party deal with 
the Democratic Unionist Party.  Many media commentators and reports have 
highlighted the Democratic Unionist Party’s stance on same-sex marriage as a 
means of suggesting that they are different to both Westminster and Britishness 
(Pasha-Robinson, 2017; Mann, 2017).  However, these conversations fail to take 
into account the fact that there was widespread opposition to the Marriage (Same 
Sex Couples) Act 2013 within the Conservative Party, with 128 Conservative 
Members of Parliament voting against it and only 117 voting in favour (Eaton, 
2013).  What this shows is that the Conservative Party and the Democratic Unionist 
Party are not so very different after all – and that it is a myth to propose that there 
is some absolute template of Britishness from which Ulster Unionist deviation is a 
perversion and alienation. 
   
The differences that can be observed in Ulster do not necessarily make Northern 
Ireland unique or deviant.  As Interviewee 12 argued (2015):  
‘I mean, there are distinct characteristics of this part of the United Kingdom, 
but that’s not any different from Wales, Scotland, the north of England and 
the south of England, the west of England or the south east of England.  It 
doesn’t make me any less British.  It doesn’t weaken the link.  In fact, if 
anything it just adds to the tapestry of the United Kingdom.’   
It is this ability not only to encompass regional identities, but to bind them under 
the overarching identity of British which is the political fabric of elective affinity.  
For Interviewee 5, this is a positive of British identity.   
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‘Ah, I think in particular also one of the advantages of Britishness, I suppose 
not unique in a British sense, is also where you can have that broader 
national identity while having a certain level of local identity, so that there is 
a great sense of coming from Northern Ireland and being involved with 
Northern Ireland.  Also, I think it’s something that’s very compatible with 
Britishness’ (Interviewee 5, 2015). 
Habermas also theorised upon the distinctions between political sovereignty and 
national identity.  As Donald summarises: 
‘Almost as if recognizing that the notion of constitutional patriotism is 
incoherent, Habermas insists in principle on the need to distinguish 
between demos, the political sovereignty of the people, and ethos, filiation 
to an imagined cultural community.  The conundrum is whether civic 
identity, the membership of this or that state, can ever be extricated from 
national identity, self-recognition as a member of a nation state.’ (1996: 
173) 
 
Britishness as a concept is constantly adapting and changing, evolving to meet the 
current needs of both the political institutions and civic society.  Interviewee 24 
(2015) acknowledges the fluidity of Britishness: ‘I suppose Britishness today isn’t 
quite the same as Britishness was 50 or 100 years ago. The world has changed.’  For 
other participants the changing nature of identity came from their own internal and 
personal decision making processes, rather than from society.  According to 
Interviewee 31 (2016): 
‘That’s a good question and I think it is probably a changing, ah, situation.  
Umm, I would regard myself as a British citizen.  I am proud to be part of the 
United Kingdom.  When I travel abroad I carry my British passport and it’s 
very clear, it says the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.  
So, I’m clear, I’m a British citizen.  But, I am, I am also Northern Irish.  I am 
proud to be from Northern Ireland.  I am an Ulsterman.’   
Perhaps the best way of describing the changing nature of Britishness and identity 
in the United Kingdom is in the observation of Interviewee 16 (2015): 
‘… your identity will shift and Northern Irish identity is important to me 
because it recognises that pluralism and diversity of the United Kingdom, 
and that you can be, you know, a Geordie.  You can be a Liverpudlian.  You 
can be Cornish.  You can be West Country, Scottish, Highland, Islander, you 
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know, Welsh and Northern Irish, and that fits seamlessly into that pluralism 
and diversity of the United Kingdom…’  
As Powell argued (2002: 89), ‘different varieties of Englishness, Irishness, 
Scottishness and Welshness co-existed or contended with other, more localized, 
loyalties, or with the facets of a more comprehensive “British” identity to which 
their relationship had to be worked out both in practical and emotion terms’ and 
why can this not continue to be the case across the United Kingdom in the face of 
growing nationalism?  According to Interviewee 17 (2015), the ability of individuals 
from Northern Ireland to claim more than one identity, whilst still retaining their 
Britishness, ‘is a bit more convoluted because of the history of the place.’  
Therefore, Britishness is not perceived as a threat to regional identity, or vice versa, 
as traditionally Britishness has adapted as an overarching identity allowing regional 
identities the space to flourish.  In Northern Ireland, however, as Interviewee 14 
noted (2015): 
‘Well, I think probably it’s one of the major problems … “what is your 
identity?”, and I think this is something that I suppose every Unionist 
wrestles with.  Is it: Are we British? Yes.  Are we English? No.  Scottish?  No.  
Welsh?  No.  But the Scots and the Welsh are also proud to be British.  So I 
suppose I’m from that wee corner called Northern Ireland and I’m Northern 
Irish, but British, and that I think is an identity I’ve come now to accept.’  
The participant in question understands there are numerous different aspects to 
Britishness, but that this does not make any one of them any less British and this 
should also be the norm for people from Northern Ireland too. 
 
5.4: Difference and Unity? 
When conducting the interviews it was interesting to observe how influential 
events are when it came to defining identity.  The most noticeable example of this 
was the Northern Ireland football team qualifying campaign for the 2016 Euros 
tournament.  During this time period a higher number of participants were more 
forthcoming to identify as Northern Irish.  For example, after one qualifying match 
Interviewee 15 (2015) stated ‘I like to look at myself as Northern Irish as well, you 
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know?’ and that it ‘was great last night being Northern Irish, you know? Whenever 
they won the football.’  Sport is a major influence on identity and for the 
participants involved this was often the case.  In regards to the sociological study of 
identity this is not a new phenomenon (Houlihan, 1997; Bairner, 2015).  Sporting 
events bring people together in solidarity and act as a glue to help bind society 
together.  Often this type of identity is expressed as taking over from the role of 
religion in society, but the thesis argues that in regards to Northern Ireland 
Unionism, it instead creates an alternative narrative of national identity, one which 
is created and influenced by sport rather than traditionally binary and sectarian 
notions of identity which have been prevalent in Northern Ireland for the past four 
decades.  This allows individuals from the Unionist community a way of holding 
onto a Northern Irish or Irish identity by challenging, yet simultaneously conforming 
to, the tribal definitions of identity which have traditionally been available to them.  
Sport allows individuals to hold onto these identities as cultural identities and these 
therefore do not necessarily have any impact upon the definitive political identities 
in Northern Ireland.  The Northern Ireland football team may have qualified for the 
Euros, but the electorate still cast their vote along traditional identity lines during 
the 2016 Assembly Election highlighting that while a Northern Irish identity may 
exist, this does not necessarily transfer into support for central parties (Belfast 
Telegraph, 2016b).   
 
One possible explanation for this is that the context of a Northern Irish Identity has 
changed.  Since the Troubles, the Northern Irish identity has been viewed within 
Unionism with suspicion.  Previous to this, a Northern Irish, or distinctively ‘Ulster’ 
identity, was seen as normal, yet with the commencement of the Troubles and the 
tribalism of identity into an ‘us or them’ mentality, Northern Irishness can be seen 
as a step closer to Irishness than Britishness, a subtle move away from the Union.  
Richard Rose has provided the most research on this area in Governing without 
consensus: An Irish Perspective (1971).  Rose observed during his study that 32% of 
Protestant participants classified their national identity as Ulster, along with 5% of 
Catholic participants (1971: 208).  Therefore, the current trend of an increase in a 
Northern Irish, or Ulster, identity is not a new phenomenon within Ulster Unionism, 
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but rather a ‘Back to the Future’ style occurrence showing the return of identity to 
more normalised levels nineteen years after the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement.  
  
The question that needs to be asked is: why now?  One answer for this may be that 
Rose’s study was conducted at the beginning of the Troubles, before the full scale 
of polarisation occurred.  Worchel et al theorised that ‘Social identity theory makes 
a strong case that people strive for the best possible self-image.  A threat to this 
self-image should motivate efforts to repair the damage and raise esteem’ and this 
may be exactly what is happening in regards to the return to favour of the Northern 
Irish identity (2000: 28).  Northern Ireland has moved out of the Troubles and it is 
now almost two decades since the Good Friday Agreement.  Based on this, it can be 
observed that Northern Irish society is moving away from ‘Troubles’ identity 
towards the pre-Troubles concepts of identity.  As outlined by Interviewee 3 (2015): 
‘I think that Northern Irish identity is something that is becoming stronger 
and stronger as we start to mature.  Umm, I think, you know, obviously the 
peace process and devolution coming here in the way that it did has very 
much put Northern Ireland on the map … I think that Northern Irish identity 
is something that is there, and I think in the coming years it’s going to 
become even stronger.’   
While this is an interesting prediction, Northern Irish identity is still held by only a 
minority within Northern Ireland.  Muldoon et al (2007) found that since the Good 
Friday Agreement only around one in five Catholics and Protestants have stated 
Northern Irish identity in surveys.  The 2007 Northern Ireland Life and Times survey 
found that Protestants are more likely to feel ‘very strongly’ that they are Northern 
Irish at 56% compared to 43% of Catholics.  This may again to a reference to the 
perception that Northern Irish is more British in nature. It can also be seen as a 
more modern take on the Ulster identity.  This is interesting, as to define as an 
identity not normally heard within the public rhetoric surrounding your community 
may put an individual at odds with others within their community, or it may be a 
way of expanding the identity which a group may have.  The Northern Irish identity 
is a way of filling the centre ground to connect both communities through mutually 
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shared aspects of identity.  As stated by Jenkins, ‘People collectively identify 
themselves and others, and they conduct their everyday lives in terms of those 
identities, which therefore have practical consequences’ (1996: 89).  Interviewee 16 
(2015), also felt that the Northern Irish identity could be a way of encouraging more 
people within Northern Ireland to support the Union: 
‘I think there is something about creating a Northern Irish identity, because 
Northern Ireland is slightly different from the rest of Ireland and it unifies us 
because there are maybe people from a very nationalist background that 
feel Northern Irish and know that we are slightly different’.   
The difference between how Unionists and Nationalists view Northern Irish identity 
is worth mentioning.  For Ulster Unionists it refers to being from Northern Ireland 
as a part of the United Kingdom, similar to the way in which an individual from 
England would state that they are English.  For Irish Nationalists on the other hand 
Northern Irish refers to being from Ireland, but from the North rather than the 
South.  Research by Muldoon et al (2007: 91) has shown that the Northern Irish 
identity is ‘preferred by one in five Catholics in the post-Agreement surveys’.  This is 
a means of maintaining an Irish connection, whilst also expressing an affinity to 
Northern Ireland. 
  
To define as British is to acknowledge Northern Ireland as a region of the United 
Kingdom, something which is still contested by parts of the Northern Irish 
community in the aftermath of the Troubles, ‘… mine is Northern Irish, but with a 
strong British hue’ (Interviewee 13, 2015).  To state identity as Northern Ireland, on 
the other hand, was almost seen to promote Northern Ireland as its own distinctive 
area separate from the Union, and subsequently can be too close to the expression 
‘the North of Ireland’ for Unionists since the Troubles to be entirely comfortable 
with it.  The use of the Northern Irish identity by participants in this study may be 
little more than a modern interpretation of the Ulster identity discovered by Rose in 
1968.  However, the surprise success of the Northern Irish football team in 
qualifying for the 2016 Euros provided a more inclusive context for a Northern Irish 
identity to thrive.  Interviewee 14 (2015), stated that they were: 
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‘very happy and delighted and loved the fact last night that NI has got 
through to the European Championships you know and you know I’m one of 
those people who would be very supportive of that.’   
It no longer seemed to be viewed as an on the fence position, a middle ground to 
Irishness and Britishness.  Now, Northern Irishness has returned to being a way of 
publically expressing pride in the geographical region of Northern Ireland (Rose, 
1971: 207-208; Dahrendorf, 1982: 131).  As Interviewee 13 put it (2015): 
‘I think I would describe myself as Northern Irish and I’m going to be there 
tomorrow night when we qualify for Europe, I’m going to be cheering the 
head off of me with the green and white army and I feel far more affinity to 
that that I would to a British team. So I would regard myself as Northern 
Irish, proudly Northern Irish and I think that Northern Ireland because it’s 
been around now for almost 100 years it’s now a sort of its chiselled out an 
identity in its own right.’  
 
Nowadays, identity in Northern Ireland is much more safeguarded on both sides of 
the community divide by the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.  Individuals in 
Northern Irish society now have more choice on how they define their own identity, 
at least in official studies such as the 2011 Northern Ireland Census which has 
recently added the option of ‘Northern Irish’ to their identity choices (2014).  
Within this postmodern global society, individuals can chose which elements of 
separate identities suit them best (Giddens, 1991).  Identity is a deeply personal 
component of human nature and one which is not consistent.  Identity can change 
depending on many different factors, such as sporting events, travel to different 
countries, where an individual lives, and also by what political events are happening 
at any given moment in time.  Identity can be much more personal than political or 
religious influences.  It can refer to being a parent, a sibling, a member of a certain 
profession.  For many individuals, their identity will be made up of numerous 
identities, not all of which would naturally be thought of as being compatible.  At 
different periods during the course of a life, a year, a day even, different identities 
will rise up to take precedence over an individual, an adaptation which is as 
unconscious as swapping over a hat.  As stated by Interviewee 4 (2015): 
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‘I’m comfortable within … my skin to be an Irishman, an Ulsterman, ah, a 
man from Northern Ireland, and being British.  So that’s probably, in a 
roundabout way, I’m comfortable in my skin.  I’m comfortable and I’m 
confident in who I am and there’s no reason why an individual can’t be 
multi-faceted.’   
This shows Ulster Unionists know who they are: the real difficulty lies in trying to 
get other people to accept their identity.  As outlined in the fear of belonging 
framework described in Chapter Four, Irish Nationalists and people from Great 
Britain do not see Ulster Unionists as British.  However, a recent survey by YouGov 
(2017) actually shows that the majority of people within Great Britain actually view 
Northern Ireland as being British, with a total of 75% of respondents agreeing that I 
DO consider them [people from Northern Ireland] to be British.  If this is the case, 
why then do Unionists still fear that they are not viewed as British by those within 
Great Britain?  The consequence of this fear of not belonging has been for Ulster 
Unionists to try to show their identity and to adapt it until it can no longer be 
questioned.  The result of this is that the new hyperversion of Britishness observed 
in Northern Ireland further alienates their neighbours in Great Britain, leading to 
the circle continuing over and over again.  This hyperversion of Britishness is a 
method by which to reinforce their Britishness, as Ulster Unionists feel more affinity 
to the United Kingdom than they do to their neighbours in the Republic of Ireland 
(Southern, 2007).  
 
When studying the identity of Unionist designated politicians, this ability for 
identity to evolve is interesting.  Can politics in Northern Ireland continue to be 
fought along the same old ethno-national divides whenever for many of the 
electorate their own identity is no -longer as clear cut as us or them?  The answer to 
this – for now - is yes.  This reverting towards a complexity of identities in Northern 
Ireland can be seen in the results of the 2011 census in which 21% of the 
population defined solely as Northern Irish, compared to Britishness at 40% and 
Irish at 25% (Clarke, 2012).   
‘…many nationalists are also happy to call themselves NI. I think that is a 
good thing. I think it brings stability and a sense of pride in where we are 
and people who describe themselves as NI can be either British or Irish in 
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terms of their political aspirations but still have a proudness of their part of 
the world’ (Interviewee 11, 2015). 
If Unionism in Northern Ireland is to survive, it must widen its political appeal.  As 
Interviewee 19 (2015) said: 
‘I think it is important, I suppose, as politicians in Northern Ireland, I 
suppose as unionist politicians, to reach out to nationalists, you know.  
People feel comfortable, I think that people feel comfortable, with the 
United Ireland - within Northern Ireland … I think it’s important that we 
must umm reach out to the other community too.’ 
Numerous different identities, not merely Britishness, were outlined by 
participants.  Some participants even expressed that they held a plurality of 
identities.  Interviewee 20 put it this way (2015): 
‘when I tick a nationality box I have no difficulty saying I’m British, in fact 
that’s my choice and I want to be British and I don’t have an Irish passport, 
but as somebody who lives on Ireland … I am happy to say I’m Irish … Umm, 
but I think it’s the nature of Northern Ireland that we have almost 
interchangeable, or chameleon like, identities.’  
Interviewee 2 (2015) perhaps best expresses how contradictory and multi-layered 
identity can be in the answer: 
‘First and foremost I feel I’m an Ulsterman and that is that I feel that I’m not 
English. I’m not a little Englishman. I’m not Scottish, but I have Scottish 
roots. But I am very much a part and parcel of this island, that I’m proud of 
being born on this island. Umm, that I reclaim it for me.  That I’m proud of 
my Irish heritage as much as I am of my Scottish and British heritage, but I 
am first and foremost very provincial and I’m an Ulsterman. Umm, but there 
is something that just makes our character very different. Yes prickly, and 
thran, and stubborn, but at the same time a very kind natured people and 
open to others. We might not like each other, but we like everyone else, you 
know? And that’s the thing I think is just a characteristic of this place, that 
when people say we’re very warm and lovely people, yes, we are to others, 
but not to ourselves.’ 
This reference to being unkind to those from other identities is a direct result of the 
stark ethno-national divide and the polarisation of identity which resulted from the 
period of ethno-national conflict in Northern Ireland known as the Troubles.  Since 
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, identity still remains a contentious and 
highly emotive subject in Northern Ireland. 
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‘I still feel that we are British.  I think most people in Northern Ireland, and I 
actually think most people in Scotland, are proud to be British as well.  Ah, 
umm, yes I’m for Northern Ireland.  I’m a proud Ulsterman.  I have an Irish 
background because I’m from Northern Ireland, but I am British, and I 
certainly view, ah, very proudly my position within the United Kingdom as 
being a British citizen from Northern Ireland’ (Interviewee 6, 2015).   
Within the context of Northern Ireland there are many identities available to 
individuals that reflect the very personal aspects of a person’s character.  ‘I suppose 
I’ve always regarded myself as British, but I can identify with the Irish connection as 
well that we have.  So, it’s probably for me a parade of identities’ (Interviewee 18). 
 
Belfast born poet John Hewitt is well known for his promotion of regionalism 
through his writings of being ‘an Ulsterman, an Irishman, British and European’ 
(cited Carruthers, 2015; Longley, 1986).  Participants of this research also multiple 
identities along the familiar lines of Hewitt, ‘So, ah, as John Hewitt once put it, 
although I don’t think he actually said it, but the sentiment is: I’m an Ulsterman, 
Irish, British, European’ (Interviewee 7, 2015).  Interviewee 20 (2015) succinctly 
described this as: 
‘I don’t want to get to the John Hewitt type line of being an Ulsterman, a 
British man and Irishman a European [laughs] umm, but I think it’s the 
nature of Northern Ireland that we have almost interchangeable, or 
chameleon-like, identities.  But East Belfast first and foremost’ (Interviewee 
20, 2015).   
This was particularly obvious in Interviewee 16’s view that ‘I would define myself as 
an Ulsterman, as Northern Irish, as Irish, as British and as European’ (2015).  Other 
participants expressed this view in all but attributing the words to Hewitt as they 
sought to express their identity through the larger entity of identity. 
‘I would define myself as an Ulsterman, as Northern Irish, as Irish, as British, 
and as European.  I carry a British passport but … I have said in the chamber 
before I am Irish.  I was born on this island and lived all my life here’ 
(Interviewee 16, 2015). 
The geographical position of where one lives seems to have had a direct impact 
upon how participants to the research defined their identity.  One of the most 
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unique aspects of Northern Ireland is its geographic position and how much it is 
influenced by the countries that it is surrounded by.  This positioning within the 
world allows individuals from Northern Ireland to experience multiple identities on 
a daily bases, even if they are not quite aware of it themselves.  As described by 
Interviewee 8 (2015): 
‘Well there’s no doubt I am a Unionist … I start off that I’m an [name of 
place] man … which makes me an Ulsterman, which makes me an Irish man. 
That is all taken for granted because that is what I am.  Umm, well, I am also 
a British subject.  I’m a British citizen because I live in the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and I believe that that link between 
Northern Ireland and Great Britain should be there’. 
 
One interesting observation that emerged on the issue of classification of identity 
came from Interviewee 24 who discussed their perceived opinions of the 
differences between members of the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community and 
the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican community when it came to discussing identity.  
As the data contained in this chapter illustrated, there are numerous combinations 
of identity that can be experienced and accepted under the overarching umbrella of 
Britishness by Unionists in Northern Ireland.  Interviewee 24 expressed concern 
that while they believed a multi-faceted approach to identity was acceptable for 
members of the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican community, that the same could 
not be said of members of the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community.  For 
Interviewee 24, they felt that to say they held more than one identity as a Unionists 
was providing an opportunity for Nationalists to see Unionism as being in a state of 
confusion over its identity: 
‘You are confused, you are having an identity crisis. You don’t know what 
you are!  “I know what I am!”, they will say, “I am green, Irish, Gaelic, all the 
rest of it.”  It is a neat package.  “You are confused.  You are a pick and mix, 
and you don’t know what you are. Are you an Ulsterman or are you British?  
What are you?”’ (Interviewee 24, 2015). 
This concern that to express multiple identities is to throw into doubt a Unionists 
sense of self is a validation of arguments in Chapter Four that discussed the nature 
of self-doubt as an inherent component of Unionism.  The presence of doubt within 
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Unionism cannot be ignored.  This doubt, as outlined in Chapter Four, does not 
come from Ulster Unionists themselves, but from outside forces such as Irish 
Nationalists and the British and Irish governments.  It is, however, a paradox: to 
refute the claim that Unionism is inherently shaped by doubt is to openly express 
the fragility of Unionism in that the possibility of doubt is so damaging a concept 
that it cannot even be expressed.  The thesis argues that doubt is not necessarily a 
negative in this context.  It is an important aspect of the very nature of Unionism 
and it has enabled it to flourish and maintain its position as the largest political and 
ethno-national groupings within Northern Ireland.  To summarise that which has 
been discussed in Chapter Four, doubt experienced from outside sources can 
strengthen identity within Unionism.  During the Troubles the IRA shook Unionists 
to their core by undertaking a campaign to break up the Union and unify Ireland by 
force, yet rather than destroying Unionism it instead forced it to forge a stronger 
version of British identity, one that could withstand the constant doubt by 
purposefully reinforcing the importance of the Union and the importance of 
Britishness for Northern Ireland (see Chapter Four, section 3.4).  To take the 
example of Interviewee 24 and to extrapolate upon that example in line with the 
theoretical framework they recognise there is doubt in their identity and the 
number of potential combinations of identity that they can simultaneous hold 
(Schrödinger, 1935); in thinking about the doubtful nature of their identity they in 
fact realise that their identity does in fact exist (Descartes, as in Wilson, 1978: 52); 
and therefore developing an overarching sense of Britishness to their identity which 
can be viewed as being unique to the Northern Ireland experience (Baudrillard, 
1994: 6). 
 
This is interesting when one looks at how individuals conceptually can be 
categorised into groups within society.  According to Althusser (1971; Fiske, 1998: 
697-698), individuals are interpellated into social groups, meaning the process by 
which one is assigned an identity through the process of being hailed by another 
member of society, usually someone who is in a position of power to promote the 
dominant ideology.  Generally in Marxist terminology this refers to the promotion 
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of ideology through identity and can be observed in Interviewee 24’s comment.  By 
being hailed as ‘confused’, both their ideology and identity is challenged.  This 
consequently may lead to a reinforcement of their identity through exaggeration, 
for example, by engaging in a more concentrated version of Britishness to counter 
what they feel is an attack on their identity by Nationalism (Baudrillard, 1983).  
According to Habermas: ‘To experience yourself as a constitutional patriot would be 
to recognize yourself in a constitutional patriotic interpellation’, meaning that to be 
seen as a member of a community or nation would be in essence to be a member 
of that community or nation’ (Donald, 1996: 175).  However, promoting a political 
identity over cultural identity leaves too much out in regards to our understanding 
of identity.  Both concepts exist and as such need to be discussed.  One cannot be 
forgotten or left out of academic debate surrounding identity as this would be 
detrimental to the study. Hence the value of ‘elective affinity’ as this thesis has 
argued. 
 
As the unity in diversity trope of this thesis argued within Chapter Two, individuals 
within the United Kingdom do not have to be the same or share the same values to 
co-exist within the Union (Goodhart, 2017: 22).  Ethnic and civic differences can 
exist side-by-side, so long as there is the combination of political representation 
and a feeling of affinity towards the United Kingdom. 
 
Fig 5.2. Britishness with options  
This chart shows the breakdown, in numbers, of the sixteen participants who viewed 
their identity as British, and as British with another identity.  Six participants 
expressed their identity as solely British, while eleven described their identity as 
British along with another identity, such as Northern Irish. 
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Throughout the interviews, participants also expressed affinity to an Ulster or an 
Ulster-Scots identity.  Nine of the Participants interviewed described themselves as 
having an Ulster dimension to their identity.  Four participants mentioned that 
Ulster-Scots made up part of their identity, with one participant stating their 
identity was solely that of Ulster-Scots, ‘Well I am an Ulster-Scot.  I am an Ulster-
Scot by birth, by culture and by choice, I suppose’ (Interviewee 21, 2015).  What 
Interviewee 21 highlighted is the role elective affinity plays within the formation of 
national identities.  The statement ‘by culture and by choice’ shows the importance 
of choice within the decision making process, but also that a shared sense of 
belonging is necessary as well.  Without both components working together, the 
identity would be fragile indeed.  The reasons expressed for this Ulster-centric 
approach to identity from some participants seems to be that of a pride in Ulster 
and of its place in the United Kingdom.  According to Interviewee 2 (2015): 
‘my culture and my identity is very much of an Ulsterman first, and with that 
becomes a sense of Britishness and it’s not just as we said before, a little 
homogenous Irishman, or a little Englishman. It is a British person whose 
identity is a collection of views and values from across these islands.’   
 
6
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Britishness with options
British only with Northern Irish with Irish with Ulster
with Unionist with Ulster-Scots with European with Other
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Other participants, such as Interviewee 20 (2015), wanted to keep their identity 
closer to home, ‘Let’s see, how would I define my identity? Ah, I’m a [name of 
place] man first and foremost [laughs].  Umm … I mean I’m an Ulster man’.   
 
One participant expressed an Ulster-Scots identity, stating ‘… that sense of 
Britishness is the overarching one and then under that is my regional identity … an 
Ulster identity.  My cultural identity would be predominantly Ulster-Scots’ 
(Interviewee 24, 2015).  Ulster-Scots is an interesting identity, highlighting a sense 
of affinity between Northern Ireland and Scotland in particular (Stapleton and 
Wilson, 2004: 564-565).  It is also interesting in regards to how it can be read as an 
identity, as Ulster-Scots can be viewed as either a form of nationalism or as a 
component of Britishness (McCall, 2010: 212-214).  If Ulster is the national identity, 
Ulster-Scots can make a fitting cultural element of this as it equally promotes a 
connection to the Union whilst understanding that Northern Ireland has its own 
unique aspects which cannot be forgotten.  Ulster-Scots in Northern Ireland is 
undergoing a resurgence in popularity (Nic Craith, 2001: 30).  In recent years there 
have been increased initiatives to promote it as a language, yet these often do not 
allow the Ulster-Scots language the same level of inclusion as Irish.  For example, in 
2017 Belfast City Council released a public consultation surrounding its policies on 
minority languages, including Ulster-Scots and Irish.  However, while the Council 
has planned to provide all correspondence in Irish, it has only stated that it will do 
so with Ulster-Scots if ‘it is possible’ (Belfast Telegraph, 2017).   
 
According to Cochrane (1997) Northern Ireland Unionism is both an ideology and a 
cultural identity which aims to maintain membership of the United Kingdom.  This 
reading of Ulster Unionism sees Britishness as entirely self-serving in that it is only a 
means by which the Unionist community can dominate the Nationalist community.  
What Unionist Britishness is in this sense is little more than an instrumental 
relationship.  Cochrane fails to take into account the solidarity and identity aspects 
of this relationship.  Ulster Unionists do not merely support the Union because it 
provides more instrumental advantages than a United Ireland, but because they 
feel they are a part of the United Kingdom and that they belong to this Union.  
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According to Lawther (2013: 159), ‘unionism seeks to preserve the union between 
Northern Ireland and Great Britain and is based on a sense of loyalty to and 
sacrifice on behalf of the British state’.  Unionism works to promote a unique sense 
of British identity within an Ulster context.  The objective of Unionism is to promote 
British identity as the national identity of Northern Ireland through a blend of 
politics, culture and religion.  Currently, Unionism within Northern Ireland 
represents the largest section of the population, both in terms of political alignment 
and identity.  An interesting method of explaining the success of Unionism in 
promoting British identity is Goodhart’s (2013: 292) statement that ‘if a national 
identity is, like an iceberg, mainly beneath the surface, it is not much use in helping 
to create a sense of common interest or belonging.  For that to happen, a critical 
mass of the population still have … to see their national identity as something 
meaningful and active’.  Therefore, to maintain a sense of British national identity 
within Northern Ireland, Unionists must be willing to promote and maintain the 
benefits of being a part of the United Kingdom.  Within a political context, this is 
mainly the function of both the Democratic Unionist Party and the Ulster Unionist 
Party.  Through party policy and electioneering, political parties promote and 
disseminate their own views of identity.   
 
Interviewee 11 (2015) discusses the difficulty in trying to define Unionism: ‘It’s very 
difficult.  I mean, you have so many different identities and people say, “Well I’m a 
Unionist”, but Unionism itself is such a broad term.  You have people on the left, 
and right, and everywhere. Umm, I would probably see myself as someone who is 
centre right Unionist.  I would be fairly fiscally conservative.  I would be a little bit 
more socially moderate perhaps than some of my colleagues would be.’  Of the 
thirty-four interviews, six discussed the role of Unionism in their identity, and for 
two of these, Unionism was the sole identity they identified as.  According to 
Interviewee 1 (2015), ‘Ah, my identity is Unionist.  I would consider myself to be a 
traditional unionist’.  Interviewee 29 (2016) also stated ‘Well, I would class myself 
as a unionist.’  For these participants, Unionism is a component of Britishness.  If 
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Nationalism in Northern Ireland is seen as the political aspect to Irishness then 
Unionism can be viewed as the political component to Britishness. 
 
The question of whether a Unionist can be Irish is one that is contentious.  Eight 
participants mentioned Irish as part of their identity and one stated Irish as their 
first identity, arguing that ‘I… believe in my Irishness and my Britishness and there is 
no conflict for me in any shape and form, although some people don’t quite 
understand it’ (Interviewee 33).  One of the ways this is expressed is through 
support of the Irish rugby team: ‘I am happy to say I’m Irish, happy to follow the 
Irish rugby team and so on’ (Interviewee 20, 2015).  This allows for Unionists to 
support Ireland as a national team, but with a distinctive Ulster dimension to it, as 
Ulster rugby players play for the Irish national team.  As Interviewee 18 (2015) 
stated, ‘I would probably support the Ireland rugby team over Scotland, England, or 
Wales if they were playing when it comes to the Six Nations.  I would have a 
preference for Ireland to win.  Umm, now that would be because of the Ulster 
connections, umm, the Rory Bests’ of this world, ah, the Andrew Trimbles’, you 
know.  So you can identify with people from Northern Ireland who are playing in 
the Irish rugby team and so I would be cheering on Ireland, umm, over the other six 
nations.’ 
 
Not all Unionists are willing to allow themselves to view Irishness as anything other 
than a threat to their identity and their lifestyle.  For some participants it was 
important that Irish was not part of their identity in any way.  Participants felt they 
had to raise this fact themselves to state that Irishness does not represent them.  
As Interviewee 13 (2015) observed, ‘No part of my identity is Irish at all and I can’t 
fathom, well, there isn’t any identity of Irish in me because our family has been 
entirely British, Northern Irish.’  For some participants this was due to the nature of 
Republican and Nationalist politics, ‘I have no desire to enter into a Republic of any 
description…’ (Interviewee 17, 2015).  In cases like this the Irish identity was closely 
connected in the participant’s consciousness to that of the aspiration by many in 
the Catholic/Nationalist/Republican community to create a United Ireland.  
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Similarly, this could be reversed to state that someone from an Irish background 
may reject the label of British because they do not wish to be a part of the United 
Kingdom and see themselves and Northern Ireland as being a part of a United 
Ireland.  For others, such as Interviewee 23, (2015), the reasoning for not being Irish 
was that ‘I never would have termed myself as Irish, because I believe that I am 
totally different in every way to someone people believe to be your typical Irish…’ 
(Interviewee 23, 2015).  Yet, as argued by Newton Emerson (2016), ‘surprisingly few 
unionists see it as a process of diluting Britishness’.  Why is this?  Emerson observed 
that the popularisation of a Northern Irish identity does not diminish Britishness as 
this is constantly being reinforced via direct rule and the media, meaning that the 
two identities can, and do, coexist harmoniously.  Irishness, as shown by the 
participants’ responses, does not have a huge bearing on their identity.  This can be 
argued by two reasons.  The first is that Ulster Unionists do not have any allegiance 
towards the Republic of Ireland and the second is they do not feel a sense of 
belonging to it either. As observed by McVeigh (2015: 127), ‘The existential choice 
between “Ulster” and “Irish” identity is the definitive political choice for northern 
Protestants.’  What is perhaps most interesting about McVeigh’s statement is the 
fact that ‘British’ is not mentioned at all.  This highlights Irish Republicanism as 
being one of the outside forces that contributes to the fear of not belonging 
discussed throughout this thesis.  The above statement suggests that Ulster 
Unionists are wrong in believing that their identity is British as they are truly Irish.  
In this context, to say that one has an Ulster identity is actually a way in which to 
reinforce the idea that Ulster Unionists are in fact Irish as Ulster is one of the 
provinces of Ireland. 
 
Of the thirty-four participants interviewed, three stated religion played a major role 
in their identity, with one participant stating that their Christian faith was their only 
identity, ‘Umm, how do I define my identity?  Well, as a person of faith that 
obviously comes first and foremost.  I feel my faith plays a huge part in my life.  So I 
think as a Christian that defines an awful lot of who I am’ (Interviewee 25, 2016).  
Until the interview stage it was not anticipated that any participants would discuss 
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religion in the identity section.  As described by Hearn, it is often imagined within 
sociological thinking that the ‘…national community’ can be viewed ‘…as a modern 
replacement for religious community’ (2006: 4).  Thinkers such as Anderson have 
come to ‘think that in a world where God is for many, if not dead, in semi-
retirement, the nation is called upon to provide an alternative source of moral 
grounding, not just in the sense of something blessed, but in providing the ultimate 
judges of our actions in the present’ (Hearn, 2006: 226).  Yet for three participants 
this was not the case, confirming previous research on Unionism which found a 
heavily religious orientated faction within Unionism in Northern Ireland (Bruce, 
2001; Bruce, 2007; Southern, 2005).  One participant stated Christian, another 
evangelical Protestant, and the third, Presbyterian.  This also ties in with traditional 
Christian teachings such as the verse, ‘and in Christ you have been brought to 
fullness. He is the head over every power and authority’ (Colossians, 2:10).   
 
5.5: Conclusion 
To say that members of the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community can only have 
a British or Ulster identity is misleading.  The notion that to be Unionist is to be 
British can again be argued as a result of the polarising aspect of the Troubles.  
Within the context of the violence in Northern Ireland, the very existence of the 
state which Unionists inhabited and called home was constitutionally threatened.  
Therefore, no ground could afford to be lost to the Catholic/National/Republican 
community which was campaigning for Irish unity. To define oneself as anything 
other than British was to dilute Northern Ireland as a region of the United Kingdom.  
As Gellner argued, ‘The deeply rooted communal conflict in Ulster is not based, 
obviously, on any communications gap between the two communities, but on an 
identification with one of two rival local cultures which is so firm as to be 
comparable to some physical characteristic, even if, in reality, it is socially induced’ 
(1983: 71).  Within this context other identities were viewed as a threat to the 
constitution.  Identities such as Northern Ireland were viewed with mistrust within 
the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community as not being a middle ground, but as a 
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concession to Irish Nationalism, and therefore a stepping stone towards separation 
from the United Kingdom and reformation with the Irish Republic.  This thesis 
argued that this is no longer the case.  Northern Irish society is now nineteen years 
post Good Friday Agreement and society is becoming more accepting to breaking 
down the sectarian barriers of the past.  For example, the 2011 census, for the first 
time, added Northern Irish to the category on identity, a move which proved 
popular with the population at large and with the participants of this thesis (Sedghi, 
2012).  Interviewee 13 (2015) observed: 
‘That’s an interesting one because in the last census there were four folk in 
our house.  Two filled in they were from Northern Ireland and two filled in 
that they were British.  Now that made me think.  I think I would describe 
myself as Northern Irish … So I would regard myself as Northern Irish, 
proudly Northern Irish and I think that Northern Ireland because it’s been 
around now for almost 100 years it’s now sort of its chiselled out an identity 
in its own right.’ 
 
The identity of Unionist designated politicians, therefore, is not straightforward. As 
expressed by Interviewee 7 (2015), ‘…the big political challenge of the twenty-first 
century is resolving this tension between the sovereignty of the piece of land you’re 
living and the identity which you wish to align yourself to.’  How Unionism will do 
this is yet to be seen, but it is an opportunity they cannot afford to let slip away.  As 
Bauman observed, ‘It soon transpired that the real problem is not how to build 
identity, but how to preserve it; whatever you may build in the sand is unlikely to 
be a castle’ (1996: 23).  To put it simply, ‘I’m proud of being Northern Irish too … I’m 
British you know, but I’m Northern Irish’ (Interviewee 19).  Unionism in Northern 
Ireland can simultaneously be viewed as both unchanging and changeable.  
Although traditional identities and social conservatisms are still prevalent within 
Unionism in Ulster, change can and is being seen to develop within the two largest 
Unionist parties, the Democratic Unionist Party and the Ulster Unionist Party, such 
as in the Ulster Unionist Party’s conscience votes on moral issues.  To say that these 
perceived changes mark a new trajectory for Unionism may be premature.  If the 
attitudes to identity and Unionism outlined in this chapter continue, it may be 
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possible that Unionism can make a change which would enable it to appeal to a 
much wider section of the Northern Irish electorate.  With Unionism across the 
United Kingdom, threatened by political events such as the Scottish independence 
referendum and the European referendum, perhaps the only way for Unionism in 
Northern Ireland to continue is for it to change.   
 
These findings show is that elements of both contractual thinking and 
primordialism exist within Ulster Britishness.  Both are vital components of Ulster 
Unionist identity.  While the instrumental reasons given by the participants in 
regards to maintaining and promoting the Union are important, these connections 
would never have been sustained without the Ulster British sense of belonging to 
the United Kingdom.  Together these themes may be understood in terms of 
elective affinity and the role it plays in binding Northern Ireland and Great Britain.  
In regards to the negative interpretation of Ulster British portrayed within this 
thesis, one can observe from the answers provided by the participants that they 
themselves feel generally secure and confident in their identity (see Chapter Four, 
section 4.2).  This reinforces the argument of Chapter Four that the Unionist fear of 
belonging does not come from the Ulster Unionists themselves, but mainly from 
without.  Each region of the United Kingdom contains its own regional identities as 
well as the overarching national identity of British.  Northern Ireland is no different 
in this regard (see Chapter Two).  What these findings mean will be discussed 
further in Chapter Nine.  Before that, the impact of major political events within the 
United Kingdom and the future of the Union must be considered. 
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Chapter Six 
Questions of British Unionism 
 
6.1: Introduction 
Identity generally tends to be discussed whenever it is deemed to be having a 
‘crisis’.  Identity and nationhood are questions which are currently at the forefront 
of British politics (McCrone, 1997: 581).  Events such as the Scottish independence 
referendum of 18th September 2014 have shown how fragile the ties which bind the 
Union can be.  The Scottish independence referendum was challenging to the 
United Kingdom in two ways.  First, it highlighted how devolution could eventually 
lead to the break-up of the United Kingdom as once the nations receive more 
autonomy they may push for even more until they achieve independence (which is 
an old Irish Unionist proposition: that there is no ‘half-way house’ between unity 
and separation).  Second, the Scottish independence referendum could be seen as 
an example of what happens whenever a large section of a region’s population 
does not feel as though it belongs within the United Kingdom.  When discussing 
issues of (in)stability and potential threats to the United Kingdom, it has long been 
an established pattern to include Northern Ireland in these conversations (Nairn, 
1977: 11; CAIN, 2016; Whyte, 1991: 146).  During the 1960s, the pot of sectarian 
tension which had been simmering dangerously finally reached boiling point, 
unleashing civil violence that would threaten to destabilise the Union (McKittrick 
and McVea, 2002: ix-x).  Since the period of the Troubles in Northern Ireland, 
political commentators have deliberated that this could have signalled the end of 
the United Kingdom (Nairn, 1977), yet this did not come to pass.  Although pulled 
recklessly taut, the ties which bound Northern Ireland to Great Britain remain in 
place.  With the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, a certain stability 
emerged in Northern Ireland (NIO, 1998).  The IRA’s campaign of nearly 30 years 
had ended and a devolved mandatory coalition government was created to 
represent both communities (Taylor, 2009: 8-10).  As the peace-process stabilised 
after 2006, politicians, academics and commentators alike began to consider the 
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Ulster Question ‘solved’ - insofar as ‘solved’ meant that it was no longer such a 
critical issue in British politics.  The United Kingdom had survived the conflict in 
Northern Ireland intact.   
 
After almost four decades in which Northern Ireland was viewed as the biggest risk 
to the stability and future of the Union, the real danger now came not from the 
West of the United Kingdom, but from the North.  Scottish nationalism is by no 
means a new phenomenon.  The events of the past influence the events of the 
present (Aughey, 2009: 1-2).  In 2010, the then Scottish First Minister and Leader of 
the Scottish Nationalist Party, Alex Salmond announced that Scotland should hold a 
referendum on whether it would remain in or leave the United Kingdom (Carrell, 
2010).  As Nairn (1977:127) once observed of Scotland and its nationalism, 
‘Nowhere else has the transformation been so abrupt, or so extensive’ within the 
United Kingdom.  The request to put the question of Scottish independence to a 
public vote was granted by Westminster and in 2014 the referendum was held, 
bringing the United Kingdom dangerously close to separation.  The very fact that 
the central sovereign government at Westminster allowed the referendum to be 
held shows that it is well aware of the multi-national identity of the United 
Kingdom and of the importance of allowing the nations to have their own say on 
their place in the United Kingdom.  In the case of Scotland this was the 2014 
referendum and for Northern Ireland this is evident in the Principle of Consent.  It 
also highlighted the position within the United Kingdom that no nation can be 
forced to stay within the Union against the wishes of its people, but as of yet no 
nation truly has any good cause to leave it. 
 
From Unionists in Northern Ireland, very little was heard during the Scottish debate.  
Instead, they watched and waited with growing concern.  Having been in a position 
of instability themselves for so long they understood the impact this event could 
have.  The Scottish independence referendum raised many painful concerns for 
Unionists from Northern Ireland.  First, Scotland and Northern Ireland have 
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traditionally shared a close relationship.  They are close geographically, culturally 
and historically (McBride, 1996: 8-9).  Without Scotland, Northern Ireland would 
lose its closest neighbour in the United Kingdom, the neighbour with whom it holds 
a special affinity as well cultural and familial connections.  Second, there was the 
question of what this referendum would mean to Nationalists in Northern Ireland 
and across the Union (Bennhold, 2014).  Although like many Unionists they also 
tended to keep quiet during this time period, they were watching carefully to see 
how the result would go (Walker, 2014).  If the people of Scotland voted to leave 
the United Kingdom, would this be the beginning of a general break-up of the 
United Kingdom which would build up political pressure for a United Ireland?  
Would one referendum on leaving the United Kingdom turn into two?   
 
Northern Ireland has traditionally shared a close relationship with Scotland based 
on a history of shared religion, culture, and migration and this is especially the case 
for Ulster Unionists. These links can still be seen today in the prevalence of 
Presbyterianism in both regions and in the fact that outside of Northern Ireland, 
Scotland has more Loyal Orange Lodges than anywhere else in the United Kingdom.  
It can be argued that, ‘Ulster Unionists have always championed the union of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, but their more particular attachment has been to 
Scotland rather than to England’, a country with which they share more in common 
(Kenny, 2012).  Debates over Scottish independence are not new.  In 1977, Nairn 
wrote in The Break-Up of Britain about how Scotland would become ‘a centre of 
disruptive development … and compelled, therefore, along a path of political 
separation’ due to its history of Nationalism and anti-English sentiment (1977: 190).  
To break a historical tie which binds the United Kingdom is no trivial matter due to 
the political, legal and cultural bonds that are shared across the Union (Kenny, 
2012).  Ulster Unionists may have expected to maintain a close relationship with 
Scotland even if it did become independent due to the shared history and culture 
between the two nations, yet whether that affinity would truly be strong enough in 
practice remains unknown.  Commentators such as de Castella and Judah (2013) 
have argued that although historically Northern Ireland ‘shares strong cultural links 
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with Scotland … there has been no mention of a political bond between the two 
should the larger nation break away,’ implying political indifference between the 
two countries should independence become a reality.   
 
Participants were questioned on their opinions and views about Scotland and the 
impact of the referendum. Ironically, devolution after 1998 had normalised 
somewhat Northern Ireland’s position in the United Kingdom by putting it on an 
equal status with Scotland and Wales.  If any region within the United Kingdom is 
now an outsider it is England, the only part of the Union not to have a separate 
devolved government.  Yet even for the English ‘there is little apparent appetite for 
ending the Union’ (Hazell, 2000: 278; Curtice and Seyd, 2009: 123). The 
constitutional issues which are being discussed in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
today influences the wider questions of what identity, legitimacy and sovereignty 
now mean in the United Kingdom (Walker, 1998). How Unionist designated 
politicians from Northern Ireland engage with these larger concerns can provide 
valuable insight into the wider United Kingdom debate surrounding belonging and 
identity within the twenty-first century (Aughey, 2013).   
 
6.2: Anxiety and Reassurance? 
In the run up to the referendum an almost relaxed approach by the Better Together 
campaign resulted in numerous panicked questions in the final few weeks before 
the vote.  Unionism across the United Kingdom was caught metaphorically sleeping 
on the job.  The situation was seen as a tick box exercise: of course Scotland would 
not vote to leave the Union.  Yet as the referendum date approached and opinion 
polls began showing more and more support for the Leave campaign, Unionism 
finally woke up to the threat and began a frantic last minute endeavour to keep the 
United Kingdom together (Brown, 2014). Suddenly opinion polls showed that the 
result would be hard to call (Nardelli, 2014). The break-up of the Union, something 
that for decades had been discussed in regards to Northern Ireland, now seemed 
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genuinely on the cards in Scotland.  When asked to give their thoughts on looking 
back at the referendum, Interviewee 2 (2015) commented that, ‘I remember at the 
time thinking it’s amazing what difference 10 years makes, where 10-15 years ago 
NI was the most unstable part of the Union. Today Scotland is the most unstable 
part of the Union and Northern Ireland’s probably one of the more stable parts.’  In 
the end, when the vote was announced Scotland had voted to remain within the 
United Kingdom by the margin of 55.3% to 44.7% (Hearn, 2014: 506).  A victory, but 
not one that would be strong enough to see off the threat of Scottish nationalism 
‘for a generation’ as it had been hoped (Aughey, 2009: 2). 
 
As the Scottish independence referendum brought the United Kingdom 
dangerously close to its knees, it was necessary to hear from the participants what 
their views were as they watched this event unfold.  To do so, this question was put 
to participants, enabling them to give in-depth qualitative responses: 
What were your opinions of the Scottish referendum? 
 
Table 6.1: Examples of responses on the Scottish independence referendum given by 
participants 
Table providing a brief summary of the feelings that were expressed by participants 
towards to Scottish independence referendum. 
Participant Summary of response 
1 Worried in the lead up 
Content with the outcome 
Worried about the future 
2 Concerned in the lead up 
Unsure of the future 
Unionists acted like they had lost instead of won 
‘Scotland is the most unstable part of the Union’ 
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3 Scotland had a democratic right to the referendum 
The divisions this has caused in Scotland will take a long time to 
heal 
Wish that the result margin had been wider 
4 The referendum was badly managed 
Concerned for the future 
More people would vote to remain in the Union from Northern 
Ireland than Scotland 
5 Concerned in the lead up 
What will be done with such a close result 
6 Future includes unknowns 
Scottish Nationalists victory in the Westminster Election 2015 
7 Allows for a debate on further devolving powers away from 
Westminster 
8 Scottish Nationalists ‘played a blinder’ 
Scotland is an integral part of the Union  
9 Has implications for Northern Ireland 
Each region should make decisions for its own benefit with the 
overarching stability of the United Kingdom 
10  
11 Pleased that they voted to stay 
This has huge implications on the future 
12 Fear and trepidation in the lead up 
Worried for the future 
Scotland is a bigger threat to the Union than Northern Ireland 
13 Relief, happy with result 
Worried about another referendum 
14 Scared in the lead up 
Referendums depend on the question being asked 
15 Nervous in the lead up 
Pleased with the result 
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Observed, but did not want to get involved with the campaign 
16 Nervous in the lead up 
Pleased with the result  
Not a fan of referendums as it all depends on the question asked 
17 Aware of the history of Scotland as a separate country 
Family ties connecting them to Scotland 
Concerned as a Unionist 
Disruptive to Northern Ireland 
18 Unionism in Northern Ireland didn’t get engaged 
History of historical and cultural links between Northern Ireland 
and Scotland 
Can understand why Scotland wished for independence, but 
wanted Scotland to remain within the Union 
19 Concern in the lead up 
Positive it was going to be a win for Remain 
20 Wake up call for Unionists 
Need to promote the value of the Union 
21 It was a difficult referendum 
Felt energised as this would have far reaching effects 
22 ‘concerned that the lobby was so strong and the government was 
so weak’ 
23 Felt that people voted to leave, but hoped that they stayed 
24 ‘How pathetic the pro-Union campaign was!’ 
25 Fearful in the lead up 
Shocked that the result was so close 
26 Concerned in the lead up 
Scotland is stronger within the Union 
27 Concerned in the lead up 
Glad of the result 
Need to encourage greater Unionism across the United Kingdom 
28 Did not wish to interfere in the debate 
160 
 
The unknowns around this referendum were worrying 
We need to make Scotland feel valued within the Union 
29 Need to make Scotland feel engaged with the United Kingdom 
‘hoping and praying that they would vote to remain’ 
30 Admitted they paid very little attention to it at the start 
Pleased at the outcome, but surprised that the vote wasn’t closer 
31 The Scottish Nationalist Party wants to break up the Union 
32 Felt relief at the decision 
Worried that Brexit has brought this up again 
33 Scared of the impact this would have had on Northern Ireland 
34 Pleased with the result 
35 ‘…why do people feel detached from being British…’ 
 
Fig. 6.1: Chart showing the number of participants who mentioned Irish Nationalism 
whilst discussing the Scottish independence referendum. 
 
Cultural similarities between Northern Ireland and Scotland are often viewed as 
two sides of the same coin in that, ‘there is, in effect, little or no difference 
between, Ulster Scots and Scottishness … they are simply two components of the 
6
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same culture’ (Wilson and Stapleton, 2006: 24). If there is substantial affinity across 
the Irish Sea, the Scottish connection would appear to be the ‘thickest’.  The term 
Ulster Scots can trace its roots back to the Plantation of Ulster when individuals 
from Scotland and England migrated to Ulster in order to settle there.  The majority 
of Scottish settlers stayed within the North East of Ulster, leaving a legacy which 
lasts to this day.  McCartney (2013) described this relationship as being one of 
solidarity and shared identity, stating that ‘To grow up in Northern Ireland is to be 
linked to Scotland in some visceral way I can’t quite explain’.  The best way to 
describe the relationship between Scotland and Northern Ireland is through the 
framework of elective affinity (see Chapter Four, section 4.3).  Both Northern 
Ireland and Scotland are connected by constitutional settlements and by the fact 
both choose to remain a part of the United Kingdom.  Yet they are also tied by a 
series of historical and cultural connections which are unique to these two areas 
within the United Kingdom.  The importance of this shared affinity was highlighted 
by Walker through institutions such as the Orange Order and non-Anglican 
Protestant denominations (1995: 62).  There are also negative cultural connections 
which have significant influence on life in both countries, such as sectarianism.  
Football, in particular the clubs of Rangers and Celtic, have long been used as a 
metaphor for sectarian tensions within both Northern Ireland and Scotland.  
Sectarianism in Scotland has long been viewed as a legacy of the historical tensions 
Catholic and Protestant migrants from Northern Ireland brought with them to 
Scotland (The Scottish Government, 2013).  This argument was condensed by Kenny 
(2012) into the statement, ‘when Rangers play Celtic, which side raises a Scottish 
nationalist flag? Neither. Rangers considers itself "British" and flies a Union Jack 
while Celtic is characterised as Irish, and flies the Tricolour’.  
 
The language of Ulster-Scots is another cultural link between the two countries 
(Stapleton and Wilson, 2004: 564-565).  Brought to Northern Ireland ‘nearly 400 
years ago’ by plantation settlers, Ulster-Scots is a strong cultural connection 
between Protestants and Unionists on both sides of the Irish Sea (Ulster Scots 
Agency, 2014).  The 2011 census showed that 8.1% of people in Northern Ireland 
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had ‘some ability in Ulster-Scots’, with the percentages in North Antrim being 
above average with Ballymoney at 29.43% and Ballymena at 22.15% (Scots 
Language Centre, 2014).  What an independent Scotland would do for the Ulster-
Scots language is open for debate and as McCall (2002: 215) has argued:  
‘where is the Ulster-Scots reinvention taking the Ulster unionist identity?  
Towards an independent Ulster?  Towards an exclusive Northern Ireland 
within the UK?  Towards alliance with Scotland?  Towards a culturally 
enriched region of the UK, the island of Ireland, and Europe?  The correct 
answer probably is: not very far.’ 
For the interviewees, the impact of the Scottish independence referendum on the 
close relationship between Northern Ireland and Scotland was a matter of 
importance.  As stated by one participant, ‘Yeah, I was glad to see the result of 
course and so it’s – I mean, in so many ways we think that Scotland is similar to 
ourselves.  I mean, we have that huge Scottish connection’ (Interviewee 27, 2015).  
Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland held a vested interest, as expressed by 
Interviewee 13 (2015): ‘I think there was not a Unionist in Northern Ireland who 
wasn’t [pleased with the result] and I’m very relieved that it went smoothly.’  This 
was not merely because of the threat that this referendum posed to the Union as a 
whole, but due to the notion that, ‘the connection between Ulster and Scotland is 
probably the closest historically, culturally, socially, of any of the connections’ of 
the United Kingdom (Interviewee 24, 2015). 
 
For some participants the close nature of the referendum and the complacency of 
the pro-Union campaign led to them having to think about the possibility of losing 
their closest ally in the United Kingdom.  This would potentially have left Northern 
Ireland even further out into the cold than it had been previously.  As Interviewee 4 
(2015) stated, ‘I believe if NI was to have a referendum, now I don’t believe we 
should have one, but if NI was to have a referendum tomorrow on whether we 
should leave the Union I think we would have a stronger link. I think we would vote 
more for the Union than Scottish people did, which worries me.’  This realisation 
that Northern Ireland for all its past issues is now more secure in the Union than 
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Scotland was brought home hard and fast in the last few weeks before the 
referendum.  Even with the final result being to remain in the United Kingdom, the 
sentiment expressed by Interviewee 4 is correct in that it shows the disengagement 
from the elective affinity of the Union felt by 45% of the Scottish electorate. 
Moreover, for some Unionists, the biggest worry was the fear that the Scottish 
independence movement could have revitalised the Nationalist agenda in Northern 
Ireland, and possibly even result in a return to the violent conflict of the past four 
decades (Interviewee 16, 2015).  According to Interviewee 18 (2015): 
‘There would be a fear that had Scotland decided to leave the kingdom it 
would have been weakened, and nationalists in Northern Ireland would 
have been emboldened, umm, in terms of their efforts to have a United 
Ireland. So, it, the basis on which I wanted Scotland to stay in was purely 
around the constitutional umm arrangements which exist within the 
Kingdom and how Northern Ireland fits into that. Umm, obviously we have 
you know in terms of Ulster and the Ulster-Scots connection there is, there 
is historical and cultural links umm with the unionist people of Northern 
Ireland and Scotland as well and obviously then those linkages are 
important to maintain’. 
No matter what the outcome of the vote in Scotland had been, the result would 
have sent shockwaves across the United Kingdom, but if the final vote had a wider 
margin, say a result of 60% Remain to 40% Leave, the future of the United Kingdom 
would have looked much more secure than it did after the vote. Although the 
people of Scotland voted to remain within the United Kingdom the fact that the 
referendum went so far has caused concern for Unionists, ‘I thought it had huge 
implications for Northern Ireland.  Ah, it’s one of those things that’s going to come 
up again’ (Interviewee 9, 2015).  
 
Although Scotland voted to remain within the United Kingdom it is hard to envisage 
how the relationship between the regions of the United Kingdom could revert to 
being what it once was.  This in part was caused by the lacklustre nature of the No 
campaign and the rushed concessions promised by the then Prime Minister David 
Cameron the morning after.  As Interviewee 2 (2015) states:  
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‘Well, the unionists won, but they behaved as though they lost. The PMs 
immediate response was hasty. He promised too much in the immediate 
aftermath. Instead of coming out and declaring victory he came out and 
decided that, oh, a 10% margin wasn’t good enough, he had to then throw 
concessions to Scotland … I think as a result of that he then galvanised what 
already was a very proactive Scottish Nationalist movement. I think that that 
was foolish, but you can’t put the toothpaste back in the tube. It’s out and 
that mess has been created.’  
It is impossible to imagine that the Scottish independence referendum of 2014 
would not have had an impact upon Unionism and the status quo in Northern 
Ireland as the politics of identity – as this thesis has noted - is often easily 
influenced by external events and pressures (Muldoon et al, 2007: 92).  However, 
the referendum also raised questions about what Scottish Nationalists saw 
independence as in the twenty-first century.  While Alex Salmond and the Scottish 
Nationalist Party wanted to end the political (or constitutional) union between 
Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom, they were in support of maintaining 
the social and monetary (economic) unions.  This decision shows an important 
dimension to the relationship between Scotland and the Union and this is where 
paradoxes of Britishness come into effect in the case of the Scottish independence 
referendum.  Britishness never completely replaced nation identities within the 
regions or sought to do so (Gamble, 2006:22).  Scottish Nationalists wish to end 
allegiance to the (political) Union, but they also wish to maintain affinities with it 
(social union).  In other words, for Scottish nationalists the political Union is a mere 
contract but there are historical connections (solidarities) which are worth 
maintaining (social union).  And finally, they do not wish to lose all of the 
instrumental benefits of being part of the United Kingdom such as having the pound 
sterling as their currency. Of course (as this thesis argues) instrumental cannot be 
divorced from non-instrumental, nor can contract from solidarity – and this was the 
position taken by the Conservative Government on the matter of sharing the pound 
or maintaining the currency union (United Kingdom, united future: Conclusions of 
the Scotland analysis programme, 2014).  This is evident through the issues that are 
currently facing the proposition to hold a second Scottish independence 
referendum in the aftermath of the decision on Brexit.  According to Interviewee 22 
(2015), ‘I mean I was glad of the outcome, but I was concerned that the lobby was 
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so strong and the government was so weak’. And as Walker put it: ‘Things will never 
be the same again’ within Northern Irish Unionism due to this referendum as it will 
have major impact upon relationships across the Union (cited in Farrell, 2014).   
 
However, rather than the fault line being Northern Ireland as was previously the 
case particularly during the Troubles, the actual risk is now Scotland.  The ball is 
firmly in Scotland’s court.  How they now choose to play this game will have 
massive implications for Unionism across the whole of the United Kingdom.  
Unionism now has to bind together and instigate defensive tactics across the 
United Kingdom in order to limit this threat and the potential consequences of it, ‘I 
think it probably brought a wake-up call to those who would like to see the Union 
maintained’ (Interviewee 30, 2016).  As argued by Interviewee 20 (2015), ‘it needs 
to provide a huge wake up call for unionists’ across the United Kingdom.  In 
Northern Ireland the implication would be for Unionism to come together to create 
greater cohesion in order to best promote the stability of the region within the 
United Kingdom.  However, this unfortunately does not seem to be the case.  One 
reason could be that divisions between the Democratic Unionist Party and the 
Ulster Unionist Party are too deeply entrenched to be truly forgotten.  As Alex Kane 
has argued (2015), the two parties are ‘Cut from the same cloth yet forever at war.’  
The two parties may put aside their differences from time to time to agree electoral 
pacts but remain two distinctive parties with different styles and approaches.   
 
In the build up to the referendum, Alex Salmond, the then First Minister of 
Scotland, ‘pledged there would not be a second Scottish independence referendum 
for another generation’ no matter what the outcome of the vote would be 
(Johnson, 2014).  That may have been the case, except for the influence of the 
European referendum of 2016.  From the beginning of the Brexit campaign the 
Scottish National Party and its then leader, the Scottish First Minister Nicola 
Sturgeon, stated that Scotland wished to remain within the European Union and 
that if the United Kingdom voted to leave Scotland would hold another 
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independence referendum (Grice, 2016).  This threat was a concern for some 
Unionists.  Interviewee 14 thought (2015) ‘if the UK vote to leave Europe, I believe 
Scotland will vote to stay in Europe and I believe that could trigger the break of the 
Union.’  In the early hours of the morning of the 24th June 2016 this looked like it 
might just be a possibility as the regional referendum results came in and it was 
announced that Scotland had voted to remain in the European Union by 62% on a 
turnout of 67% (The Electoral Commission, 2016).  Others interviewed for this 
research were not concerned by the Scottish vote.  For some such as Interviewee 
31 (2015) this was more of an annoyance which sought to divert attention from the 
real issues arising from the Brexit: 
‘Well, of course the Scottish National Party is a separatist party.  They want 
to break up the Union, they want an independent Scotland, so one is not 
surprised to see the opportunity of the EU referendum to advance their 
argument for another referendum.  I’m not sure how much credibility that 
argument has … I think the SNP needs to come to terms with the reality that 
they are part of the United Kingdom.  They voted to remain in the United 
Kingdom, so they have to accept the verdict of the United Kingdom 
electorate.’ 
On the 13th March 2017, Nicola Sturgeon called for a second Scottish independence 
referendum to be held due to the outcome of the European referendum (Maguire, 
2017).  To date this has been blocked by Prime Minister Theresa May as due to 
Brexit (Watts, 2017).  Clearly there is deep uncertainty linking across from Scotland 
to Northern Ireland (which also voted ‘Remain’) but that uncertainty post-Brexit has 
become so pervasive that it has encouraged a passive ‘hope for the best’ 
disposition. As Interviewee 1 (2015) put it, ‘It’s worrying where we are in relation to 
the UK around Scotland, but it’s one that’s just going to have to play out for a while 
and see how it goes.’  
 
6.3: Self-rule and shared rule? 
The result of the Scottish independence referendum and the ramifications of the 
strong Yes campaign reverberated across the United Kingdom.  One of these 
ramifications was that the United Kingdom as a whole has been forced to take a 
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long hard look at the current structures of the Union, forcing them to engage 
directly in conversations regarding the Union and its future.  Interviewee 1 (2015) 
stated that ‘I think it has made everyone sit up, you know.  The referendum 
subsequent to the success of the SNP has made people sit up and have a second 
look where as before hand people weren’t interested’.  For Unionists in Northern 
Ireland, one of the concerns that they have faced from the start of this campaign 
was that of Irish Nationalism being energised and revigorated by events in Scotland.  
Commentators, such as ex-Army Officer Crispin Black did not help matters by 
coming out with statements such as ‘For those who still dream of a 32-county 
Ireland, it will be a time of opportunity’ (cited Sommers, 2014).  Interviewee 17 
(2015) was concerned that the national divide in Scotland over independence could 
lead to a situation developing similar to the civil unrest which was experienced in 
Northern Ireland, ‘I don’t believe for one second it has helped the Nationalist cause 
in anyway in Scotland. I actually think it has divided opinion along very, ah, strong 
lines now and if they are not careful they will end up with an almost sectarian strife 
that we have seen in Northern Ireland and I think they need to be very, very careful 
about where they go with that debate.’  This warning came from a place of 
friendship, the affinity of someone who has lived through it and experienced the 
deeply held divisions within a society once created are almost impossible to 
remove.  Interviewee 12 (2015) also expressed this view: 
‘It worries me for the future of the Union  [be]cause I think that we’re now 
going to face the same thing in Scotland as we have faced here in Northern 
Ireland where aggressive nationalism will look for every opportunity to 
create a grievance and then from that grievance then try and make political 
capital. And to me, what happened in Scotland is probably a bigger threat to 
the Union than all of the problems that we experienced here over the 
period of the IRA campaign because it’s much more – where people are 
using terrorism it actually galvanises people into resistance.’  
How much impact this may have on Scottish society is yet to be seen, but remains 
an area of interest.  The Scottish independence referendum certainly caused 
divisions within Scotland, an almost half and half split between those who wish to 
leave the United Kingdom and those who wish to remain within it.  If a second 
referendum on Scottish independence were to be held it is not certain how this 
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vote would go towards healing this division.  It may in fact only act to reignite the 
divisions that were caused by the first.  It is interesting to note that some 
participants such as Interviewee 31 (2016) took a more pragmatic approach to the 
ideological stance of the Scottish Nationalist Party, stating that ‘Well, of course the 
Scottish National Party is a separatist party.  They want to break up the Union, they 
want an independent Scotland…’  As stated by Jack (2016) ‘To be fearful is 
sometimes to be wise’ and in the case of the Scottish independence referendum 
this phrase rang true for Ulster Unionists.  
 
From the position of the Unionist politicians interviewed for this research the 
feeling of unease that lingered after the referendum is in part due to the response 
of the Westminster government to the narrow victory to remain.  The morning 
after the referendum David Cameron gave a press conference (Cameron, 2014).  
Although this highlighted that the government at Westminster was pleased with 
the decision of the people of Scotland to remain within the United Kingdom, the 
speech was full of concessions to appease Scottish nationalism, such as the promise 
of more powers being devolved to the Scottish Assembly.  It also weakened the 
victory of Unionists by reigniting debates surrounding the West Lothian Question 
and issues regarding English Nationalism (Cameron, 2014).  Instead of celebrating 
the success of the Remain campaign and seeking to promote a closer, more 
inclusive Union, it opened up a whole new debate that has the potential to weaken 
or erode the United Kingdom.  Participants such as Interviewee 16 (2015) expressed 
their sincere disappointment that the reaction of the Westminster government was 
such that ‘it didn’t bury Scottish devolution, or [the] Scottish referendum for a 
generation.’  A feeling which emerged from the interviews was that this should 
have been an opportunity for David Cameron to cement the United Kingdom by 
praising the result and by starting a national discourse on the strengths and 
benefits of the Union.  The response showed fear from the government of what 
could have been and did little to encourage cohesion across the Union.  An 
unintended, but important, consequence of this response was that it further 
highlighted inequalities between the regions of the United Kingdom (Mullen, 2014: 
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640).  However, as Kenny (2014, 116) has noted, the English are traditionally 
supportive of the autonomy of the smaller nations of the United Kingdom and their 
right to have devolved institutions.  The lack of Westminster involvement then can 
be observed as allowing Scotland the space it needed to decide whether self-rule or 
shared rule was the right choice for it as a nation. 
 
As observed by Interviewee 5 (2015), ‘I think the problem I suppose has been that 
that, a) we had a referendum that got relatively close and b) then that it has 
created a certain level of energy from a separatist point of view and I think that’s 
something again that people would find ah quite worrying.’  Devolution in the 
United Kingdom can only work when a strong central government supports the 
other smaller regions and allows them to make certain decisions within a safe 
space.  This was outlined in the statement by Interviewee 9 (2015): 
‘So in the UK we almost need to look at ourselves as, you know, the various 
tiers in that the UK in itself is the overarching tier, but within each of our 
own regions we can actually make decisions, what’s right for us, and don’t 
have to include the other parts.  And I think, I think we’re very different in 
the different regions within the UK.  I think it’s important that we’re able to 
do that but still we’ll have that overarching stability of the UK.’  
This quote highlights the fact that the United Kingdom should be considered as a 
whole and not only as its individual parts.  The Unionist political focus should be not 
only on ‘self rule’ but also on ‘shared rule’ (Elazar, 1987). This relationship was 
understood by interviewees in the following way. 
 
Devolution is important in what it represents for people more so than what it 
actually achieves (Kay, 2003: 176).  This is why it holds value for both Nationalists 
and Unionists.  For Nationalists it can be seen as a step towards the dissolution of 
the United Kingdom, while for Unionists it can be viewed as a method of ensuring 
the continuation of the Union whilst allowing regional identities space to flourish 
and co-exist, this being partially due to national identities being more important in 
Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales than they are in England (Bond and Rosie, 
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2010: 99; Bechhofer and McCrone, 2012: 1351).  Many participants expressed 
concern that the events of the Scottish independence referendum could have led to 
greater devolution across the United Kingdom (Interviewee 1, 2015; Interviewee 2, 
2015).  The majority of the participants interviewed expressed traditional Unionist 
views that in the United Kingdom the Westminster government must be the largest 
holder of political power and were ‘…quite sceptical on how far we should push 
devolution’ (Interviewee 2, 2015).  Any attempts to disperse power away from 
Westminster could be seen as diluting the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and 
as another step down the road towards the weakening of the Union.  As 
Interviewee 8 (2015) has expressed, ‘Scotland, like ourselves and Wales, to me is an 
integral part of the union and I want to see all four nations staying together 
because that’s … what our strength is … I think we need the strength of that United 
Kingdom.’  From this position, ‘Devolution has always got to be limited and keep 
central power at Westminster’ (Interviewee 1, 2015).  To put that otherwise in the 
language of this thesis, the people of Scotland elected to remain a part of the 
United Kingdom in order to keep the solidarity of the Union and the strength that 
this Union provides. 
  
When discussing the impact the Scottish independence referendum had on 
devolution across the United Kingdom, it would be seriously amiss not to discuss 
the growing public unrest within England over a lack of a purely English parliament. 
The idea of an English parliament, or of English Votes for English Laws, has been 
toyed with as a way of creating greater equality after devolution (Jackson, 2016: 
309).  In discussions surrounding this, this is often envisaged as taking one of two 
forms.  The first is that there would be a distinctive English parliament created to 
manage laws which effect England alone, with Westminster remaining as a national 
parliament for the whole of the United Kingdom (Watt et al, 2014).  This plan would 
raise issues surrounding what this English only parliament would look like.  Also, 
there are very few matters which influence England only (Falconer, 2006: 7).  Were 
would it be geographically?  The north and south of England are so different that 
they may as well be separate countries.  Would there need to be more than one 
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English parliament for each region?  The second of the two ideas is that Members 
of Parliament at Westminster would be distinguished so that only English MPs only 
could vote on English matters (Watt et al, 2014).  Ulster Unionists have been 
consistently critical of this latter option because ‘….the fact is that whatever 
happens at Westminster umm should be to the good and to the advantage of 
everybody within the UK, it shouldn’t just be for one country’ (Interviewee 3, 2015).   
As argued by Interviewee 31 (2016), ‘I can understand where English MPs are 
coming from.  I’m not sure that the current way we deal with English Votes for 
English laws is the best way of dealing with it.  But, again, that needs to be part of a 
wider conversation about how the UK and the nations of the UK work together in 
the future and how much autonomy each one of those nations has.’   
 
Of the participants interviewed many were sympathetic to the aspirations of the 
English that they alone should have a say on the issues which affect them, although 
they did not think that Westminster is the place for this (Interviewee 9, 2015; 
Interviewee 18, 2015).  As stated by Interviewee 2 (2015): 
‘I am sympathetic to Englishmen who, and Englishwomen … who feel that 
Scottish MPs can hold them to ransom, especially if it’s done for cynical 
reasons…I think we have to tread very carefully. Every MP is the same. The 
PM to the lowliest backbencher, we are all equal. It’s not about some being 
more equal than others, we are all equal. The PM just happens to be the 
first amongst the equals in that he is selected to be the PM and that we 
cannot do anything that changes the balance.’  
From a Unionist viewpoint, Westminster is respected as bringing together people 
from all across the United Kingdom to discuss laws and policy for the betterment of 
the Union as a whole.  To change the balance of this may be detrimental to 
members from the smaller regions such as Northern Ireland as they tend to benefit 
from the asymmetrical nature of the devolved settlements (Hazell, 2006: 53).  As 
Interviewee 5 (2015) expressed this, ‘I would be very concerned I think from a 
broader constitutional point of view if we move towards English votes for English 
laws in part because of the fact that ... England from a population base would 
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represent perhaps around 80 or 85% of the overall population … but I can 
understand it. There is a clear feeling of disparity.’  
 
Interviewee 17 (2015) succinctly expressed their thoughts on English Votes for 
English Laws in the dramatic yet impactful statement, ‘Oh I think that would be the 
death knell of the Union’.  However, this is how Westminster now does order its 
business and the Union is still standing (Jackson, 2016).  Other participants 
expressed concern that as England is the largest region of the United Kingdom that 
very little to no legislation truly only affects them and that any decisions they would 
make on an English only basis still filter down to have an impact on the other 
regions.  According to Interviewee 8 (2015), ‘I can see the reason why you would 
want English Votes for English People because clearly we have Scottish laws for 
Scottish people and we are a legislative assembly and we can have Northern Irish 
laws … so it is difficult to disagree with it, but at the same time English laws can 
obviously be amended in ways that affect us.’  For Gover and Kenny (2016: 37-38) 
even the term ‘English Votes for English Laws’ is divisive and that it should be 
changed to ‘English Consent to English Laws’ to prevent it from being seen as 
negative towards the other component nations of the United Kingdom.  Therefore 
how will the United Kingdom address this problem?  As Interviewee 25 (2016) said, 
‘Look, we need a settlement to all of this and I don’t know what it is.  Is it a 
completely federal UK? Is it an English parliament? Is it English Votes for English 
Laws? I don’t know what the answer to that is’.  The question of what is the United 
Kingdom for in the twenty-first century is extremely important post-devolution 
(Jeffery and Wincott, 2006: 10).  The ties which bind the Union together now need 
to be strengthened.  With identity becoming so fragmented across the Union as 
regional identities become more popular than Britishness, it may be that 
strengthening shared rule rather than self-rule alone will be the key to the survival 
of the Union, reconciling allegiance and identity, contract and solidarity and 
instrumentalism and non-instrumentalism (Aughey, 2009: 9). The question of how 
to settle the constitutional question of the United Kingdom is difficult to answer, 
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yet it is a suggestion of this thesis that the theoretical framework of elective affinity 
can at least provide an imaginative grounding of how this can be achieved.   
 
The elective components which bind the regions of the United Kingdom together 
are there.  The Acts of Union are still in place.  Each region still takes part in 
elections to a national parliament and has political representation at this national 
level.  Equally three of the four regions of the United Kingdom have their own 
devolved institutions and have a level of political autonomy to themselves.  
Devolution itself is not a threat to the Union so long as the connections at the 
national level are maintained and to do this one also needs to take into account the 
affinity aspect of the United Kingdom.  The elective ties themselves are not enough.  
To secure a union state and to ensure that it continues one needs a shared sense of 
affinity and belonging to exist between the regions.  This social union needs to be 
strengthened across the United Kingdom in order to move the current argument 
from that of ‘self rule’ alone to ‘shared rule’ within the Union (Elazar, 1987). 
 
6.4: Instrumental and non-instrumental Union? 
From the view point of Unionists in Northern Ireland the decision of the Scottish 
people to remain within the Union was a victory (in the language of this thesis) for 
elective affinity.  Even though a continuation of the social and economic unions was 
promised by the Scottish Nationalist Party for an independent Scotland the best 
method of safeguarding these was to vote to remain within the Union.  The 
instrumental connections are important.  They are the tangible benefits that exist 
as a result of the Union.  Yet even when discussing these there is a non-
instrumental element which cannot be ignored.  As discussed within Chapter Two, 
instrumental and non-instrumental components of the United Kingdom cannot be 
separated as the two are mutually inclusive as argued above in relation to the 
political and social unions.  Thus the single currency of the pound sterling may be a 
primarily instrumental aspect of the United Kingdom, but it is also a part of the 
174 
 
identity of the United Kingdom and therefore of Scotland.  Former Prime Minister 
David Cameron said in his speech after the result was announced, ‘Scotland voted 
for a stronger Scottish Parliament backed by the strength and security of the United 
Kingdom and I want to congratulate the No campaign for that – for showing people 
that our nations really are better together’ (2014).  Although a narrow victory, the 
result of the Scottish independence referendum remains a victory.  As stated by 
Interviewee 21 (2015), ‘I want to see them [Scotland] staying in the Union. Now 
whenever I walk through Westminster and you walk in to the central lobby and you 
look up above you and you have four flags. You have the English, the Welsh, the 
Scottish and the Northern Irish. The four regions come together as one in that place 
and that’s the way I want it to stay.’  Political representation, as discussed within 
Chapter Two, does seek to reconcile the regional within the national.  Whilst 
devolution may allow Scotland and the other devolved regions to have a certain 
level of regional autonomy over their own political affairs, the fact that they then 
also send political representatives to the national parliament at Westminster 
ensures that a tie to the United Kingdom is secure.   
 
This sentiment was also expressed in Interviewee 8’s comment that ‘…I want to see 
all four nations staying together because that’s what keeps us together that what 
our strength is. I think Scotland would be too small to go it alone. I think we need 
the strength of that United Kingdom’ (2015).  This statement is interesting in that it 
fits into the theme of contract and solidarity.  In one sense, the participant is 
arguing that Scotland cannot survive itself and for that reason it should continue to 
keep the contracts it has with the United Kingdom as the larger union state is 
stronger together than it is in its individual component parts.  On the other hand 
this idea of safety in numbers for the regions of the United Kingdom also promotes 
a sense of solidarity between the regions, a sense that together they can 
accomplish more than they ever could apart.  Whatever way the tide of Scottish 
(and Irish) nationalism turns it remains clear that the issues raised by the Scottish 
independence referendum are not finished yet.  For now, Scotland has elected to 
remain a part of the United Kingdom.  There are instrumental reasons for this 
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decision based upon contractual obligations and political allegiances, but there are 
also the non-instrumental reasons of identity and solidarity which can only be 
explained through a shared sense of affinity existing across the United Kingdom.  
Chapter Four argues that the paradoxes of Ulster Britishness can be described using 
the theory of elective affinity.  This is also the case of explaining how Scotland voted 
to remain within the Union. 
 
6.5: Conclusion 
The question of how Scottish independence or a more autonomous form of 
devolution will affect Northern Ireland has been open to much debate.  
Commentators such as Maxwell (2012) believe that: 
‘it seems unlikely that the break-up of the Anglo-Scottish Union would bring 
Sinn Fein’s dream of a united Ireland any closer to realisation … The most 
recent Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, an authoritative account of 
political attitudes in the north, shows that 73 per cent of the Ulster 
electorate as a whole wants to remain part of the UK, with 52 per cent of 
Catholic voters content to maintain the union with Britain. (The figure for 
Protestants is 96 per cent.)’.   
Some Unionist politicians such as Lord Empey have argued that the current Scottish 
situation has the ability to reignite difficulties which have been dormant in 
Northern Irish society in recent years, ‘I don't wish to exaggerate, but if the Scottish 
nationalists were to succeed it could possibly reignite the difficulties we have just 
managed to overcome’ (cited Maxwell, 2012).   
 
Much of the concern of the Unionists interviewed for this thesis is focused on the 
perception that it is now Scotland and not Northern Ireland which is the most 
unstable and volatile region of the United Kingdom.  Interviewee 2 (2015) ‘I 
remember at the time thinking “It’s amazing what difference 10 years makes”, 
where 10-15 years ago Northern Ireland was the most unstable part of the Union.  
Today Scotland is the most unstable part of the Union and Northern Ireland’s 
probably one of the more stable parts’.  The overwhelming sentiment that emerged 
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from the question on the Scottish independence campaign was the feeling of 
unease that is still felt by Unionist politicians in relation to this.  The continued 
strength of the Nationalist movement in Scotland even after the outcome of the 
referendum still plays on the mind of Unionists, ‘So it’s a worrying situation that 
there’s still a campaign there, I hope if there is another referendum that folk will 
again see sense … But I am worried that Nicola Sturgeon is saying she’s going to be 
coming back for another bite of the cherry’ (Interviewee 13, 2015).  As Interviewee 
26 replied (2016), ‘I would be very sad and very disappointed if Scotland didn’t 
remain within the United Kingdom.’  As observed above, to ensure that Scotland 
continues to elect to remain as a part of the United Kingdom the social aspects of 
the Union must be strengthened to ensure that Scotland continues to feel as 
though it belongs within this union state. 
 
For the participants of this research, the Scottish independence referendum was 
defined by a series of paradoxes, these being: anxiety and reassurance, self-rule 
and shared rule, and Instrumentalism and non-instrumentalism.  As discussed 
above, Ulster unionists within Northern Ireland experienced each of these concepts 
during the 2014 referendum.  They were anxious about the referendum, but were 
reassured by the decision of the Scottish electorate to remain within the United 
Kingdom.  However, the 2016 European referendum once again raised the spectre 
of Scottish independence, resulting in a continued presence of anxiety surrounding 
this topic.  The participants, being Unionists, are advocators of the shared rule of 
the United Kingdom, but they are also supporters of the right of each region of the 
United Kingdom to have its own devolved institutions.  The concern surrounding 
this would be the potential risk that English and Scottish nationalism, rather than 
Irish Nationalism, may have over the future of the Union.  The referendum also 
provided an opportunity to discuss the instrumental and non-instrumental 
components of the United Kingdom and using the Scottish independence 
referendum as a case study, this thesis argues that elective affinity exists within the 
United Kingdom.  The Scottish electorate elected to remain within the United 
Kingdom, underling a shared sense of affinity between Scotland and the rest of the 
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United Kingdom that has resulted in the majority of the Scottish population feeling 
as though they belong within the Union.  
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Chapter Seven 
Questions of European Union 
 
7.1: Introduction 
While Europe bears the same nomenclature of a union, it differs from the British 
Union in many obvious ways.  First, it is a union of very distinctive sovereign states 
that came together through trade agreements and beneficial shared policies, or in 
other words, mainly for instrumental rather than for non-instrumental reasons.  
This relationship portrays a version of elective affinity yet to be discussed, that of 
an inverted elective affinity in which in the balance of relationships, contract takes 
priority over solidarity, diversity over unity, instrumental over non-instrumental, 
and self-rule over shared rule. The United Kingdom had a referendum in 1975 on 
continued membership of the then European Economic Community (Curtice, 2016: 
209).  Yet while the elective component exists, the European Union has never 
succeeded in securing deep affinities - or a sense of European identity - for the 
majority of British citizens (Hewstone, 1986; Cinnirella, 1997).  Even though the 
Scottish Nationalist movement sought to leave the United Kingdom in 2014, when it 
came down to the actual vote the majority of the Scottish people chose to remain.  
This is the result of centuries of shared history and belonging that Scotland shares 
with the rest of the United Kingdom.  However, the European Union never fully 
achieved this sense of affinity to complement its economic and political roles and as 
a result the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union on the 26th June 
2016 (Manson et al, 2016).  This chapter addresses the questions of inverted 
elective affinity which have emerged during the European referendum and its 
aftermath and will discuss this within the frameworks of contract and solidarity, 
difference and unity and allegiance and identity which have been used to examine 
Unionism and Britishness throughout this thesis.   
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7.2: Contract not solidarity 
If we are to examine the relationship between Ulster Unionists and the European 
Union through the framework of inverted elective affinity, it is important to discuss 
it as a contradiction an inversion of our understanding of elective affinity.  
Therefore, rather than the relationship being one of contract and solidarity, it 
becomes one of contract without solidarity and this distinction is key when 
observing the decision of the United Kingdom as a whole to leave the European 
Union.  Elective affinity binds the United Kingdom together through a combination 
of constitutional and political contracts, whilst also creating a sense of belonging 
and solidarity through shared culture, history and identity.  This is not the case for 
the European Union.  It may have the contractual ties in place, but without a shared 
sense of European identity to reinforce these contracts they are fragile and this is 
why the majority of the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union on the 
23rd June 2017.  With no deeply shared sense of belonging to bind the British 
electorate to Europe, they were able to look at the contractual relationship in 
purely instrumental terms and as a result decided that the negatives outweighed 
any benefits the United Kingdom received from the European Union.  What then do 
Ulster Unionists think of the European referendum and do their views and opinions 
prove the existence of this inverted elective affinity?  This will be discussed at 
length in this chapter.   
 
The interviewees were asked to give their views on the European referendum.  It is 
important to note that most of the interviews were conducted in 2015 before the 
date of the referendum had been decided.  This is why the wording for this 
question originally refers to if and not when.   
What do you believe will happen if there is an EU referendum? 
The timing of the referendum may account for the high number of undecided 
responses from participants who were unwilling to give voice to whether they 
wished to leave or remain in the European Union.  This section will provide a brief 
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summary of the opinions of participants surrounding the European referendum.  
Further analysis is provided in the following section. 
 
Table 7.1: EU referendum voting inclination of participants 
This table examines the view held by each participant on the European referendum. 
Participant Remain Leave Undecided 
1  Yes  
2  Yes  
3   Yes 
4   Yes 
5  Yes  
6   Yes 
7 *Interview cut short* 
8   Yes 
9   Yes 
10    
11   Yes 
12  Yes  
13  Yes  
14   Yes 
15   Yes 
16 Yes   
17  Yes  
18  Yes  
19   Yes, but closer to 
remain 
20  Yes  
21  Yes  
22  Yes  
181 
 
23  Yes  
24  Yes  
25   Yes 
26  Yes  
27   Yes 
28   Yes 
29  Yes  
30  Yes  
31  Yes  
32   No defined answer 
33 Yes   
34 Yes   
35  Yes  
 
Fig.7.1: Participants indication of how they will vote in the EU referendum  
This graph portrays the information from Table 7.1 in a visual manner in order to 
show more concisely the breakdown in opinions around this question. 
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When examining age in relation to how participants viewed the European 
referendum, some interesting findings emerged.  Although most of the interviews 
conducted for this thesis took place before the referendum was held, the break 
down as observed within Fig.7.1 manages to be a reasonably accurate portrayal of 
the overall Protestant/Unionist vote in Northern Ireland, which was spilt around 
70% Leave to 30% Remain in opinion polls in the months leading up to the 
referendum (White, 2016).  One participant to say outright that the United 
Kingdom should remain in Europe was within the 35-44 age category, with the 
other two Remainers being in the 45-54 category.  More interesting is the 
observation that participants from the 45 to 64 age range were more likely to 
express the view that the United Kingdom should leave the European Union.  One 
reason that might explain this is that these participants remember the first 
referendum on Europe and can remember a time when it was considered to be 
mainly an economic union with contractual benefits.  Having watched the European 
Union develop into a more political and potentially federal association may have 
been the swaying factor for these individuals.  On the reverse of that, participants 
from the 25-34 age category tended to be more cautious in regards to the 
European referendum and were largely undecided at the time of the interviews.  
One explanation for this is that having grown up with the European Union they 
have more of a sense of solidarity with it, having not experienced life in a United 
Kingdom that was not a part of the European Union. 
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Fig.7.2: Breakdown of participant’s inclination to vote in EU referendum based on 
age
 
Due to the low number of female Unionist designated politicians who took part in 
this study, no actual generalisations can be made.   
 
Fig. 7.3: Breakdown of participant’s inclination to vote in EU referendum based on 
gender
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As observed in Chapter Five, only three participants expressed that they had a 
European component to their identity (Interviewee 7, 2015; Interviewee 16, 2015; 
Interviewee 20, 2015).  What is interesting about this is that all three of these 
participants only mentioned a European component due to the fact that they 
quoted John Hewitt in regards to their identity (see Chapter Five).  One would 
assume that having a European component to their identity would mean that these 
participants would be more likely to want to remain within the European Union, yet 
this was not so clear cut.  Unfortunately, the interview with Interviewee 7 was cut 
short due to circumstances that were outside of the control of either the 
participant or the researcher and due to this we do not know their stance on the 
European referendum.  Interviewee 16 stated that they would vote to Remain 
within the European Union.  This would make sense in regards to what we know 
about elective affinity.  Interviewee 16 felt that they had an affinity to Europe and 
elected to remain within it, arguing that ‘Now I would like as somebody who 
believes in the UK to be making the argument that the UK and Northern Ireland … is 
better in the European Union, you know’ (2015).  However, Interviewee 20 feels 
that they have a European component to their identity, but that they will still vote 
to leave the European Union.  As Interviewee 20 explained, ‘we don’t ignore the 
benefits and there are some.  Northern Ireland as a region has benefited more 
financially than any other … [but] if the referendum was tomorrow we would say 
thanks very much, it’s been an interesting experiment, but love many, trust few, 
always paddle your own canoe and that’s what we should do as a country’ (2015).  
What this statement from Interviewee 20 highlights is that the affinity between the 
United Kingdom and the European Union and the benefits that it receives from its 
membership of this union is not strong enough to overlook the negative aspects of 
it.  This is inverted elective affinity in action. 
 
Not all of the participants were confident about the perceived benefits of leaving 
the European Union.  This was not due to a feeling of solidarity with the European 
Union, but because of the contractual relationship and the benefits with the United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland has received from it.  Unionism, and in particular the 
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Ulster Unionist Party, has been going through a pragmatic change in attitudes 
towards their relationship with the European Union (Murphy, 2009: 590).  
Interviewee 11 (2015) expressed unease with the referendum over the impact it 
could have on the economic union in particular, stating that, ‘I would be a little bit 
cautious over it and certainly we need to listen to the business community who 
would be very nervous about leaving the EU and the farming community as well 
who obviously benefit hugely from ah Europe.’  The contractual aspects of the 
European Union have provided many benefits for the United Kingdom.  Interviewee 
4 (2015) raised the financially pragmatic point that: 
‘Europe is going to be there.  It’s a landmass which we have to deal with.  So 
the question then is: how do we deal with it? What form or partnership 
does that take? Ah, when you look at some of the nations … outside of the 
EU they still have to pay money in trade deals.  So are they getting a good 
deal being outside of Europe, but still have to pay money in trade deals?’   
 
One of the key claims made by those supporting Leave - that the United Kingdom 
would have the capability to negotiate more lucrative trade deals and immigration 
policies outside of the European Union (Leave.eu, 2016: 2) – was met by this 
respondent at least with some scepticism.  Worryingly for Unionists and those of 
the electorate who voted to Leave on the basis of immigration one of the possible 
clauses of a trade deal with the European Union may be to retain the freedom of 
movement which is currently in place (Rampen, 2016).  It is also questionable just 
how much money the United Kingdom will actually save in this manner, and even 
greater questions have been raised over how the money that has been saved will 
be transferred back into the economy of the United Kingdom.  When trying to 
understand why such a large proportion of participants unsure as to how they 
would vote in the referendum, one possible answer may be that the Remain 
campaign was viewed as weak and provided no real tangible information to the 
electorate in the weeks leading up to the referendum.  Interviewee 16 (2015) 
expressed the view that there should have been an argument that ‘the UK and 
Northern Ireland … is better in the European Union’ yet this rhetoric was not often 
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heard during the campaign.  The sense of confusion surrounding the European 
referendum was captured by Interviewee 27 (2016) in the statement: 
‘Oh my word … if you are voting with your heart you would vote out 
because you want to see Northern Ireland, the United Kingdom be the great 
country that it was and that it should be, you know, but at the same time we 
are part of Europe, umm, and we joined it for the trade agreements and the. 
You know, the free market.  Umm, and so, if you are voting with your head, 
should we stay in?  I think there is so much information that we actually 
really need.  There is so much propaganda out there that you don’t know 
what to believe either and so it is, it is very difficult.’  
 
Interviewee 28 (2016) was also deeply troubled, arguing, ‘I think there’s, I think 
there is a lot of scaremongering going on from all sides, umm, and there is not 
enough clear facts there.’  In regards to the larger focus of the thesis, this can be 
connected to the fear of belonging and the doubt component of Ulster Unionists 
identity.  Ulster Unionists have no real affinity with Europe or a sense of belonging, 
but there are instrumental and contractual connections which cannot be 
overlooked.  This is the inverted version of elective affinity noted in the 
introduction to this chapter.  Here is a paradox difficult to reconcile and when put 
to the test, as it was in the European Union referendum, and when forced to 
choose most Unionists chose to vote Leave.  This is why even an individual such as 
Interviewee 20 who expressed a European component to their identity would still 
rather leave the European Union than remain within it. 
 
Without a sense of affinity and solidarity towards the European Union, participants 
focused on the contractual aspects of Europe.  From the perspective of businesses, 
participants were concerned over whether leaving the European Union really was 
the best option.  As outlined by Interviewee 15 (2015): 
‘Well, I’m not the most enthusiastic European Union supporter, but 
obviously there are advantages and disadvantages … Now it’s going to be 
very difficult to leave Europe because there is a lot of businesses rely on a 
lot of the European trade…’   
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Does leaving the European Union then result in more opportunities for businesses?  
Is it the best decision contractually and instrumentally?  There was a pragmatic 
approach to the relationship between money and the European Union that ran 
through the interview process, but as expressed by Interviewee 20 (2015), ‘finance 
is crude.  We can’t focus on it alone and we need to look at the barriers, the pit 
falls.’  Interviewee 9 (2015) took the view that if one were only to look at financial 
gain when making this decision that ‘from that point of view we probably should 
stay’ as during this time European funding is one of the only pots of money 
available for certain types of projects.  Northern Ireland has often been heavily 
dependent on money from the European Union, most notably through the Peace 
Funding money which was available for infrastructure and for cross-community 
projects (O’Carroll and McDonald, 2016; Whysall, 2016: 2; EU debate NI, 2016: 9; 
House of Commons, 2016: 10; Leave the EU, 2016: 97).  How the decision to leave 
the European Union will affect this funding is an area of concern for Northern 
Ireland as latest figures show that ‘Northern Ireland [is] due to receive almost €3.4 
billion over the current EU budget period 2014-2020, with additional funds 
expected from centrally managed EU programmes’ (Ulster Unionist Party, 2016: 5).  
From a contractual viewpoint one may argue that it would have been more 
beneficial for Northern Ireland to remain within the European Union, yet without a 
sense of solidarity to support the contractual arrangements they were not strong 
enough to endure.   
 
The issue of trade was brought up as a main reason why the Unionist politicians 
who were interviewed wished to leave the European Union.  The idea that the 
United Kingdom gives more money to the European Union than it receives back was 
prevalent throughout the interviews and within wider Unionism. 
‘As a country we are pouring, you know, twice as much into the European 
Union as we ever get out of it, umm, and are we seeing net benefits which 
would offset that?  I actually don’t believe we are’ (Interviewee 17, 2015).   
The relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom is portrayed 
as one that is overwhelmingly contractual with very little solidarity to underpin it.  
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Ulster Unionists, as discussed within previous chapters, feel solidarity with the 
United Kingdom, but this has never been the case with the European Union.  For 
some participants there was a perception that ‘we burnt too many bridges in 
joining the EU’, something that could be rectified by leaving the European Union 
and being in a position to negotiate a better, separate trade deal, one which would 
benefit the United Kingdom far more than had previously done (Interviewee 1, 
2015).  For example, more trading partnerships could be created with nations such 
as the United States of America (Oliver and Williams, 2016).  Being a member of the 
European Union was seen as restrictive when it came to forging trade deals with 
other parts of the world.  Interviewee 31 (2016) provided a concise outline of this 
feeling in the statement: 
‘Our economy is doing well, but we are constrained by the fact that our EU 
membership means we can’t negotiate trade agreements with big countries 
like China, India, the United States, even our Commonwealth partners like 
Canada and Australia, we can’t negotiate bi-lateral trade agreements.  So I 
actually think that being outside of the European Union now, but having a 
strong relationship with the EU, gives us the freedom to negotiate trade 
agreements to the benefit of the UK economy.’ 
To provide the United Kingdom, and as a direct result Northern Ireland, with the 
best options for increasing trade deals many felt leaving the European Union was 
necessary to allow the United Kingdom to have full access to these markets 
(Interviewee 6, 2015).  As the world continues to get smaller due to increased 
travel, ease of moving goods and globalisation, it is necessary for the United 
Kingdom to compete in global markets, something it has found difficult to do within 
the confines of the European Union (Interviewee 22, 2015).  Some participants felt 
the European Union was fine when it was purely an economic union, but the 
increased bureaucracy greatly outweighs the benefits the United Kingdom receives 
from these trade deals (Interviewee 6, 2015).  What is interesting about these 
findings is that the responses provided by participants are not specific to Northern 
Ireland.  Instead, they are very much of a ‘British’ response.  What this shows is that 
the sense of shared affinity which exists between Great Britain and Ulster Unionists 
in regards to opinions surrounding the European Union.  Elective affinity may be 
inverted in regards to the European Union, but this is not the case for the United 
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Kingdom (see Chapter Four, section 4.3).  The United Kingdom as a whole voted to 
leave the European Union by 51.9% to 48.1% (BBC News, 2016b).  Whilst Northern 
Ireland voted as a whole to remain within the European Union at 55.8% of the vote, 
Unionists were overwhelmingly shown to be voting to leave in pre-referendum 
polls in keeping with the majority decision of the whole of the United Kingdom 
(White, 2016).  For Arlene Foster, the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, this 
decision meant that ‘We are now entering a new era of an even stronger United 
Kingdom’ (BBC News, 2016b).  
 
The European referendum has been and gone, but the impact on the United 
Kingdom is only just beginning.  Now the decision has been made that the United 
Kingdom is leaving the European Union and Article 50 has been triggered, the key 
question which remains is: How will this affect the United Kingdom in the future 
and Northern Ireland’s place within it?  It may be that the only way for the United 
Kingdom to succeed is to focus on making this transition as smooth and as 
beneficial for all the regions of the Union as possible.  How this will be managed is 
difficult as even within the Unionist community in Northern Ireland, a section of the 
United Kingdom well known for being distinctively Eurosceptic, there is still 
uncertainty over Brexit and its implications.  As outlined by Interviewee 4 (2015):  
‘There’s so many unanswered questions. What does Europe look like in the 
future whether we’re in it or not? What does the UK look like if we’re in it or 
not? What does the relationship look like if we’re in it or not? Those are all 
questions that I can’t answer. So how can I who has got the finger on the 
pulse, who eats and breathes and sleeps this stuff, if I don’t know those 
questions answers how can I go into a polling booth and make a decision on 
a referendum? How can ordinary people that don’t really know about 
Europe and what it does and what it doesn’t do and how it regulates and 
how it doesn’t and the burden on it and the regulations, how do they make 
an informed decision? And that, the whole thing worries me?’ 
The result of the European referendum of the 23rd June 2016, then, has the 
potential to become one of the biggest risks and destabilizing factors for Unionism.  
Though Article 50 was triggered on the 29th March 2017 it remains (at the time of 
writing) unclear about what sort of deal the United Kingdom can reach with the EU 
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27 and how this will affect Northern Ireland’s border with the Republic of Ireland 
(Hughes and Midgley, 2017; House of Lords, 2016: 5).  Thus, for Northern Ireland in 
particular, Brexit raises serious territorial, constitutional and financial questions 
which do not affect any other region of the United Kingdom.  The situation 
surrounding the border with the Republic of Ireland has not been sufficiently 
addressed, even though politicians on both sides of the border - as well as the 
British Government and the EU Commission - have made public commitments to do 
their best to avoid a ‘hard border’ (Campbell, 2017).  At the time of writing, there is 
currently an ongoing issue in regards to these negotiations, with European Union 
officials stating that trade talks between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union cannot take place until a border agreement has been reach, whilst British 
politicians argue that ‘a final decision on the Northern Irish border cannot be made 
until a UK-EU trade deal has been agreed’ (Elgot et al, 2017).  These concepts of 
diversity and unity within the United Kingdom following the European referendum 
will be discussed within the next section. 
 
7.3: Difference not Unity 
So far this thesis has discussed unity-in-diversity as an element in elective affinity 
within the United Kingdom.  However, in the case of Ulster Unionists and the 
European Union this changes to difference not unity.  This argument is that 
difference cannot be reconciled in ‘inverted’ elective affinity such that the very thin 
sense of allegiance to the structures and objectives of the EU was always fragile and 
conditional.  This difference is not just in relation to the United Kingdom and the 
European Union.  Another difference which is vital to this thesis is the perception 
that Ulster Unionists do not think positively of European Union unity and only 
observe the differences which exist between the United Kingdom and the European 
Union.   
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From a cursory glance, one may wonder why this referendum had such an impact 
on the Union as the United Kingdom as a whole would be either in or out of it as a 
result.  The issue came from the breakdown of the vote.  Overall, the United 
Kingdom voted to leave by a narrow margin of 51.9% to 48.1% with an overall voter 
turnout rate of 72.2% (The Electoral Commission, 2016).  The voting pattern across 
the four regions varied.  England and Wales both voted to leave by 53.4% and 
52.5% respectively, but Northern Ireland and Scotland voted to remain by 55.8% 
and 62% respectively (BBC News, 2016b).  In light of this Scotland began to call for a 
second independence referendum, a mere two years after the first.  Gone was the 
idea that the 2014 Scottish independence referendum would put that debate to 
rest for a generation.  Northern Ireland is also unsure of its position within the post-
Brexit United Kingdom.  It is the only region of the United Kingdom to share a land 
border with a European Union member state, the Republic of Ireland.  Would this 
result lead to the creation of a hard border between the two countries?  How 
would this affect the movement of people?  Could this also lead to increased 
support for a United Ireland to ensure Northern Ireland remains a member of the 
European Union?  All these questions remain unanswered, with little or no 
indication of answers being provided satisfactorily any time soon. 
 
For Unionists in Northern Ireland, this is a particularly worrying development.  
Whilst British sovereignty free from the confines of the European Union is at the 
foremost of most Unionists desires for the United Kingdom, was this bought at too 
high a price?  The potential consequence that this could lead to the break-up of the 
Union is an issue which was not often discussed in detail in the weeks leading up to 
the referendum, an accurate representation perhaps of the old adage, ‘Out of sight, 
out of mind’.  However, it is necessary to note that this was not viewed as a 
potential consequence by the Democratic Unionist Party who actively campaigned 
for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union (Belfast Telegraph, 2016a; 
Foster, 2016).  Between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Ulster Unionist Party 
there have been large differences over what a vote to leave in the European 
referendum would mean for the border.  The Democratic Unionist Party 
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campaigned for Leave in the run up to the referendum, while the Ulster Unionist 
Party erred on the side of caution, but they still support the decision of the United 
Kingdom as a whole to leave the European Union after the referendum result was 
known (Gormley-Heenan and Aughey, 2017: 503; Ulster Unionist Party, 2016).  This 
difference in attitudes is also apparent when one observes how party voters 
reacted to this referendum.  A 2016 study by Garry and Coakley found that 70% of 
Democratic Unionist Party voters and 54% of Ulster Unionist Party voters voted to 
leave the European Union (Fealty, 2016).  For some Unionists in Northern Ireland 
the risk this referendum brought to the unity of the Union was at the foremost of 
their thoughts before the referendum.  The 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum was still in the memory of many, as well as more recent statements by 
the Scottish First Minster Nicola Sturgeon that Scotland would call another 
independence referendum if the United Kingdom voted to leave the European 
Union.  For Interviewee 15 (2015), this was something that needed to be 
considered before the referendum was held:  
‘Yeah, well Scotland have clearly said if that happens they’ll go for another 
referendum vote and want to remain in Europe. It’s a big issue and … you 
know it could raise all sorts of questions around the Union.’   
Leaving the European Union was a massive decision and one that must be managed 
delicately so that it does not have the consequence of further weakening the 
United Kingdom.   
 
The difference that has emerged between the voting of the nations of the United 
Kingdom over the European referendum must be taken into account during the 
leaving process so that the United Kingdom can move forward as a single unit and 
not fragmented.  As Interviewee 2 (2015) colourfully described this situation: 
‘we’re fighting not only the full frontal battle on Europe and our relationship 
with Europe, but also fighting a backwards retreat movement on our 
relationship with Scotland … that’s going to be dramatic and maybe 
traumatic.’   
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This has the potential to create division within the Union unless the unease of the 
electorate of Northern Ireland and Scotland who wished to remain within the 
European Union are addressed and calmed.  Interviewee 13 expressed concern over 
this in 2015: 
‘If the referendum on Europe votes to leave, but the constituent parts 
Scotland and Wales want to stay, I think that could be a really difficult 
constitutional issue because [of] the move for independence in Scotland and 
they could easily vote to stay … they would demand independence within 
the EU and then you would have a situation of Scotland remaining in the 
European Union and England not.’ 
It can be argued that very little heed was taken of the Scottish dimension before 
the referendum and it is only now in the aftermath that it has been realised as a 
potentially destabilising factor.  Questions surrounding consent also need to be 
delicately addressed within the Union in relation to Brexit.  The United Kingdom as 
a whole may have voted to Leave the European Union, but Northern Ireland and 
Scotland both voted to Remain.  One way to minimise any potential damage is to 
ensure that the voices of the people of Northern Ireland are heard during 
discussions on the future of the United Kingdom post-Brexit and that they are 
allowed to influence the political agenda surrounding this (Davis cited House of 
Commons, 2016).  One thing is for certain and that is that Brexit ‘holds issues for 
the Union in the longer term’ in regards to managing difference and promoting 
unity and that it will continue to be an issue within the United Kingdom for the 
foreseeable future as it continues the process of leaving the European Union 
(Interviewee 12, 2015). 
 
The situation surrounding Brexit in Northern Ireland is one that will take careful 
management to ensure the best deal is achieved for the people of this region.  Even 
though the majority of the Northern Irish electorate voted to Remain within the 
European Union, the Democratic Unionist Party, the largest Unionist party in 
Northern Ireland, campaigned for the Leave campaign.  This is in part due to the 
Eurosceptic nature of Unionism in Northern Ireland (Minto et al, 2016: 180; 
Peatling, 2001: 375).  As this referendum was held after the 2016 Assembly Election 
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in which the Democratic Unionist Party won 38 out of the 108 seats available 
(resulting in it retaining its position as the largest party in Northern Ireland), this 
was seen by many to give the party a larger platform to campaign on.  As explained 
by Interviewee 31 (2016): 
‘…the DUP was the only main party that campaigned for leave and to 
achieve 44% of the vote in Northern Ireland is no mean achievement in my 
opinion.  And so the DUP was very pleased with the outcome of the 
referendum because not only did we, umm, increase support significantly in 
Northern Ireland for the leave option, we also saw an overall majority in the 
UK.  So the DUP supports the decision of the British people to leave the 
European Union.’ 
 
For many of the participants interviewed the issue of sovereignty came first and 
foremost in any conversation about the European referendum. 
‘Like a lot of Unionists I would have some concerns over the, ah, 
federalisation of Europe and indeed as someone who sees themselves as 
very pro-British as wanting to maintain the sovereignty of the UK’ 
(Interviewee 5, 2015).   
How issues of national sovereignty within the United Kingdom are influenced by the 
European Union has long been an area of concern for Unionists in Northern Ireland 
(Meehan, 2000: 87).  Sovereignty can unite a country, but a lack of it can lead to 
fragmentation.  For some, the high level of European Union bureaucracy that is 
being forced upon the United Kingdom is the main reason why Brexit needed to 
happen.  Interviewee 13 (2015) argued that, ‘I really do get annoyed when Europe 
tries to force its values upon a liberal democracy such as the United Kingdom’ and 
Interviewee 26 (2016) stated that:  
‘The bureaucracy of the European Union is absolutely scandalous … the 
sooner we close Strasburg and actually put the real power at the centre of 
our devolved administrations and our national parliament I think it would be 
better for everybody’.   
For others the large scale of the European Union and the level of power held by it 
was an area of concern that could not be over looked and that smaller sovereign 
units were much more representative of the people they served (Interviewee 11, 
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2015).  This is an interesting point to raise as leaving the European Union has the 
possibility to increase the power of all government institutions in Northern Ireland 
(Gallagher, 2016: 2).  In the words of Interviewee 24 (2015): 
‘I think there is a lot to be said for smaller units. Trying to balance together 
or hold together a lot of different countries in that sort of union doesn’t 
work. And I think the United Kingdom is just about the right size.’ 
 
These narratives fit into the wider theoretical framework of the thesis through the 
concept of inverted elective affinity.  This idea is when elective affinity is flipped on 
its head.  Unlike the elective affinity mentioned previously within this thesis that 
can be used to reconcile issues of allegiance and identity, this variation contains 
contradictions which cannot be democratically reconciled.  Whilst the relationship 
between the regions of the United Kingdom are bound by both allegiance and 
identity this allows the Union to stay together even in the most difficult of times 
this cannot be said for the relationship between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union.  Rather, this relationship is purely one of contractual and 
instrumental connections with no deeply shared sense of identity, solidarity or 
affinity.  Without cultural and historical affinities of the sort developed under 
sovereign states to provide a stable underpinning for the constitutional and 
economic unions, there is little to prevent this grouping from separating, as has 
been the case with the United Kingdom and the European Union.  Daniel Innerarity 
has stated that for the European Union to work without this sense of demos it 
would have to ‘replace belonging with identification’, highlighting the inverted 
elective affinity which is present within this union (2014: 26).  Rather than having 
an ingrained sense of belonging to the European Union, individuals within it would 
instead have to choose to identify with a European identity through elective means. 
 
One of the largest issues regarding sovereignty relates to the nature of the laws and 
policies implemented in the United Kingdom at the request of the European Union.  
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For many of the participants, the policy making aspect of the European Union had 
become little more than a joke with Interviewee 3 (2015) expressing this as: 
‘… whenever I look at stupid things … that Europe has done I find myself 
taking a very right wing view on it.  I mean, let’s just get out of here!  It’s 
damaged beyond repair, let’s just get out.’   
Interviewee 12 (2015) also expressed a similar sentiment in the comment: 
‘I think we’d be better off out of Europe, and I think that Europe has 
impinged on our national sovereignty in ways which are unacceptable. So 
many EU directives now can have, supersede anything which we can do in 
parliament and it will be one which again I think has the potential to weaken 
the Union because the Scottish nationalists have said they’re pro-Europe 
and if Britain votes to leave Europe then that gives them another reason not 
to feel British and not to want to go along the direction which Britain is 
going in. So it holds big, I think it holds issues for the Union in the longer 
term. I still think we’re better off out and I’m still voting for better off out.’  
The feeling of frustration which comes from being an elected representative, but 
not having any tangible autonomy over policy creation and law making was a strong 
recurrent theme during the interview process (Interviewee 20, 2015; and 
Interviewee 21, 2015; Bulmer et al, 2006: 77).  The control of the European Union 
over Westminster led to a feeling of disconnect between the component nations of 
the United Kingdom, an issue that does little to promote feelings of political 
solidarity and unity across the Union.  Interviewee 29 (2016) best outlines this 
feeling of powerlessness which resulted from this lack of sovereignty in the 
statement: 
‘…I can’t answer as to what the overall picture will be, but certainly the 
majority of people I have been speaking to would be of an opinion to leave 
and the basis that you know, they feel that too many of our laws and 
regulations are being set by Europe and that we want to have more control 
over those.  Ah, in terms of immigration and our borders we need more 
control.  It’s not about shutting the UK down and closing everything, it’s 
about, you know, more tight in terms of regulation, umm, and of course the 
issue as well of how much we put into Europe and the debate around, you 
know, are we getting value for money back and how do we control our 
expenditure better and we feel that’s best done by our own UK 
government.’  
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For Ulster Unionists the concept of difference not unity is that of the differences 
between the United Kingdom and the European Union and the fact that these 
differences cannot be reconciled due to the nature of inverted elective affinity.  The 
issue now is that since the European referendum it has become more about the 
differences within the unity of the United Kingdom.  When observing questions of 
unity and diversity within the United Kingdom and how these have been affected by 
the European referendum and its aftermath, the threat Scottish Nationalism poses 
post-European referendum cannot be underestimated.  It is important to consider 
the Scottish element to these debates in that Scotland voted to remain within the 
European Union and that this has reignited calls for a second independence 
campaign.  Interestingly, the result of the referendum was almost perfectly 
predicted by Interviewee 25 (2016) before the referendum, stating: 
‘What will be the effect on the Union?  It will depend on the results within 
the Union.  If England votes no and the UK as a whole votes no, but 
Northern Ireland and Scotland and Wales votes yes then that’s obviously 
one country and the verdict of the people, but within that that can have a 
destabilising effect.  If nothing else it will give Nicola Sturgeon and the SNP a 
reason to go back and say this is why we need another referendum’. 
One certainty is that nothing surrounding this is certain, ‘You can only ever tell 
when it happens and by then it’s too late’ (Interviewee 9, 2015).  As discussed in 
Chapter Six, the ties which bind the Union are strained, but they are not quite 
broken yet.  For the Unionists interviewed, the European Union is seen as an alter-
ego (Jekyll to Hyde) of the United Kingdom which inverts the concepts of allegiance 
and identity, contract and solidarity and unity and belonging that have been 
previously discussed within the thesis. 
 
7.4: Neither Identity nor Allegiance  
Identity, as discussed in previous chapters, is one of the pillars that holds the United 
Kingdom together.  Allegiance is another.  Whilst both of these concepts can form 
political linkages on their own, they are inherently weak without both aspects to 
strengthen and complement each other (see Chapter Two).  This is one of the areas 
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in which the idea of inverted elective affinity can best be observed in relation to the 
European Union and the United Kingdom.  The electorate of the United Kingdom 
may have voted to stay in the European Economic Community in 1975 and have 
been connected to Europe through many contractual and instrumental policies and 
agreements, but the European Union has never succeeded in substantially creating 
a supranational identity sufficiently strong to shift the primary allegiance of British 
citizens as a whole (Hayward, 2006: 910).  Even with an overarching European 
identification (rather than identity) the United Kingdom generally felt as though it 
was a place apart within this union, a symbolic scenario similar in many ways to 
Northern Ireland’s place within the United Kingdom (Carl, 2003: 478; Hepburn and 
McLoughlin, 2011: 386).  The United Kingdom, although part of Europe, is not 
connected to the landmass as it is separated by the English Channel.  This physical 
separation enhances the distinctions between the British and European identities.  
A consequence of this lack of shared identity, allegiance, affinity and sense of 
belonging within the United Kingdom towards the European Union is in part the 
reason why the electorate of the United Kingdom as a whole voted to leave.  
Research by John Garry in 2016 found that ‘Sixty-three percent of British identifiers 
[in Northern Ireland] voted to leave’, highlighting a shared affinity with the majority 
of the United Kingdom in regards to the referendum.  So far the focus has been on 
the contractual and instrumental aspects of the relationship between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom.  This section will shift the focus onto the questions 
surrounding identity as raised by both the European referendum and the 
implementation of the decision to leave the European Union. 
 
For Great Britain, leaving the European Union has little impact on its physical 
borders and only becomes a problem when borders are discussed in terms of 
immigration, freedom of movement or trade agreements (Springford, 2014).  This 
cannot be said for Northern Ireland, the one part of the United Kingdom where 
questions of borders post-Brexit will affect the day to day lives of individuals, as 
well as in regards to trade, immigration and freedom of movement (Tonge, 2017: 1; 
Tonge, 2016: 3; Leaving the EU, 2016: 103-104).  Northern Ireland is the only part of 
the United Kingdom that shares a land border with another European Union 
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member state, the Republic of Ireland.  This complicates Northern Ireland’s position 
in leaving the European Union as serious consideration must be given to how the 
border will look once Brexit is implemented.  Will it continue to be a soft border like 
how it is now?  This scenario, although preferable to many, would not be without 
its own difficulties as it would be extremely difficult to manage cross-border trade 
and movement of people this way.  The alternative however would be to have a 
hard border between the two countries, an unwanted scenario that would 
effectively divide the island of Ireland even further (Chilchott cited Roche, 2016; 
House of Commons, 2016: 87).  No matter what decision on the border is made it 
will still impact on the relationship between the two neighbouring countries.  One 
literary example of the situation Northern Ireland now finds itself in can be 
interpreted within the poem Mending Wall, by Robert Frost. 
 
 ‘He only says, “Good fences make good neighbors.” 
Spring is the mischief in me, and I wonder 
If I could put a notion in his head: 
'Why do they make good neighbors?  Isn’t it 
Where there are cows?  But here there are no cows. 
Before I built a wall I’d ask to know 
What I was walling in or walling out, 
And to whom I was like to give offense. 
Something there is that doesn’t love a wall, 
That wants it down.’ 
(Abstract from ‘Mending Wall’ by Robert Frost) 
  
The protagonist of Frost’s famous poem was greatly concerned with why the wall 
was necessary, a thought recurrent during the course of the poem.  In contrast, one 
of the most startling observations during the interview process was that hardly any 
of the participants openly discussed the issue of the Republic of Ireland and borders 
when talking about the effects of Brexit.  Only one participant, Interviewee 18 
(2015) felt this would be a major issue for the Northern Irish electorate.  This is an 
intriguing observation, given that since the referendum vote on the 23rd June 2016 
the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland has become a 
major political issue for the British government and one that has the potential to 
complicate the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union (Elgot et al, 
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2017; Beesley, 2017).  This has been a significant finding within this chapter.  Given 
the high media profile that is currently being enjoyed by the border question, it 
seems almost incredulous that only one participant has mentioned the border as an 
issue of concern.  However, this can be explained by the timings of the interviews.  
The majority of the interviews conducted for this thesis were undertaken in 2015 
and early 2016, before the European referendum was held.  Due to this, many of 
the participants had not yet given serious consideration to the practical difficulties 
that would arise from the United Kingdom deciding to leave the European Union.  
Gormley-Heenan and Aughey (2017), have outlined three aspects to the border 
between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland which need to be addressed 
post-Brexit.  These are: ‘what’ the border is (either a hard border or a soft border), 
‘where’ the border is (on the island or in the Irish Sea) and most importantly, ‘the 
border in the mind’ (Gormley-Heenan and Aughey, 2017: 498).  This concept of ‘the 
border in the mind’ refers to the history of the border in Ireland and the 
connotations which this has on the political situation in Northern Ireland (Gormley-
Heenan and Aughey, 2017: 500-501).  This is unique to Northern Ireland as no other 
part of the United Kingdom has this direct consequence of Brexit.   
 
According to Interviewee 18 (2015): 
‘…Northern Ireland will probably have more of an acute interest given that 
we share a land border with a European member state in the Republic of 
Ireland … I think will have a focusing of minds for people in Northern 
Ireland...’   
This is a potential reason why the Northern Irish electorate as a whole voted to 
remain within the European Union (BBC News, 2016b).  For the people of Scotland 
this decision was based on a sense of affinity to the European Union not 
experienced elsewhere within the United Kingdom (Carl, 2003: 480-481; Minto et 
al, 2016: 180).  For Northern Ireland, and in particular Nationalists, this decision 
was also based on affinity, but of affinity towards the Republic of Ireland as much 
as, and probably more, than towards Europe.  Going into the European referendum 
there were many unknowns:  How is this border going to be effected by Brexit?  
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Will this result in the creation of a hard border with customs which will affect 
individuals on both sides of the border?  The actual physical implications of having a 
hard or soft land border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is an 
important conversation which has to date complicated simple Unionist narratives 
about Brexit.   
 
At the time of writing there is current controversy surrounding the border issue.  
On the 4th December 2017 a proposal for a deal between the Conservative 
government and the Irish government regarding the border was publically rejected 
by the Democratic Unionist Party (Stone, 2017).  This deal would have seen 
Northern Ireland leave the European Union on separate terms from Great Britain.  
The issue of ‘regulatory alignment’ and what this could mean for Northern Ireland is 
of core concern to Unionists.  For the Democratic Unionist Party, any deal such as 
this would be unwanted as it would further distance Northern Ireland from the rest 
of the United Kingdom and fails to take into account their views surrounding the 
Brexit process (Polley, 2017).  To give Northern Ireland a different deal post-Brexit 
than Great Britain would be to once again ignite questions over the identities of 
Unionists from Northern Ireland: are they British yet do not act like it, or are they 
truly Irish but do not know it (see Chapter Three, section 3.3).  This may also have 
serious long term consciences for Theresa May as her minority Conservative 
government is dependent upon the support of the Democratic Unionist Party in key 
votes (Bush, 2017b).  The concept of ‘regulatory alignment’ also raises concerns in 
other regions of the United Kingdom, with Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon 
arguing that Scotland should also be allowed to retain a relationship with the 
European Union post-Brexit (Birnie, 2017; Parker et al, 2017). 
 
The fact only one participant during the fieldwork stage of this thesis mentioned 
the issue of a border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland is itself 
an extremely important finding.  But what does this mean?  On a purely identity 
based level this is because of the lack of affinity and sense of belonging that exists 
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between Ulster Unionists and the Republic of Ireland, a continuation of the inverted 
elective affinity framework of this chapter.  They, being Ulster Unionists, already 
see the border between the two countries as something that is fixed and existent 
and as such do not appear to have concerns over a perceived hardening of this 
border.  A hard border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland may 
actually strengthen the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.  It 
would clearly show there is a boundary between Northern Ireland and the Republic 
of Ireland that exists and will remain until the Northern Irish electorate as a whole 
choose to leave the United Kingdom and form a United Ireland.  The same can be 
said in regards to allegiance.  Ulster Unionists give their allegiance to the Union, the 
Monarchy and Westminster, not to the Republic of Ireland.  The relationship 
between Ulster Unionists and the Republic of Ireland is one that is purely 
instrumentally economic for cross border trade currently accounts for around 37% 
of Northern Irish exports (Whysall, 2016: 2).  Equally, as the United Kingdom is one 
of the main trading partners of the Republic of Ireland there is the concern that a 
border of any sort could have negative implications on trade (Jenkins, 2017). 
 
Interviewee 28 (2016) addressed this in the statement: 
‘Will there be a hard border put in place?  Umm, I think we need to look at it 
and this is where we don’t look at it on a wider Union aspect in its entirety.  
We need to look at it from a Northern Ireland point of view.’   
However, just what is this ‘Northern Ireland point of view’?  It cannot be a one-size-
fits-all approach as not everyone in Northern Ireland is on the same page in regards 
to Brexit (Gormley-Heenan et al, 2017).  One immediate consequence of the 
referendum was the influx of applications for Irish passports from Northern Irish 
residents as many worried about the changes to travel across Europe resulting from 
the United Kingdom leaving the European Union (Mortimer, 2016).  Perhaps most 
telling was that Post Offices in East Belfast ran out of Irish passport application 
forms.  This is interesting considering the usually negative connotations of Irish 
identity within the Unionist community (Todd, 2005: 445).  This has more to do 
(mainly) with the instrumental purpose of retaining freedom of movement across 
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Europe post-Brexit rather than a show of Unionist support for Irishness or 
Europeanness.  It is an interesting position considering the attitude of some 
participants towards being perceived as European.  As argued by Interviewee 1 
(2015), ‘My identity is British, it’s not European, you know?’  Interviewee 2 (2015) 
was also passionate in rejecting any claim to feeling European in the statement, 
‘No, I don’t feel European at all. Ah, I feel that the continent is a foreign country, 
even though they take a lot of our money.’  As has been discussed within Chapter 
Five, choosing to hold an Irish passport does not necessarily relate to having an Irish 
identity.  This again is a case of instrumentalism as the decision of Northern Irish 
Unionists to obtain an Irish passport after the outcome of the European 
referendum is purely self-interested without any sense of political commitment, 
allegiance or affinity. 
 
7.5: Conclusion 
As addressed within this chapter the relationship between the United Kingdom and 
the European Union can be described using the framework of inverted elective 
affinity.  By being able to flip the elective affinity framework to fit the reverse 
scenario provides confirmation of its existence for Unionists within the United 
Kingdom and its ability to accurately describe the relationship between the 
component parts of the Union.  As both the Scottish independence referendum and 
the European referendum have illustrated, the ties which bind the United Kingdom 
can be extremely fragile.  Elective affinity not only reconciles the allegiance and 
identity, contract and solidarity and instrumental and non-instrumental tropes of 
Britishness, but also secures these bonds at a time of constitutional unrest and 
upheaval and the answers provided by the participants in Part Two of this thesis 
demonstrate how elective affinity can provide an understanding of how Ulster 
Unionists think as they do.  This will be further addressed within Chapter Eight and 
Chapter Nine of this thesis. 
 
204 
 
The findings outlined and discussed within this chapter, even though the majority of 
the data was collected before the referendum was held, accurately reflects the 
voting patterns of Unionist voters in Northern Ireland.  This illustrates that Unionist 
political representatives are in fact largely representative of their community as a 
whole.  This is important in regards to the future of Northern Ireland within a post-
Brexit United Kingdom.  Northern Ireland may be the smallest part of the United 
Kingdom, but it is necessary that its voice is not lost within the discussions currently 
taking place surrounding the future of the United Kingdom (see section 7.4).  ‘The 
days of being a “Remainer” or a “Brexiteer” are over. It is time to come together 
and work collectively to identify and exploit the positive potential for Northern 
Ireland’ (Ulster Unionist Party, 2016: 2; House of Commons, 2016-2017: 3).  This is 
the Unionist position now – but it is contested within the United Kingdom and, of 
course, within Northern Ireland. 
 
The elephant in the room of this chapter has been the lack of responses from 
Unionist participants on the issue of the border.  Given the fact that the border has 
become one of the biggest questions surrounding the United Kingdom’s process of 
leaving the European Union in recent months, one would assume that if these 
interviews were repeated today the border would have a starring role.  Many of the 
interviews conducted took place in 2015 and early 2016, before the European 
referendum was held.  The participants interviewed at that time were more 
focused on issues such as their perceived lack of sovereignty within the United 
Kingdom and concerns over the bureaucracy of the European Union on daily politics 
in the United Kingdom.  These are reasons to justify leaving the European Union.  
The practical problems of how the United Kingdom would look after it had left the 
European Union was not a major concern for participants at this stage as the 
referendum had not yet happened. 
 
This chapter highlights some of the difficulties currently faced by the United 
Kingdom.  No region can be left out of discussions as these will have implications 
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for the future of the United Kingdom as a whole.  In regards to the Scottish 
independence referendum, even though the Scottish electorate voted to remain 
within the United Kingdom, it has still caused damage to relations within the United 
Kingdom which must now be addressed in order to balance tensions.  The United 
Kingdom is in an uncertain time as a result of these events and the thesis will not 
attempt to sugar coat this fact.  All across the Union there is a sense of 
disenfranchisement and unrest which if not addressed properly by politicians will 
led to even greater instability in the future.  The United Kingdom has survived a 
challenging couple of years.  Survived, yes, but one could not necessarily say that it 
has thrived as a result of this.  Within the near future there is still more uncertainty 
on the horizon in regards to Brexit.  One could not estimate how much more strain 
the ties which bind the United Kingdom could take until it is irrevocably damaged to 
the point of no return (Ashcroft and Bevir, 2016: 355).  These questions and more 
will be addressed within Chapter Eight when the future of the United Kingdom will 
be discussed from the perspective of Ulster Unionists. 
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Chapter Eight 
Questions of political narrative 
 
‘You’d have to laugh if it wasn’t so bloody tragic.’ 
(Interviewee 32, 2016) 
 
8.1: Introduction 
This chapter explores the competing political narratives which face Ulster Unionists 
regarding the future of the United Kingdom.  Political scientist Robert Hazell once 
stated ‘The United Kingdom is a union of four nations that works in practice but not 
in theory’ (2006: 37).  Change, and the ability to react to this change, is nothing new 
within the history of the United Kingdom.  The United Kingdom has undergone 
major transitions throughout its existence and in its present day form it has only 
existed since 1922 with the creation of the Irish Free State (British Institute of 
International and Comparative Law, 2015: 1).  Today it is different from what it was 
in the past and of what it will be in the future - if it survives.  The question that this 
chapter will address is whether the United Kingdom has finally been confronted 
with a situation that it cannot adapt to as a whole.  Political scientists such as 
Richard Rose have argued that recent events such as the Scottish independence 
referendum of 2014 and its continued implications, and the European referendum 
of 2016 and the decision to leave the European Union have the possibility to break 
up the Union (Rose, 2016).   Recent political and constitutional turmoil has divided 
the United Kingdom along cultural, political and national lines.  A 2015 report by 
the Constitution Unit and edited by Hazell outlines the importance of academic 
research into this area in the statement, ‘The interests of the Union need to be 
grasped as never before, at the point when politics may be more fragmented than 
ever’ (Hazell, 2015: 8).  However, the United Kingdom is yet to collapse and the 
result of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum had put to rest discussions 
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surrounding endism and the Union, at least until the 2016 European referendum 
(Aughey, 2010b). 
 
The thesis began by looking at a singular question: What is the United Kingdom for 
in the twenty-first century (Trench, 2008)?  What has been derived so far is that the 
Union has survived long above the expected life span of a union state through the 
effective merging of political representation at national level with regional 
autonomy, or to put it another way, the United Kingdom has found a way to resolve 
George Boyce’s 1998 distinction effectively (see Chapter Two, section 2:2).  This is 
key to understanding the complexity of identity within the United Kingdom as ‘We 
certainly cannot assume that “national identity” trumps other identities, or indeed 
that one “national identity” must trump others’ - and in the case of the United 
Kingdom it has not (Mandler, 2006: 297; Aughey, 2007a: 484; Clark, 2001: 261).  
However, this does not mean that the Union does not face some stark challenges.  
With the issues of Scottish Nationalism, English votes for English laws, the United 
Kingdom leaving the European Union and the continued challenge of Irish 
Nationalism, there are numerous factors with the ability to unsettle the stability of 
the United Kingdom.  In particular, could it be that a reunified Ireland is the best 
option for Northern Ireland (Meagher, 2016)?  Is it therefore possible that the 
United Kingdom has reached the end of the road and that one or more of the 
challenges mentioned could lead to the eventual break-up of the Union?   
 
For Rose in 1982 Northern Ireland provided the best case study for the United 
Kingdom as a state (see Chapter Three, section 3:2).  This is still the case today.  By 
providing an up-to-date approach to Rose’s work this chapter will address the 
choice of the United Kingdom between two ultimate narratives: break-up versus 
continuity and what implications this has on Unionist identity and on the fear of not 
belonging concept that has been discussed within this thesis.  By examining the 
views of Unionist designated politicians in Northern Ireland this chapter will address 
the following future oriented questions:  Where can the United Kingdom go from 
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here?  What does this mean for British identity?  Finally, what does this mean for 
Unionists in Northern Ireland?  Is Northern Ireland now mainstream within British 
politics as Rose suggested decades earlier or is it still a place apart on the periphery, 
too British to truly belong (Rose, 1982; McLean and McMillan, 2005; see Chapter 
Three, section 3.4)?  Are Unionist politicians optimistic or pessimistic about 
Northern Ireland’s place in the United Kingdom?  These questions will be addressed 
in regards to the narratives of break-up and continuity which are currently facing 
the United Kingdom. 
 
8.2: Integration or Disintegration? 
Throughout the previous chapters events have been mentioned which have had the 
potential to cause disintegration to the United Kingdom.  Devolution, Nationalism 
in Scotland, Northern Ireland and England, and the decision of the United Kingdom 
to leave the European Union have all been considered a risk to the stability and 
future of the Union.  In order to understand the views of Unionist politicians on the 
future of the Union participants for this research were asked the following 
question: 
It has been suggested from the 1970s that the Union will break.  Can you envisage 
the Union breaking? 
This question was asked with a specific objective in mind and that was to ascertain 
how strong the Union currently is in the minds of Northern Irish Unionists, 
individuals who have been campaigning for the continuation of the United Kingdom 
for decades due to the history of ethno-national conflict experienced within 
Northern Ireland (Nairn, 1977; Pocock, 1975).  In Chapter Six and Chapter Seven 
participants were questioned on their views of the two largest political events to 
happen in the United Kingdom in recent years, the Scottish independence 
referendum of 2014 and the European referendum of 2016.  The future of the 
Union question was asked to ascertain if they felt that these events have had a 
serious impact on the stability of the United Kingdom.  
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Overall the answers given by the participants to this question showed a high level of 
realism about the stability of the United Kingdom.  Twenty participants answered 
that they could not envisage the Union breaking, nine could envisage the Union 
breaking, and one participant did not provide a conclusive answer (Fig.8.1).  For 
some, such as Interviewee 6 (2015), the thought of the Union breaking was 
inconceivable, ‘No.  I mean, why would it break?’  The belief that solidarity would 
overcome any perceived threats to the contractual aspects of the Union was 
common among the participants.  Of the twenty participants who responded that 
they could not envisage the Union breaking an overwhelming theme that emerged 
time and time again was of the United Kingdom being strong against perceived the 
weakness of threats to the Union posed by challenges such as Scottish Nationalism.  
The United Kingdom was often cited as being the best constitutional arrangement 
for all four component parts as it provided stability and financial benefits for all, ‘I 
have every confidence it will continue.  Ah, I think it has served the people of 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland very well for generations’ 
(Interviewee 19, 2015).  Superficially, this approach to the Union focused on the 
instrumental benefits but in context it is only superficial. There were also answers 
that highlighted the affinity which exists between the regions of the United 
Kingdom, such as Interviewee 21 (2015) stating that, ‘Unity is strength and strength 
supports us.’  The theme of unity through diversity is one that has been recurrent 
throughout this thesis (see Chapter Two) and contrasts with the discussion in 
Chapter Seven.  This connects theoretically to Benedict Anderson’s concept of the 
imagined community in that the perceived ties which bind the four regions of the 
United Kingdom are stronger that the sum of the individual component parts 
(2006).  This feeling of solidarity and non-instrumental allegiance which exists in the 
United Kingdom provides a strong defence against potential disintegration.  
Although Scottish Nationalism was not put to rest for a generation after the 2014 
independence referendum as had been hoped, it did highlight the importance of 
affinity in maintaining a union state (see Chapter Six). 
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Whilst much of this feeling of belonging within the United Kingdom is created by 
shared culture, history, language and identity there is also another aspect to the 
Union which is less romantic, that of the instrumental financial and economic 
benefits it provides each region.  This much more pragmatic approach to the 
continuation of the Union acknowledges that financial and political stability are 
often viewed as important as the non-tangible feelings of affinity.  As stated by 
Interviewee 1 (2015), the break-up of the United Kingdom ‘… would be disastrous.  
No, we would lose influence on the world stage.  Economically there would be big 
questions around that.’  Many of these financial benefits that participants 
mentioned come from the Barnett formula, the formula by which money from 
Westminster is distributed to the devolved regions (Keep, 2016: 3).  This formula 
calculates the way that public expenditure in England has ‘consequentials’ for the 
devolved regions of the United Kingdom, such as £10,876 per head in Northern 
Ireland (Wilkinson, 2015; Barnett, 2000).  However, while the participants 
questioned spoke of the positives of the financial benefits, for others across the 
United Kingdom this is a bone of contention.  Not every region of the United 
Kingdom benefits from the Barnett formula in the same way as Northern Ireland, 
particularly England as it is the only region not devolved.  For example, England 
receives £8,529 per head, while Scotland receives £10,152 per head.  As stated by 
Lord Barnett himself, ‘The formula was intended to be approximately population 
based and was intended as a stopgap until a needs-based system came into 
operation’, yet this move forward has never happened and the Barnett formula 
remains in place unchanged (2000: 69).  The Northern Ireland Assembly currently 
depends on the block grant from Westminster as it is unable to make up the deficit 
in public spending itself.  Therefore any changes to the Union could have drastic 
economic implications for Northern Ireland.  
  
The views of the participants interviewed for this research displayed at times both 
an instrumental and a primordial understanding of their connection to the Union 
and its future (McLean and McMillan, 2005).   
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‘The majority of people in Northern Ireland wish to remain within the Union 
and for some it is emotional reasons, cultural reasons. For others it is more 
financial, but there is a clear majority.’ (Interviewee 24, 2015) 
Participants such as interviewee 3 (2015) discussed how the Union was the best 
constitutional arrangement for Northern Ireland, while other participants such as 
Interviewee 20 (2015) talked about encouraging people ‘emotionally… theologically 
and culturally towards the Union.’  These viewpoints tie in with Jennifer Todd’s 
1987 typology of Unionism which can also be analysed in similar ways to that of 
McLean and McMillan: British Unionist and Ulster Loyalist.  Within academia these 
two concepts have traditionally tended to be separated as two different 
classifications of Unionists.  This black and white description of Unionism in 
Northern Ireland disregards the rich and complex nature of Northern Irish Unionism 
within the United Kingdom.  The evidence of this thesis affirms another approach - 
elective affinity - to both explain and reconcile the paradoxes of Britishness and 
Unionism that were discussed in Part One of this thesis. 
 
However nine of the participants interviewed, almost a third, stated that they could 
envisage the United Kingdom breaking up.  Of these responses, the answers given 
tended to revolve around the threat of Scottish Nationalism and the possible 
consequences of the European referendum.  As expressed by Interviewee 18 
(2015): 
’So, ah, yes I could see the United Kingdom breaking up, certainly not in the 
near future, or in the medium term, but in politics, “Events dear boy, 
events”. You know, things can change.’   
This feeling of concern among Unionists for the long-term future of the United 
Kingdom is one that cannot be taken lightly.  Implicit is the concern that at some 
point a constitutional earthquake could shake the foundations of the Union. The 
questions raised by the Scottish independence referendum in 2014 created a sense 
of unrest in the United Kingdom which feeds the concern of Ulster Unionists.  
Interviewee 17 (2015) expressed this concern when proposing that ‘The peak 
danger now seems to be Scotland and the issues which are arising out of the 
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Nationalist movement in Scotland.  I think it is very divisive.’  The subsequent 
referendum on the United Kingdom’s future in the European Union has done little 
to alleviate these concerns within Unionism.  One participant did not provide a 
definite answer to this question, stating only ‘Who knows?’  Uncertainty and doubt 
is another core theme that has emerged throughout the thesis.  Doubt, as outlined 
within Chapter Three, section 3.3, is often connected to the Ulster British identity in 
regards to the question of: Are Ulster Unionists British or not British?  However, in 
this scenario the doubt, as the thesis argued, is not self-doubt but over events and 
external pressures which could affect their position as citizens of the United 
Kingdom. 
‘I could envisage the union breaking up. I think if, ah, for example, the UK 
votes for Brexit … So yeah, I think there is an existential threat to the UK as 
we sit today’ (Interviewee 7, 2015).   
 
Interviewee 17 (2015), expressed concerns that: 
‘I just think there is going to be severe trouble ahead in Scotland and I think 
that’s where the biggest danger to the Union actually lies.  It no longer lies 
within what we would have traditionally thought was Northern Ireland, 
which is bizarre [laughs].’   
If anything, this concern at being able to envisage the Union breaking is actually a 
sign of the strength of the Unionists interviewed.  They believe in the Union and 
they want it to survive, but they understand that there are forces which can break it 
and that these cannot be ignored.  This is a practical Unionism that is not afraid to 
look at the worst case scenario for the future of the United Kingdom.  It would 
perhaps say more about Ulster Unionism if it did not recognise the threat that exists 
to the Union from nationalism and events such as leaving the European Union.  
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Fig 8.1: Participants response to the question ‘Can you envisage the Union 
breaking?’ 
Graph portraying the breakdown of participant responses to the question of ‘Can 
you envisage the Union breaking?’  In response, twenty stated that they could not 
envisage the Union breaking, nine observed that they could envisage the Union 
breaking, and one participant did not provide a defined answer to this question. 
 
 
 
One observation from the findings which is relevant to this thesis is the recurring 
theme that the Union is ever evolving and that this is a strength and a survival 
method.  This connects the viewpoints of participants with what political historians 
such as Linda Colley see as the benefits of a flexible Union (2014: 90).  Interviewee 
11 (2015) observed this strength of the United Kingdom in the comment, ‘So I don’t 
think the Union is under threat. I think it will continue to change and evolve over 
the decades to come and I think that’s inevitable.’  This is notable as it connects two 
distinctive areas of this research, British identity and the future of the Union, in a 
clear and structured fashion.  Both the Union itself and the overarching identity of 
Britishness in the United Kingdom can be accurately described as ever changing.  
9
23
1
Participants response to the question 'Can you envisage the 
Union breaking?'
Yes No No defined answer
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Throughout its history the United Kingdom has met with changes or threats which 
potentially would have separated other nations yet has only had the effect of 
strengthening the Union.  This ability to adapt is what has kept the United Kingdom 
together.  The ever changing nature of the United Kingdom has allowed it to merge 
the four regions together and allow them to develop distinctively whilst still being 
common members of the United Kingdom.  In the words of Interviewee 2 (2015): 
‘the Union is always at evolving point.  It’s an evolving, and more of a 
sponge that changes. I think that’s its best and ultimate strength … I think 
we have to allow the Union to be able to breathe like that and to be flexible, 
to be agile.’   
This method of preservation may continue to underpin the Union for years to 
come, but just what issues do the participants feel that the United Kingdom is 
facing? 
 
Table 8.1: Summary of participant’s responses on whether the Union could break 
This table provides a condensed synopsis of the answers provided by participants in 
order to provide an overview to the types of varied responses which this question 
received. 
Participant Overview of 
answer 
Summary 
1 No The United Kingdom would lose influence on 
the world stage if it separated. 
There would be economic problems. 
2 No The Union is always evolving. 
The Union is strong. 
3 No The Union has survived threats before. 
This is now an opportunity for the United 
Kingdom to regroup. 
4 No The separate parts could not survive alone. 
‘…the world needs a strong UK.’ 
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5 No The Union is ‘…as strong as it’s ever been.’ 
The people of Scotland are turning from 
separatism. 
6 No The Scottish referendum was a danger, but the 
result was positive. 
7 Yes Brexit could cause a second Scottish 
independence referendum. 
8 No A United Ireland cannot be forced upon the 
people of Northern Ireland 
9 No No self-sustainability within the regions 
Devolution satisfies the self-determination of 
regions 
10   
11 No The Union will evolve 
Threats to the Union have been over-hyped 
12 Yes The threat is from Northern Ireland, not from 
Scotland 
English votes for English laws is a threat 
13 Yes It could if Scotland left the United Kingdom 
14 No Brexit could have an impact 
15 No Scotland could leave, but it would be 
detrimental to everyone in the Union 
16   
17 Yes Scotland is the biggest danger to the Union, not 
Northern Ireland 
18 Yes The Union is always changing 
19 No The Union has served people well 
20 No The Union can accommodate different views 
21 No ‘Strength is unity and unity supports us.’ 
22 Yes Scotland is the issue within the United Kingdom 
23 No The Union is strong 
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24 No The Union will survive, but it might look 
different 
25 Yes Scotland is the threat, not Northern Ireland 
26 Yes Brexit could lead to another Scottish 
independence referendum 
27 No There is value in the Union 
28 Yes Northern Ireland is safe 
Scotland and England are the problem 
29 No The Union could change in the future 
30 No Northern Ireland is secure within the Union 
31 No Confident in the Union 
32 Don’t know Northern Ireland is not the biggest threat 
anymore 
33 No There will never be a United Ireland 
English Nationalism is the biggest threat 
34 No Not in their lifetime 
35 No Need a constitution  
 
As presented in Table 3, the responses received from participants to the question of 
the break-up of the Union produced some interesting findings.  First of all, the 
overwhelming theme to emerge from the answers is that Northern Ireland’s place 
is secure in the Union, although this does not necessarily mean that the Union itself 
is secure (Table 3).  This observation often came across in interviews as both a point 
of pride for Unionism in Northern Ireland and as a source of self-depreciating 
humour and shock.  The aspect of pride comes from the irony that Northern 
Ireland, the place apart in the United Kingdom for decades, had become (perhaps) 
one of the most stable regions within the Union.  According to Interviewee 12 
(2015): 
‘You know, at one stage I suppose everybody thought if the Union was going 
to break it would be Northern Ireland who would either be leaving or be 
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kicked out. Actually I think that is less and less likely and it’s certainly less 
likely than most of the time I was involved in politics’.   
The humorous aspect came from the shock factor that Northern Ireland’s 
displacement as the area causing concern to the United Kingdom is by Scotland, 
something that no one perceived a generation ago:   
‘The real threat to me comes from the narrowness of the Scottish 
referendum. I mean, I believe if there was a referendum held in Northern 
Ireland about being part of the United Kingdom it wouldn’t be as tight as it 
was in Scotland’ (Interviewee 12, 2015).   
This unlikely change is still something which has an air of the surreal about it for 
some participants, ‘I never thought that the risk to the Union would come from 
another part of the Union’ (Interviewee 26, 2016).  Interviewee 25 (2016) also 
expressed this sentiment in the comment, ‘I think if there is any weakness it is to do 
with Scotland, it certainly isn’t to do with Northern Ireland.’  In Chapter Four of this 
thesis, section 4.2 examined the idea whether Unionist doubt over belonging in the 
United Kingdom had a negative impact upon their identity which resulted in a 
hyperreal Britishness based on a sense of not-belonging and existential doubt. The 
evidence here suggests that this is no longer the case (at least at the time when the 
interviews were conducted). 
 
An overwhelming finding from this chapter is that the participants view Northern 
Ireland as secure within the United Kingdom.  The Principle of Consent has secured 
the position of Northern Ireland within the Union unless a border poll shows that 
the majority of the Northern Irish electorate wish to vote to leave the United 
Kingdom and join a United Ireland.  Within Unionism there is little support for a 
border poll in Northern Ireland.  A 2017 LucidTalk poll found that only 8.6% of 
Unionists believe that there should be a border poll within the next five years with 
52.8% stating that there should be no border poll ever.  These figures change 
whenever political affiliation is removed from the equation and national identity is 
used as the defining characteristic.  For those who identify as British, 17.7% believe 
that a border poll should be held within five years compared to 14.2% of those who 
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identify as British and Northern Irish (LucidTalk, 2017).  In regards to those who do 
not believe that a border poll should be held, this accounted for 46.6% of British 
identifiers and 36.9% of British and Northern Irish identifiers (LucidTalk, 2017).  
What this poll shows is that there is less support for a border poll from those who 
identify as British only and that Unionists in particular do not wish to see a border 
poll as this is a perceived threat to the Union.  
 
The decision of the United Kingdom to leave the European Union had not been 
made when most of these interviews were conducted, yet participants still believed 
that it held a potential threat to the Union.  With England and Wales voting to leave 
the European Union and Scotland and Northern Ireland having voted to remain, 
what does this mean for the future of the United Kingdom?  As it stands, the Union 
has been split by this referendum.  It is not merely enough to say that the will of the 
majority is final in a situation like this.  Yes, in regards to democracy the people of 
the United Kingdom overall voted to leave the European Union, but it is necessary 
to address the large proportion of the population who do not wish to leave.  For 
those people, and in particular the regions of Scotland and Northern Ireland, much 
needs to be done by the Westminster government to reassure them that their fears 
are being acknowledged and that every attempt will be made to include them in 
the process of leaving the European Union.  If this is not done, or it is only half 
managed, then it is not a huge leap forward to predict that the very fabric of the 
United Kingdom is in peril.  One obvious way this could happen would be through a 
successful second Scottish independence referendum.  Ever since the referendum 
on the European Union was called, First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon has 
argued that as Scotland wishes to remain in the European Union, they will have to 
seriously consider another independence referendum in order to secure their place 
within Europe (BBC News, 2016a).   
 
Although the Ulster Unionist Party did not support the Leave campaign, it accepts 
the democratic decision of the whole of the United Kingdom to leave the European 
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Union (Ulster Unionist Party, 2016).  This highlights the contract and solidarity trope 
of the thesis as even though this was not the decision which the leadership of the 
Ulster Unionist Party would have wanted, they understand that in order for the 
United Kingdom to successfully leave the European Union each part of the Union 
must accept and support this decision.  For the Democratic Unionist Party who 
supported the Leave campaigned, the result of the United Kingdom shows elective 
affinity in action.  During this referendum the Democratic Unionist Party was in line 
with the majority of the British electorate by wishing to leave the European Union 
and this underpins a shared sense of affinity across the Union in regards to the 
feeling that they are better off without Europe (Foster, 2016).  
 
What would happen to British identity if such an apocalyptic situation were to 
befall the United Kingdom?  Would the organic nature of Britishness allow it to 
survive even this?  In short this thesis believes the answer to this may be yes, 
Britishness will survive, but not in the way it is perceived today.  Instead a growth in 
English identity will be observed within England and Wales, while in Northern 
Ireland and Scotland regional identities will emerge at the fore of national rhetoric.  
Within Northern Ireland, what would this look like?  For a start, Unionists in 
Northern Ireland would be in a situation they could never have envisaged in their 
wildest and most troubled of nightmares.  For decades Unionists in Northern 
Ireland have held onto the Union with Great Britain as a lifeline, a preservation of 
all they hold dear and the centre of all their traditions and ideologies.  They truly 
feel they belong to this culture and heritage; fully involving themselves in the 
promotion of this imagined community (Anderson, 2006).  How could Britishness 
survive in a Northern Ireland which is no longer a part of the Union?  If Northern 
Ireland were to merge with the Republic of Ireland it could be argued that this may 
have the effect of polarising identity even more within Northern Ireland.  As argued 
by Jenkins (1996: 89), ‘People collectively identify themselves and others, and they 
conduct their everyday lives in terms of those identities, which therefore have 
practical consequences.’  This is very true in regards to the context of the ethno-
national conflict which has provided the background to identity in Northern Ireland 
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for decades.  Unionists who feel their identity is being directly threatened within a 
United Ireland may in fact go to the very extremes of their identity in order to try 
and preserve and reinforce their own group singularity.  This would be an odd 
situation for Northern Irish Unionists to find themselves in as they have traditionally 
enjoyed the position of being the dominant identity within their country.  In a 
United Ireland they would find themselves an extremely small minority.  Feeling 
threatened, this may led to an outbreak of violence and even a civil war within a 
newly created thirty-two county Ireland unless provisions were in place to ensure 
that their rights were met.  In a case like this, ‘to achieve positive social identity, 
ingroup-outgroup comparisons must yield perceived differences which favour the 
ingroup’ and it is only after this has been achieved that positive movement can be 
made (Turner, 1978: 236).  This is a hypothetical scenario that has been put forward 
by this thesis as an example of what may happen in a situation such as this.  It is not 
the purpose of this thesis, but it is something that would benefit from further 
research in order to examine this more, particularly given the current uncertainties 
surrounding the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.  
 
How would Unionists in this situation be able to express their identity?  If Northern 
Ireland were to leave the United Kingdom it may be they would no longer be 
allowed to remain as British citizens and that they therefore would not be under 
the Union flag.  In a scenario like this it is to be expected that a more enhanced and 
hyper version of Ulster identity may be created with the express purpose of trying 
to ensure a degree of control over their identity.  On the other side of the 
argument, Unionists finding themselves in a United Ireland may react by embracing 
their Irish heritage.  However, this seems unlikely and if it were to happen it would 
probably be in the form of a more richly developed version of a Northern Irish 
identity rather than that of an Irish identity. 
‘No, I just think that, I think that there is a real value in the Union and I think 
most people see it and maybe we just need to make it work better.  I think 
we need to probably let each individual be valued for their individual 
identity, but as part of the Union it is something to be valued as well.  So, 
sure I am a forever optimist.  Yeah, I think we have work on our hands to do 
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and, ah, I think it’s not something we can rest easy on, but I think work 
needs to be done on it and I think we will win.’ (Interviewee 27, 2016)  
What does this say about British identity?  As observed by McCrone (1992: 195), 
‘the question to ask is not how best do cultural forms reflect an essential national 
identity, but how do cultural forms actually help to construct and shape identity. . .’  
What this thesis shows is that British identity within Ulster Unionism is not an alien 
sort of Britishness, but that it is a vital component of it.  Difference within the 
United Kingdom is not detrimental and in fact helps to cement a sense of affinity 
across the Union as the differences within each nation help to give Britishness 
meaning.  Difference integrates the component parts of the United Kingdom, it 
does not lead to its disintegration.   
 
8.3: Peripheral or Mainstream? 
The United Kingdom is facing critical questions at the moment: questions of 
national belonging and questions about the future of the Union post-Brexit.  These 
are questions which Northern Ireland also has to face.  A key issue for this thesis is 
the role Northern Ireland plays in the United Kingdom going forward.  What role 
Northern Ireland will play in the United Kingdom in the future is based upon 
whether its fate is considered peripheral to the United Kingdom or whether it is 
central to it.  This is what will be discussed in this section. 
 
Traditionally Northern Ireland has been thought of as the problem child within the 
United Kingdom.  If any region were to break away, surely it would be Northern 
Ireland?  The Republican dream of a thirty-two county sovereign Irish Republic was 
often cited during the armed struggle and this has always been a risk to the 
territory and sense of imagined community which binds the United Kingdom 
(Smith, 1971: Anderson, 2006).  Yet this has not happened.  In 1998 the Good Friday 
Agreement was signed.  As part of this agreement it was understood that the 
Republic of Ireland would hold a referendum on removing Articles 2 and 3 from its 
constitution (Access Research Knowledge, 2002).  These articles laid claim to the 
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territory of Northern Ireland.  The response of the Irish people was overwhelming 
with 94% voting to remove the claim (Access Research Knowledge, 2002).  This was 
a clear sign that the Republic of Ireland, like the United Kingdom, was largely 
indifferent to Northern Ireland.  According to Coakley (2002: 25), ‘southern 
acceptance of the constitutional status quo, strikingly demonstrated in the 1998 
referendum that followed the Good Friday Agreement suggests that the pursuit of 
political stability has taken a decisive lead over traditional irredentism in the mind 
of the southern electorate’.  Republicans and Nationalists in the North asserted this 
was only a temporary measure and that the long hoped for United Ireland would 
still happen in the future.  Yet at this stage a United Ireland looks further away than 
ever since 1920.  The rise in Nationalism recently has come not from Northern 
Ireland, but from Scotland.  With Scotland challenging their place within the United 
Kingdom, Nationalists in Northern Ireland are watching carefully and quietly to see 
how the situation unfolds.  If Scotland votes to leave the United Kingdom, then this 
gives Northern Ireland the perfect opportunity to slip out of the door behind 
Scotland without anyone really paying much attention.  The current feelings of 
disenchantment felt within the United Kingdom may have the response of causing a 
domino effect across the Union, with one region leaving after another.  
Interviewees identified a number of key points. 
 
The old adage that nobody wants Northern Ireland is not necessary wrong, yet 
Northern Ireland is a position where it is not able to push for independence.  Firstly, 
Northern Ireland as a country cannot possibly ‘go it alone’ as it is not financially 
secure enough to do so and survive.   
‘I don’t know how. Umm, ah, you know a lot of factors have to come into 
play and even ones that you think maybe shouldn’t.  Self-sustainability is the 
… priority because that you can only realistically see the Union breaking up 
if each of the regions can actually sustain themselves. NI couldn’t.  It’s a wee 
tiny, tiny place compared with, you know, even in the UK it’s a small place, 
but in the world it’s very tiny.  You know, so the region, or the UK would 
break up I’d say if Northern Ireland became part of a United Ireland.’ 
(Interviewee 9, 2015) 
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Geographically Northern Ireland is an extremely small country with a population of 
only 1.86 million (NISRA, 2015).  As is occurring within most western liberal 
democracies the manufacturing sector is collapsing, for example recent job losses in 
Northern Ireland such as the closure of JTI Group in Ballymena in the constituency 
of North Antrim.  Northern Ireland is a key financial beneficiary from United 
Kingdom membership.  As it currently stands it is dependent on the Westminster 
subvention.  European funds financing the financial situation in Northern Ireland 
are even more precariously placed at this moment due to the uncertainty 
surrounding the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union.  The 
European Union currently helps to fund a plethora of different areas within 
Northern Ireland, from cross-community initiatives to agricultural policies 
(Department of the Economy, 2017).  Without this, Northern Ireland will definitely 
feel the pinch and will have to hold onto the purse strings even tighter once Article 
50 is triggered.   
 
Secondly, the Good Friday Agreement does not allow provision for Northern Ireland 
to become independent.  The people of Northern Ireland will either choose to 
remain as a part of the United Kingdom or they will choose to leave and become a 
part of a United Ireland.  Nowhere in this Agreement does it provide a third choice 
of independence.  This is important as in a hypothetical independent Northern 
Ireland where would the protections be for members of each ethno-national 
community?  The history of Northern Ireland is one of ethno-national conflict 
between two communities and these tensions have been managed through the 
safeguards that were established within the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 
(Northern Ireland Office, 1998).  Under this both the Irish and British governments 
have the ability to assist and influence matters within Northern Ireland.  This is a 
measure which allows members of each community to feel their interests are being 
protected by forces outside of the Northern Irish government.  Either way one thing 
is certain; Northern Ireland can either continue as part of the United Kingdom or it 
can merge with the Republic of Ireland to create a thirty-two county United Ireland, 
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but most certainly it cannot survive independently.  Interviewee 13 (2015) raised 
Northern Irish independence and its problems in that statement: 
‘So, economically it would be a disaster and that’s why when there was a 
Northern Ireland independence movement it got less than 1% of the vote 
because people could not see it working and there was no political will for it 
either.’ 
 
The impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland may influence this.  Unlike any other part 
of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland shares a land border with a European 
Union member state, the Republic of Ireland.  This not only raises questions about 
what type of border should be created, meaning a hard border or a soft border, but 
also about what impact this may have on identity within Northern Ireland 
(Gormley-Heenan and Aughey, 2017: 503).  Many have argued that due to the 
United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union and the majority vote in 
Northern Ireland to remain this would be a good reason to create a United Ireland.  
By joining with the Republic of Ireland, this would enable Northern Ireland to 
remain as part of the European Union and to continue to receive the benefits that 
this entails (Rowley, 2016; Humphries and Ferguson, 2016).  One of the most 
interesting consequences of the European referendum was that the morning the 
vote was announced there was a sharp rise in the number of members of the 
Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community in Northern Ireland applying for an Irish 
passport.  Post Offices in East Belfast actually ran out of application forms following 
the result of the referendum.  Even Unionist politicians such as Ian Paisley Junior 
MP encouraged members of the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community to take up 
this opportunity (Payton, 2016).  What does this narrative tell us about British 
identity?  To give the short answer: very little.  This would relate to a much more 
pragmatic view of Britishness in Northern Ireland that understands that the best 
interests of the country of Northern Ireland need to be taken into account.  It could 
just have been done as a type of insurance policy, a measure to protect individuals 
travelling abroad after Brexit without actually saying anything deeper about their 
true political alignments.  Northern Ireland has been spoilt in this regard as 
individuals from here have been fortunate enough to have either British or Irish 
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identities, or even both.  It may be argued that people in Northern Ireland have 
become lackadaisical about national identity to a certain degree, although as 
argued by Mitchell and Todd, for Unionists in the North, ‘Irishness is still the other 
even if Ireland is seen as more benign.’ (Mitchell and Todd, 2007: 650).  Should 
Northern Ireland receive special status as part of the United Kingdom’s deal to 
leave the European Union?  This is an emotive issue for Unionists as to have special 
status in regards to Brexit would mean that Northern Ireland would once again be 
at the periphery of the Union, rather than the mainstream position which it has 
been currently enjoying.  While this may be preferred by European officials, there is 
still little known about what this would actually look like (O’Carroll, 2017).  Would 
there be a border in the Irish Sea, effectively distancing Northern Ireland from 
Great Britain, or would a land border, even hard or soft be the route to go down 
(Meagher, 2017)?  For Ulster Unionists these are the questions which now foster 
disquiet.  For Unionists, their narrative is that they want to be seen as British by 
others within the United Kingdom and to be seen as a valued member of the Union.  
To be given special status over Brexit, or the possibility of a border being placed 
within the Irish Sea rather than between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland once again raises the issue that Northern Ireland is considered to be Irish, 
not British, by others within the United Kingdom (see Chapter Three, section 3.3.2). 
 
Northern Ireland currently has a more mainstream position within British politics 
due to the Conservative Party/Democratic Unionist Party pact that was established 
after the 2017 General Election (see Chapter Three, section 3.4).  But what does this 
mainstream position mean for Northern Ireland and its position within the United 
Kingdom in the future.  What this position allows is for Northern Ireland to have 
greater influence over negotiating a deal for post-Brexit.  ‘I think we have to make 
sure that we keep on with our negotiations and try to get the best deal out of 
Europe possible and try to, you know, obviously unite the constituent parts of the 
UK as well’ (Interviewee 29, 2016).  On the 30th November 2017, Democratic 
Unionist Party MP Sammy Wilson stated that the party would remove their support 
from the Conservative Party if Northern Ireland was given special treatment during 
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the Brexit negotiations that would set it apart from the rest of the United Kingdom 
(McDonald and Stewart, 2017).  This is the crux of both the elective affinity 
framework and the negative interpretation of Unionist identity discussed in Chapter 
Four: Ulster Unionists want to be treated like everyone else within the United 
Kingdom, but they fear that they are not seen as the same by those within Great 
Britain (see Chapter Four, section 4.2; section 4.3).  The Democratic Unionist Party 
now hold a position of power at Westminster and they appear to be using it to their 
advantage. 
 
8.4: Optimism or Pessimism? 
As the findings illustrate the majority of participants felt that the United Kingdom 
will not break up, yet they were still realistic about the threats that exist towards 
the Union.  What then is the future of the United Kingdom?  Where does 
Britishness go from here?  Perhaps most importantly for this thesis, where do the 
interviewees believe Ulster Unionism fits into all of this?  The United Kingdom as a 
state is a complex multinational state (Aughey, 2001b: 60).  The United Kingdom is 
often ridiculed for its heavy reliance on what is known as ‘pomp and ceremony’, the 
traditions and institutions which make the United Kingdom, and subsequently 
Britishness, what they are today.  While these traditions such as the Royal opening 
of parliament can at times seem archaic and strange they have helped to keep the 
United Kingdom together through many hardships and periods of historical 
upheaval.  As observed by Palmer (1999: 135), ‘…the symbols that help to construct 
and to convey a sense of national identity are imagined to lie at the heart of a 
nation’s soul.’  What the United Kingdom does, Unionists continue to think it does 
well, and this is the core of the political – but not emotional - identification with the 
state. 
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Fig. 8.2: Threats to the Union as raised by participants 
Graph showing what issues were raised by participants in response to the question 
on the breakup of the Union. 
 
 
 
As portrayed by Fig.8.2 Scottish Nationalism was overwhelming raised by 
participants when discussing if they could envisage the Union breaking.  Second was 
the European referendum and the uncertainty which has emerged about what a 
post-Brexit United Kingdom would look like particularly for Northern Ireland.  Third, 
Irish Nationalism was cited as another concern to the Union, but most of the eight 
participants who raised this were talking about how the Union had overcome this 
threat in the past.  This finding is significant in that it shows how secure Ulster 
Unionists felt that Northern Ireland’s position within the Union remained secure.  
The threat of Irish Nationalism has quietened over recent years with IRA ceasefires 
and the Principle of Consent ensuring that no outside forces can remove Northern 
Ireland from the United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of its 
electorate.  This feeling may also be due to the high level of media coverage which 
is being given to Scottish Nationalism, effectively overtaking Irish Nationalism (at 
the time of the interviews) as the biggest risk to the Union.  Also, part of this may 
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be due to the fact that Irish Nationalists have signed up to power sharing in 
Northern Ireland, with the Democratic Unionist Party (then) working in government 
with Sinn Féin.  This commitment to devolution also helps to ensure that Northern 
Ireland remains as a component part of the United Kingdom.  The consensus 
appears to be that Irish Nationalism has in the past been one of the biggest threats 
to the continuation of the United Kingdom, but issues such as Scottish Nationalism 
and concerns over the implications of Brexit now overshadowed it.  Finally, two 
participants expressed concern over how English votes for English laws may shape 
the future of the United Kingdom (Fig.8.2).  These themes will now be examined in-
depth along with an analysis of what these scenarios could mean for the future of 
the Union, Britishness and Unionism in Northern Ireland and how these connect to 
the themes of allegiance and identity, contract and solidarity and instrumentalism 
and non-instrumentalism that have been the framework of this thesis.   
 
The primary challenge to the United Kingdom volunteered by interviewees is 
Scottish Nationalism.  The Scottish electorate voted on the 14th September 2014 
and concluded that Scotland was better off as part of the United Kingdom.  The 
overall percentages, 55% Remain to 45% Leave, was not enough to silence the issue 
of Scottish independence forever, but it was accepted that this result would 
quieten the conversation for a generation (The Guardian, 2016; Salmond cited 
Johnson, 2014).  Elections are expensive and referendums are particularly costly 
enterprises, surely another would not be held for a while?  Unionists across the 
United Kingdom relaxed at the result to keep the Union intact, not least of all those 
from Northern Ireland.  The Scottish independence referendum was the closest the 
United Kingdom had come to collapse since the Troubles.  With the signing of the 
Good Friday Agreement in 1998 Northern Ireland’s position within the United 
Kingdom was contractually secured through the Principle of Consent.  The vote was 
a resounding success on behalf of those who had created the Agreement with 
71.1% of the Northern Irish electorate endorsing the Agreement (Access Research 
Knowledge, 1998).  However, this did not stop the Democratic Unionist Party from 
still holding grave concerns about Northern Ireland’s place within the Union.  But 
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that was 1998 and this is 2017 and somewhere in the past nineteen years the 
Democratic Unionist Party has come to also support the Good Friday Agreement.  
This is due in part to the Democratic Unionist Party becoming a mainstream party 
and going into a power-sharing government with Sinn Féin in 2007 (Weaver, 2007). 
 
Shock occurred when Scottish Nationalism emerged as the biggest threat within the 
Union.  Yet the result of the referendum was a victory for the Remain campaign, 
although by a narrow margin.   
‘I mean, I think a blind man could have seen that the loss of Scotland I think 
inexorably would have led to the breakup of the Union, eventually.  Now, 
we would have fought that tooth and nail, but there is absolutely no doubt 
things would unravel you would have had moves for greater devolution 
within the English regions, the Welsh would have started to become more 
militant and needless to say it would have been incredibly encouraging to 
the nationalist community here.  So, you know, I think we’ve got over that 
hurdle. I think if we can get over the next one then it will be put to bed for a 
generation.  But whilst other parts of the Union could break away and 
become independent the one part that couldn’t is NI.’ (Interviewee 13, 
2015) 
The result of the Scottish independence referendum was welcomed, but it would 
be reckless to state this is the last the United Kingdom will hear of Scottish 
independence.  The vote meant that there was no definitive sense of victory within 
the Remain campaign despite the Government.  Scotland as a country was 
effectively split down the middle on this decision.  As those from Northern Ireland 
have the unfortunately ability to know first-hand, good things do not happen when 
a country within the United Kingdom is divided over issues of nationality.  What is 
fascinating about this is that Scotland has taken over Northern Ireland’s position as 
the most volatile place with the Union.  Nicola Sturgeon, leader of the Scottish 
National party and current First Minister of Scotland, has often reiterated that she 
would like to hold another independence referendum (Carrell, 2016).  However, 
this may not be as easy as it seems.  A 2017 study by the British Election Survey 
found that Scottish Nationalist Party lost four out of ten of its supports over its 
strong stance on remaining within the European Union.  This may have influences 
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of the percentage of Scottish voters in a second independence referendum who 
want to leave the United Kingdom, but it seems likely that this question will be 
asked again.  The real catalyst in this resurgence was the decision via a referendum 
to leave the European Union.   
‘I could envisage the Union breaking up.  I think if, ah, for example, the UK 
votes for Brexit, for leaving the EU, ah that will very swiftly be followed by a 
second vote on independence in Scotland and given the first vote and what 
has happened since in terms of the rise of the Scottish Nationalist Party 
think the vote would be to exit the UK.  So, yeah, I think there is an 
existential threat to the UK as we sit today.’ (Interviewee 7, 2015) 
This came to pass on the 13th March 2017 when Nicola Sturgeon called for a second 
independence referendum (Maguire, 2017).  Part of the reasoning behind this 
decision was due to the high percentage (62%) of the Scottish electorate how voted 
to remain as part of the European Union (BBC, 2017).  This is an interesting 
situation as it raises the question of what union do the Scottish electorate feel more 
affinity towards, and which will they elect to remain a part of: the United Kingdom 
or the European Union?.  What is interesting about this second demand for a 
Scottish independence referendum is the reaction of the Westminster government 
towards a referendum at this time as this would cause further instability within the 
United Kingdom during the already turbulent process of leaving the European 
Union, arguing that ‘Right now we should be working together, not pulling apart’ 
(Stewart, Walker and Carrell, 2017).  This can be summarised as: 
‘we have a challenge to ensure that our component parts hold together and 
show that a smaller unit of nations holding together actually can be much 
stronger and better for the area’ (Interviewee 2, 2015). 
This view was also shared by Interviewee 11 (2015), who stated, ‘I ultimately think 
that the four parts of the UK are better working together than they would be 
separating’.  These statements may appear to be instrumental, but they also show 
an elective aspect to the relation between the component parts of the United 
Kingdom.  There is also an aspect of affinity to maintaining the United Kingdom that 
is dependent upon shared experience and solidarity across the Union.  Interviewee 
26 (2016) describes this in the statement: 
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‘I think the strength of the United Kingdom is the union and I think, ah, while 
we have been able to adapt and have been able to, I suppose, develop our 
own different identities, the fact that we on many occasions can come 
together on issues of common cause I think is something to be valued and 
the United Kingdom and the devolved regions I think are better and closer 
and stronger when they are within the union and I was very concerned that 
what Scotland was doing.  While I have a lot of time and respect for many of 
the people in Scotland, ah, and it’s a place we love to visit, I would be very 
sad and very disappointed of Scotland didn’t remain within the United 
Kingdom.’ 
Questions now have to be asked as to why Scottish Nationalism is enjoying so much 
prominence in contemporary Scotland.  As observed by Agnew (1984: 193), 
‘Scottish nationalism is more than the Scottish National Party’, so why has it 
gathered momentum in the first place?  Is the rise of Scottish nationalism ‘about 
viewing the Union with England as so fundamentally bad in every way that it must 
be ended sooner rather than later, or is it more about presenting a long-term, 
socio-economic strategy?’, as argued by Leith and Steven (2010: 286).  To refer back 
to Anderson and Smith (2006; 1971), it could be argued that the territorial aspect of 
Scotland has led to an insular sense of Scottish community and identity which does 
not need the United Kingdom to feel a sense of belonging and purpose.  This also 
ties in with the writings of Agnew who discussed ‘nationalism in Scotland as a 
reflection of national cultural traditions and emerging economic interests that 
differentiate Scotland from the rest of the British political system’ (Agnew, 1984: 
192).  What the situation in Scotland does is to secure Northern Ireland within the 
Union to a degree.   
 
On the 19th September 2014, the morning after the Scottish independence 
referendum, Unionists across the United Kingdom breathed a collective sigh of 
relief.  This however was to be short lived.  Almost immediately after the result of 
the vote had been announced, David Cameron, the then Conservative Prime 
Minister, gave a speech that quickly reignited the feelings of unease that had 
settled over Unionists in the weeks leading up to the referendum.  Within the 
speech, he conceded new powers to the Scottish parliament at Holyrood (BBC 
News, 2014).  In this speech he also talked about English votes for English laws, the 
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concept that aims to address the long talked about, much contended, ‘West Lothian 
Question’ (Crampton, 2014).  When looking at this from the writings of Hobsbawm, 
this may have been another defining moment for the nation of the United Kingdom 
and one which has the ability to change the shape of it forever.  It was felt by many 
that this was not the time or the place to be bringing up such things.  The Scottish 
independence referendum can be portrayed as a response to the feeling that the 
Anglicisation of the Union has dominated the United Kingdom.  Why then would 
anyone wish to raise the question of England’s future in answer to Scotland’s 
decision to stay?  To discuss the situation of England the day after the referendum 
result could be viewed as a power play by Westminster.  However, it raised some 
interesting questions about the perceived lack of autonomy which English MPs at 
Westminster feel they have over issues which impact upon England. 
 
8.5: Conclusion  
The United Kingdom, as described in Chapter Two, is a union state comprised of 
separate nations.  This is not a problem, but rather a benefit if only it can be 
envisaged in this way.  It is this integration of both national and regional identities 
and political institutions that makes the United Kingdom so dynamic and original.  
This is its strength and it needs to be defended to the best of its ability.  Brexit may 
have the potential to lead to the disintegration of the United Kingdom, but it also 
has the potential to be its saving grace and to further integrate its component parts 
in solidarity.  As Interviewee 24 (2015) suggests, ‘It may be a very different Union, 
but I don’t see it breaking up’, showing that within Unionist narrative, the Union is 
safe from this threat of disintegration.  If anything, leaving the European Union 
provides the United Kingdom with an opportunity to focus on the needs of its 
component parts and to ensure that a cohesive partnership is developed and 
promoted across the Union.  Developing and promoting a sense of community 
across the United Kingdom through the use of elective affinity will help to secure 
the territorial situation, at least for a set moment in time.   
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A major concern of Unionism that has been discussed within this thesis is that of 
the fear of not belonging within the United Kingdom (see Chapter Four, section 
4.2).  Unionists in Ulster are currently in a paradoxical situation where they are both 
on the periphery of the Union, whilst also having a mainstream position within 
British politics.  They are currently mainstream due to the Conservative 
Party/Democratic Unionist Party deal of 2017 and the media attention on the 
border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland post-Brexit.  Unionists 
are on the periphery as discussions surrounding the border are drawing a 
distinction between Northern Ireland and Great Britain and there are questions 
over whether Northern Ireland is best viewed within Ireland as a whole or within 
the United Kingdom.  In regards to narrative, this is a difficult time for Unionists.  
They want to be viewed as British by others within the Union and their increased 
visibility in mainstream British politics helps to promote this.  However, Unionists 
are also in a position where differences between themselves and the United 
Kingdom are currently more publically pronounced, such as the Irish dimension and 
the fact that Northern Ireland is the only part of the United Kingdom that shares a 
land border with a European Union member state.  These issues are currently being 
played out within British (and Irish) politics, and only time will tell what the final 
outcome will be. 
 
In regards to the future of the Union, it can be defined in terms of both optimism 
and pessimism.  For the Unionists who participated in this research the majority 
were optimistic about the future of the United Kingdom, but this did not stop them 
from being pragmatic about the threats which exist within the Union, from Scottish, 
England and Irish Nationalism to the uncertainties of Brexit and the ongoing process 
of leaving the European Union.  From a narrative perspective, Unionists feel that 
the Union is secure (as Is their own place within it), but they are not unaware of the 
difficulties that exist.  To return to elective affinity, Unionists do not view their 
relationship with the Union as  being purely instrumental and contractual.  Even 
when the United Kingdom is in a uncertain situation, there is still a strong feeling of 
affinity that binds Unionists to the Union.  The future of the United Kingdom is 
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uncertain right now as it is taking a bold step into the unknown in regards to Brexit.  
But this does not have to be the end.  In fact, this may only be the beginning. 
  
The next section of this thesis, Part Three, will discuss the questions asked at the 
start of this process and the answers to them that have been suggested along the 
way.  This will provide a fitting end to our conversation surrounding the paradoxes 
of Britishness. 
  
235 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part Three 
Concluding reflections   
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Chapter Nine 
Concluding reflections 
 
9.1: Introduction 
We have come to the end of our journey into the paradoxes of Ulster Britishness.  If 
anything, one could observe that this thesis incorporates a strong T.S. Eliot flavour 
in that ‘And at the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and to 
know the place for the first time’ (1943).  Topics discussed in this thesis may not be 
new, but it is an original approach providing an academic understanding of the 
paradoxes of Britishness and Unionism.  This thesis set out at the beginning to 
examine Britishness and Unionism and to ascertain if the two concepts were 
mutually exclusive, or if they could be understood in a way that allowed the 
seemingly incompatible paradoxes of each to work together.  With the 
development of the Conservative Party deal with the Democratic Unionist Party 
following the 2017 General Election, the Ulster Question is now once again central 
to discussions surrounding both Britishness and the future of the United Kingdom.   
 
Part One observed that Britishness in Northern Ireland has been portrayed in 
paradoxical terms as being both shared and separate from the Britishness of 
mainland Great Britain. It proposed five core questions to investigate: What does it 
mean to be a British citizen?  Do Ulster Unionists fit this description?  What does it 
mean to have a British identity?  Is there an essential core Britishness?  Are Ulster 
Unionists experiencing a ‘crisis of identity’? (see Chapter Three, section 3.4).  By 
first using a negative reading of Ulster Britishness through an adaptation of some 
ideas of Schrödinger, Descartes and Baudrillard, this thesis discussed and assessed 
the traditional anti-Unionist arguments (see Chapter Four, section 4.2). Having 
done so, the aim was to reconcile these paradoxes through the theoretical 
framework of elective affinity (see Chapter Four, section 4.3).  The elective affinity 
framework was then tested in Part Two of the thesis by examining the responses of 
Unionist designated politicians on questions of identity, the 2014 Scottish 
237 
 
independence referendum, the 2016 European referendum and the future of the 
Union (see Chapters Five to Eight) in order to provide answers to the questions 
developed within Part One. 
 
When discussing potential limitations of the research project, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the fact that only Unionist MLAs, MPs and MEPs have been 
interviewed (Peabody et al, 1990).  A more generalised approach to Britishness and 
Unionism in Northern Ireland could have incorporated the views of members from 
across the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist community.  Instead the decision to focus 
solely on the views of Unionist elites takes a very specific look at what is a much 
larger research topic in general.  The decision was made on the basis that as 
politicians are elite actors they should represent the identities of the communities 
whom they serve and that in return the electorate should defer to their judgement 
in political decision making (Jennings, 1992: 421; Bullock, 2011: 496; Browning, 
1992).  The thesis has been based on a top-down approach to the diffusion of 
identity within Unionism in Northern Ireland as traditionally academic research on 
Unionism and Britishness in Northern Ireland has been based on a more grassroots 
approach to identity and belonging exempting the recent study by Tonge et al in 
2014 on the Democratic Unionist Party.  The theory behind the study of elites is 
that Unionist designated politicians are in a position of power within their 
communities and therefore have influence over how British identity in Northern 
Ireland is portrayed and promoted (Fearon and Laitin, 2000).  Unionist politicians 
are the most visual representation of Britishness in Northern Ireland due to their 
position of power and authority not only within their own communities, but also in 
Northern Ireland as a whole.  Through the elected representatives’ mandates and 
of their own stances and viewpoints, one can observe how representative they are 
of the overall Unionist community in Northern Ireland.  Events such as the Union 
flag protests of 2011 have shown that Unionist designated politicians may often 
misjudge and/or lose control of identity within the communities they represent 
(Silva and Mace, 2015; BBC News, 2013).  In this specific scenario members of the 
loyalist community felt that politicians, and in particular the Democratic Unionist 
238 
 
Party, did not do enough to stand up for their community and for British identity in 
Northern Ireland (Greenslade, 2013; Norton et al, 2017).  From the findings 
gathered for this research political Unionist representatives are in fact 
representative of the views of the community who they represent, at least in terms 
of voting patterns and identity. 
 
The limitations of the methodology must be acknowledged.  Whilst every attempt 
has been made by the researcher to minimise any potential bias throughout the 
interview stage it has to be noted that this can happened within qualitative 
research (Oppenheim, 2000; Williams, 1964).  The very nature of the research 
methodology itself, namely semi-structured one-on-one interviews, also provides 
its own limitations to an area of study (Barriball and While, 1994; Gall, Gall and 
Borg, 2003; Turner, 2010: 755).  Whilst the research took measures to address any 
potential issues with this methodology, it is necessary to observe that it does have 
limitations.  Perhaps the most obvious limitation to the methodology is the 
questioning of participants identity itself.  As outlined in Chapter Five, the very act 
of asking a participant to define their identity throws the very existence of that 
identity into doubt, as described within the framework of Cogito, ergo sum that has 
been discussed previously (Descartes, 1969; Chapter Four, section 4.2.2).  By 
questioning what their identity is, the researcher could inadvertently lead the 
participant to state a stronger version of their own identity in order to defend 
themselves.  Unfortunately there is no way to ascertain if this is the case or not.  On 
the contrary to this scenario, a participant may have stated their identity to be 
something other than British to present themselves as more progressive and 
inclusive.  During the data collection period for qualitative research the researcher 
to a degree is at the mercy of the participants as to what answers they receive.  As 
a researcher one would expect to receive the truth as an answer, yet this is not 
always the case.  There is a large degree of trust placed both ways during an 
interview. 
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The timescale during which the research was conducted could also be considered to 
have been a limitation.  Due to the nature of the discussions surrounding the 
European referendum and when it would be held, it is unfortunate that many of the 
interviews were conducted before the European referendum of 23rd June 2016 had 
been called (BBC, 2016).  For most of the participants their views on a European 
referendum were based upon pure speculation as at this stage in the discussions 
and very few of the participants had actually given much consideration to this 
possible referendum and the possible impact upon the United Kingdom as a whole.  
After the referendum date was announced, the answers given by the last four 
participants tended to become more focused and in depth in their structure (see 
Chapter Seven).  For these participants their answers were very much based on 
how the United Kingdom would now have to move forward from this referendum 
and how they as elected representatives could ensure that Northern Ireland 
received the best deal possible.  Based upon this, the viewpoints expressed by 
participants towards the European referendum tended to vary greatly depending 
on at what stage of the interview process they participated at.  As a snap shot of 
Northern Irish Unionism, being able to see how attitudes changed and developed 
towards the European referendum and the question of the United Kingdom leaving 
the European Union can be said to add to academic research into the area of British 
politics and identity.  Whilst this makes the overall data gained throughout the 
research rich and interesting, it would have been preferable to have had the 
timeframes of the interviews closer together in order to gain a better insight into 
this threat to the Union.  Of course, any timeframe is problematic. A week certainly 
is a long time in politics – and the events of the last three years made it very 
difficult to find a point of interpretative stability. Things changed fast and 
unexpectedly. 
 
This chapter will review the research findings to analyse both their importance and 
contribution to our academic understanding of the social identity of Britishness in a 
contested region of the United Kingdom during this time of constitutional change 
and political transformation.  These findings will then be presented in relation to 
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the framework of elective affinity and what understanding this brings to the 
academic study of the paradoxes of Britishness and Unionism.  The limitations of 
the research project will be addressed in order to acknowledge areas upon which 
future research could improve.  This chapter will state how the overall thesis has 
provided an original contribution to knowledge, before reaching its conclusion by 
stating what scope this thesis leaves for future research on Britishness and 
Unionism in Northern Ireland. 
 
9.2: Re-stating the paradoxes 
This thesis argues that no research into Britishness is complete without including 
the viewpoints and opinions of Northern Irish Unionists.  Unionists in Northern 
Ireland deserve to have their voice heard over issues of Britishness, threats to the 
Union, and the future of the Union.  A recurrent theme throughout this thesis has 
been Richard Rose’s idea that Northern Ireland is a test case for the United 
Kingdom as a state and that it is not peripheral at all to British politics, but central 
to it (1982).  Ulster Unionists may be unique when it comes to identity within the 
United Kingdom, but only in the same way that individuals from England, Scotland 
and Wales are also unique.  The Northern Ireland situation provides an opportunity 
to study British identity and the future of the Union from the viewpoint of 
individuals who have a distinct angle of vision on the nature of identity and the 
Union.  Northern Ireland has always been at the edge of the Union and has often in 
its short history come close to the precipice, with ex-Democratic Unionist Party 
Leader Peter Robinson stating back in 1991 that the Union was ‘finished’ (Phoenix, 
2017).  Yet it is still here today. 
 
This thesis could be described as a follow up to Richard Rose’s 1971 book, 
Governing without Consensus.  This research makes the case that by uncovering 
findings similar to those which Rose discovered in 1968 when the study was 
conducted, this research continues and extends previous academic literature.  The 
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research conducted by Rose was at the beginning of the Troubles, this research by 
comparison has been conducted almost half a century after Rose’s pioneering 1968 
study. The question going into this research was, What has changed? But in reality 
what was discovered was that as things have changed, they have also stayed the 
same - a fitting paradox to result from a study of paradoxes. Much academic 
literature talks about how the Troubles had the effect of polarising identity within 
Northern Ireland and it is this period of polarisation that created the hyper version 
of Britishness in Northern Ireland discussed in the thesis and which is so prevalent 
even today.  It is this period of polarisation which reinforces the old adage that 
Northern Ireland Unionists wanted to be as British as Finchley.  Yet what Rose 
found in 1968 and what this research discovered is a more richly textured Unionist 
identity.  It can therefore be argued, as has been done in Chapter Five, that identity 
in Northern Ireland is returning to what it once was previous to the Troubles.  This 
is an important contribution to make to academic knowledge surrounding Northern 
Irish Unionism.   
 
Two core paradoxes of British identity within Ulster Unionism have been discussed 
within Chapter Three, section 3.3.  These paradoxes are that Ulster Unionist identity 
is viewed in two contrasting ways: Ulster Unionists are either British, but they do 
not act as though they are; or they are British, but are not accepted as such by the 
British who actually view them as Irish.  To say that Ulster Unionists do not act as 
though they are British raises some interesting questions about what it means to be 
British and the different interpretations which exist surrounding this.  For Miller 
(1978), Ulster Unionists are not British enough to be called so, yet for other political 
theorists such as McLean and McMillan (2005), Ulster Unionists are viewed as being 
too British to truly be British.  This is a fascinating, yet confusing paradox to grasp.  
An attempt was made to resolve this conundrum in section 4.2.  The second 
paradox of Ulster Britishness, that Ulster Unionists are not viewed as British by their 
neighbours in Great Britain, also fits into this negative interpretation of Unionist 
identity, highlighting the assumption that the fear of belonging has defined the 
identity of Ulster Unionists (see Chapter Four, section 4.2).  This thesis tried to 
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demonstrate that Unionists are not – as a matter of self-understanding - scared of 
not belonging.  Elective affinity was used to explain how that self-understanding 
functions: that both the shared and separate aspects of Britishness within Ulster 
Unionism actually support each other.  It is not enough to simply be a part of the 
United Kingdom through elections and referendums – though that is important – 
but that one must also feel an affinity towards the Union in order for the 
constitutional aspects to hold fast.  One must also feel that this affinity is 
reciprocated by the Union and this has historically been the issue for Ulster 
Unionists.  As discussed within Chapter Four, section 4.2, the notion of a ‘fear of not 
belonging’ comes from outside forces and not from the Unionists themselves. 
 
From these two paradoxes of Britishness emerged five key questions to be 
answered by the thesis.  Chapter Four, section 4.4, sought to provide theoretical 
answers to these questions before the interviews commenced.  The first question, 
What does it mean to be a British citizen?  To say that Ulster Unionists are either 
not British or too British is all well and good, but just what is meant by Britishness 
must first be clarified.  If we look at Britishness through the first of Boyce’s 
distinctions then it is one of political representation.  Each of the four component 
parts of the United Kingdom is represented at Westminster.  Devolution does not 
infringe upon British citizenship, but instead strengthens it by allowing each nation 
to retain its individuality within the whole. Do Ulster Unionists fit within this 
description of Britishness?  To provide a short answer: yes, they do.  The United 
Kingdom is a union state of four distinctive nations which have been brought 
together through both contractual and instrumental reasons and by a shared sense 
of self and belonging.  This is where Boyce’s distinction and Elazar’s idea of ‘self-
rule’ and ‘shared rule’ comes into play (1995; 1987).  The United Kingdom only 
works if it operates on two levels.  First, the ‘shared rule’ level that brings all the 
nations together through political representation at the national parliament.  
Second, the ‘self-rule’ component allows for the three smaller nations of the United 
Kingdom to have a degree of regional autonomy - in short, allowing the four 
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component parts of the Union to retain their individuality whilst also being a sum of 
the whole. 
 
What does it mean to have a British identity?  Identity is important.  It provides a 
sense of place and belonging.  It also works on a psychological level to define in 
groups and out groups.  Within the United Kingdom, it is the overarching umbrella 
identity of the United Kingdom that encompasses England, Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and Wales.  But what does it mean for Ulster Unionists?  For Ulster 
Unionists to have a British identity and to be a part of the United Kingdom is to 
belong and this sense of belonging is vitally important.  The history of Ulster 
Unionism has been one of trying to secure their place and to gain a sense of 
belonging.  It has changed from Irish Unionism which sought to keep Ireland as a 
whole within the Union during the Home Rule Crisis to Ulster Unionism since the 
creation of Northern Ireland in 1921.  The only constant that has existed is their 
place within the United Kingdom and at times this position has been severely 
tested, such as during the Troubles.  It is an interesting observation that the British 
identity means different things to different people and this is where the next 
question gains its significance.   
 
Is there an ‘essential/core’ Britishness?  In one way, this question can be answered 
as no.  How can there be an essential or core version of Britishness whenever 
Britishness is different depending on what part of the United Kingdom one is in?  It 
is actually within this paradox that a more complete answer is discovered.  Yes 
there is an essential Britishness present within the United Kingdom, but it is more 
flexible than may have been previously thought.  It is this flexibility and organic 
nature which is the core of British national identity.  There is no one version of 
Britishness which describes the whole of the United Kingdom.  Regional identities in 
each part of the Union influence Britishness.  Britishness in England is not the same 
as the Britishness that one would see in Northern Ireland and this applies also for 
Scotland and Wales.  This is why Northern Ireland is unique – but paradoxically it 
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also the same as everywhere else. The reason why Northern Ireland is portrayed as 
the ‘exception’ is partly due to the geographical location it holds.  A case of out of 
sight, out of mind as it is separated from Great Britain by the Irish Sea.  Another 
reason is simply that there has been a lack of understanding surrounding the nature 
of Britishness and how the paradoxical aspects of its nature can be reconciled 
across the United Kingdom.   
 
Are Ulster Unionists experiencing a crisis of identity?  Again, to provide a short 
answer: no.  Ulster Unionists know who they are.  It is other people who do not 
know what Ulster Unionists are.  This is partly through lack of understanding.  
Although that is not to say that issues of doubt and fear of not belonging do not 
exist, they do.  Britishness in Northern Ireland may look different to that which can 
be seen in Great Britain due to the use of flags, symbols and emblems, but this 
overt show of Britishness is to affirm to others that Northern Ireland belongs within 
the Union.  Contractual and instrumental arrangements are not enough to secure 
the Union, there must also be reciprocated feelings of shared identity and 
belonging in order to strengthen and maintain the United Kingdom.  This has 
tended to be lacking in regards to the relationship between Ulster Unionists and 
Westminster.  Ulster Unionists promote the Union and give their support and 
loyalty to it, but they feel as though this relationship is one-sided.  This may be 
resolved in some part by the deal between the Conservative Party and the 
Democratic Unionist Party following the 2017 General Election as this has raised the 
profile of Ulster Unionism within mainstream British politics and has provided the 
Democratic Unionist Party with a position of greater power at Westminster 
effectively making them the ‘Queenmakers’ of Theresa May’s government. 
 
To summarise, Part One addressed the existing literature and the theory behind the 
paradoxes of Britishness and Unionism and developed questions from this that 
needed to be answered to provide an understanding of Ulster Britishness.  
Hypothetical answers to these questions were provided within Chapter Four using 
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two distinctive theoretical approaches.  The first was a negative reading of Ulster 
Britishness using the concepts of doubt and fear of belonging which are often 
included within narratives of Unionist identity.  The second was a positive approach 
that used the framework of elective affinity as a method to reconcile the paradoxes 
of Unionism and Britishness.  This will be discussed in detail within section 9.4 of 
this chapter as this truly is the core of the thesis and as such deserves special 
consideration on its own.  But before one can get to that, Part Two of the thesis 
must first be discussed in relation to how the interviews with Unionist designated 
politicians impacted upon the hypothesised answers to the questions of Ulster 
Britishness as outlined within Part One.  
 
9.3: Re-investigating the paradoxes 
Part Two investigated the views and opinions of Unionist designated politicians in 
regards to the above paradoxes of Britishness and questions of Ulster Britishness to 
establish if the hypothetical answers provided in Part One had actually grounding 
within Ulster Unionists and their own understanding of identity and the Union.  To 
do justice to the complexity of the paradoxes of Britishness, Part Two was divided 
into four chapters focusing on Ulster Unionist identity, Scotland and the Union, the 
European referendum and the Union, and the future of the United Kingdom.  These 
chapters will now be revisited to highlight once more the connections between the 
theoretical framework and the answers of participants.   
 
In Chapter Five, the question of identity was asked of the research participants 
involved in this study.  This was asked in order to provide an answer to the research 
questions discussed within Part One.  What was interesting about these findings 
was that they corresponded with the view that identity within Ulster Unionism 
cannot be easily categorised into neat little boxes of identity.  Instead, what Ulster 
Unionism portrays is a deeply paradoxical multi-faceted approach to identity.  Of 
the thirty-four participants interviewed, only 18% viewed their identity as being 
solely British.  When compared to the findings of Rose’s 1968 study this is lower 
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than the result he obtained which was 39% (1971: 208).  One of the most 
interesting findings in regards to the question of participants’ identity was that 
around 20% did not mention Britishness as being a part of their identity.  This result 
was not anticipated as even for those who did not state Britishness as their first 
preference identity still mentioned it as a component of it.  Of the thirty-four 
participants, only nine viewed Irishness as a part of their identity while four saw 
their identity as being distinctly Ulster only.   
 
These findings prove the validity of the hypothesised answers that have been 
provided to the answers in Part One.  Ulster Unionists are British citizens and this 
fact cannot be disputed.  This is not only the case through the constitutional ties 
which bind the Union and through instrumental British connections such as 
representation at Westminster, the National Health Service and holding a British 
passport.  It is also the case because Ulster Unionists feel themselves to be British 
citizens.  If a United Ireland were to be created tomorrow this may stop Ulster 
Unionists from being constitutional British citizens, but one may argue they would 
still feel British - and would certainly not lose their shared sense of identity and 
affinity with the United Kingdom.  This is what British identity means: it is a way of 
life.  It is a sense of self and a feeling of belonging that cannot be simply switched 
off.  In that sense, there is no crisis of identity within Ulster Unionism.  If anything, 
there is a crisis of solidarity within the United Kingdom which must be addressed.  
This is not just in the case of Northern Ireland and Irish Nationalism. There are the 
issues of Scottish and English Nationalism to contend with as well as the unknowns 
of what a post-Brexit United Kingdom could mean for the Union.   
 
As for the paradoxes of Britishness which were discussed in Chapter Three - that 
Ulster Unionists were British but do not act like they are, or that Ulster Unionists 
are British, but are not viewed as such by others within the Union who see them as 
Irish - it is clear to see that neither of these two suggestions quite hits the nail on 
the head.  Perhaps a better way to phrase Ulster Britishness is the statement: Ulster 
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Unionists are British and they are so in a way that is fitting to their geographical, 
cultural and constitutional position within the United Kingdom.  Ulster Unionists do 
act as though they are British (for they are British), but they do so in a style that is 
fitting for them. This situation is same for individuals within each part of the United 
Kingdom as each region has its own unique cultures and histories which shape 
identity.  This does not make Ulster Unionists different any more than it makes a 
Unionist from Scotland, England or Wales different.  Instead, through the concept 
of unity through diversity it makes - ironically - the place of Ulster Unionists within 
the Union just like that of everyone else.  As for the second statement, that Ulster 
Unionists are British, but are seen as being Irish, this too is not entirely accurate.  
Yes there are some who believe that Northern Ireland should be a part of a United 
Ireland and not a part of the United Kingdom, but it is not fitting to say that those in 
Great Britain see Ulster Unionists as Irish.  The participants own responses show 
that Ulster Unionists feel as though they are British and they have conviction in this.  
This raises wider questions of citizenship within the Union and how members of the 
United Kingdom are taught about the history of each nation.  From a Unionist point 
of view at least, diversity within the Union should not be looked upon as a negative, 
but as a positive and it needs to be expressed as such.  
 
The question asked in Chapter Six was how the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum impacted on the United Kingdom and on how Ulster Unionists 
perceived its effect on the Union.  Perhaps one of the most surprising findings to 
emerge from this chapter was that the participants had very little concern for the 
effect on Northern Ireland and the constitutional unrest which resulted from them.  
What is interesting is that they viewed Northern Ireland’s position within the Union 
as secure no matter how these events unfolded – at least at the time of the 
interviews.  This is a unique position for Ulster Unionists to be in as traditionally 
Northern Ireland has always been the region of the United Kingdom most likely to 
result in the break-up of the Union.  The participants did not seem to have many 
concerns about the aftermath of the Scottish independence referendum on Irish 
Nationalism, with only five participants discussing Irish Nationalism when giving 
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their views of the referendum.  Scotland was viewed as the overarching threat to 
the stability of the Union.  The concerns of the participants interviewed were not 
for Northern Ireland’s place within the Union, but for the Union as a whole, 
especially over the perceived lack of effort Westminster is putting into securing and 
maintaining the Union. Eleven of the participants stated that they had been worried 
in the lead up to the Scottish independence referendum that Scotland may in fact 
have voted to leave the Union as there was little done by Westminster to appeal to 
broad affinities and belonging that connects the Union.  
  
The European referendum provided an interesting dynamic to the interview 
process as discussed within Chapter Seven.  All of the participants were asked for 
their views on the then upcoming referendum, yet their answers varied greatly 
depending on the timeframe when the interview took place.  At the beginning of 
the interview stage, a date for the referendum had not yet been set and as a result 
only four of the interviews were conducted after the referendum had taken place.  
What this resulted in was 37% of the participants stating they were unsure of how 
they would vote when the referendum took place.  This uncertainly was due to the 
lack of information that was being provided by Westminster on what could 
potentially happen to the United Kingdom post-Brexit.  Ulster Unionism is 
traditionally Eurosceptic and has always taken a position of opposition to further 
weakening of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom.  What this finding shows is 
that Ulster Unionists are instrumental in their political decisions about Europe.  
Across the board there was very little affinity and solidarity expressed in regards to 
Europe.  As has been stated previously in this thesis, elective and contractual ties 
are not enough on their own without the support of a shared sense of belonging 
between the nations in questions, yet in the case of the European Union even these 
contractual bonds were not viewed as being particularly beneficial and there is 
certainly no shared sense of belonging to strengthen them.  Yes, the United 
Kingdom voted to join the European Economic Community in 1975 for the 
instrumental benefits which this brought, but since then the feeling among the 
participants was that the European Union has over stepped its boundaries in terms 
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of what it originally set out to do and that the negatives of this far outweigh any 
positives.  This concept of inverted elective affinity that exists within the 
relationship between Ulster Unionists and the European Union is a sharp contrast 
to the elective affinity which binds Ulster Unionists to the United Kingdom, 
providing an insight into why one of these unions is still strong, whilst the other is 
being dissolved. 
 
According to participants, the European Union is a negative in that it takes 
sovereignty away from the national parliament and for Unionists this most certainly 
is not a positive.  Based upon this, the majority of participants believed that the 
United Kingdom would be better off out of the European Union.  Even the very 
wording of these answers was interesting in that participants tended to talk about 
the United Kingdom as a whole, rather than focusing upon Northern Ireland.  Again 
this shows the support of Northern Irish Unionists towards the Union and outlines 
how much value is placed on the strength of the Union and the importance of 
keeping the United Kingdom together.  In the aftermath of the European 
referendum Unionist politicians from Northern Ireland, in particular from the 
Democratic Unionist Party, argued that the people of Northern Ireland should 
accept the result of the referendum as it was the will of the people of the United 
Kingdom as a whole (Ainsworth, 2016).  This was because Northern Ireland voted to 
remain in the European Union, whilst the overall result across the United Kingdom 
was to leave.  This is revealing as it shows the importance of the unity of the Union 
over the will of the people of Northern Ireland.  In this scenario, the nation state is 
more important than one component part by itself, even if it is in regards to 
something as serious as the nation’s future within the European Union.  Even with 
the European Union itself being seen in negative terms, participants felt the need to 
weigh this up against the risk of the unknowns they would face when outside of the 
European Union before making their final decision.  Whilst 37% is a high percentage 
of undecided participants, 59% were confident they would vote to leave the 
European Union.  This percentage breakdown of participant attitudes is quite 
accurate in numbers to the vote of Unionists in Northern Ireland in the referendum 
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which was estimated to be around 70% in polls leading up to the referendum 
(White, 2016), again showing the representativeness of Unionist designated 
politicians in Northern Ireland.  
 
The fact that only one participant viewed the border as an active concern is the 
most surprising finding to have emerged from Chapter Seven.  The lack of 
discussion on the border is particularly striking given the recent media attention 
that has been focused on this issue.  One may be forgiven for thinking that the 
border between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland would be a 
Northern Irish problem, but it has become a major problem for central British 
politics.  Trade agreements between the United Kingdom and the European Union 
post-Brexit are now intertwined with the border situation.  For this not to be 
mentioned by participants raises interesting questions.  Is this because Ulster 
Unionists are not concerned about the border?  Is it because a hard border would 
potentially benefit Ulster Unionists by further securing their territorial position 
within the United Kingdom?  While these are all fascinating potentials, in the case 
of this thesis it is more plausible that the timing of the interviews in relation to the 
actual referendum has meant that participants have not looked in detail about the 
potential consequences of leaving the European Union.  This is a finding that would 
benefit from further research in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of 
the views of Ulster Unionists towards the border post-Brexit. 
 
The question of where does the United Kingdom go from here was addressed 
within Chapter Eight.  This chapter analysed the data gathered from interviews to 
provide an idea of where the participants saw the future of the United Kingdom in 
the face of the constitutional uncertainty of the previous few years.  When asked if 
they could ever envisage the Union breaking, 67% of the participants said no, while 
30% said yes and 3% gave no defined answer.  Of those who said that they could 
envisage the Union breaking, eight said this was because of the risk Scotland and a 
possible second Scottish independence referendum posed to the United Kingdom.  
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Two stated the European referendum as a threat to the Union due to the Scottish 
position on this.  Perhaps the most interesting of these findings is that two 
participants viewed England as the biggest risk to the Union.  As the largest region 
of the United Kingdom, England holds the majority of power in the relationship.  If 
this dynamic was to change then it is possible to see how the Union would struggle 
to survive.  When discussing perceived risks to the Union with all participants, 
Scottish nationalism remains the largest concern with fifteen participants 
mentioning it – and not the threat of imminent Irish unity. The European Union 
comes in second with nine participants, Irish nationalism third with eight 
participants and England last with two participants raising concerns over it.  For the 
participants interviewed, while they believe the position of Northern Ireland is 
secure, they still have concerns over the stability of the other regions when it 
comes to holding the Union together.  What does this then mean for the future of 
British identity within the United Kingdom?  It means that it is currently safe, but 
that the United Kingdom cannot afford to become complacent.  The four 
component parts of the United Kingdom may currently elect to remain within the 
Union, but the non-instrumental ties which created solidarity are now more 
important than ever.  The United Kingdom is a union state and it needs to ensure 
that each nation within it is in a reciprocal relationship based on allegiance and 
shared identity.  Participants interviewed believed now is the time to bring the 
regions of the United Kingdom together in order to try and regain a shared sense of 
purpose and belonging across the whole of the Union.  Due to the unknowns of the 
United Kingdom leaving the European Union this is now more vital than ever.  
 
These findings have shown that what Richard Rose found in 1968 is still the case in 
2017.  Though there is almost half a century between these two studies Unionism is 
still convinced of the value of being British.  The next section, 9.4, will be a review 
of the elective affinity framework and will address how this concept can be used to 
reconcile the paradoxes of Britishness and Unionism that have been raised 
throughout this thesis. 
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9.4: Resolving the paradoxes of Unionism? 
In Chapter Four, section 4.3, elective affinity was introduced as a positive 
interpretation of Ulster Britishness and as a means of addressing the paradoxes of 
Britishness and Unionism which were discussed within Part One.  Elective affinity 
explained the way interactions in relationships happen and are observed.  Within 
the case of Ulster Unionism and Britishness it is used to observe the behaviour of 
Ulster Unionists in regards to both British national identity and in terms of their 
relationship with Great Britain.  This is achieved by taking the paradoxes of 
allegiance and identity, contract and solidarity and instrumentalism and non-
instrumentalism and observing them as partners rather than as separate 
components of Ulster Britishness.  By seeing the paradoxes as positive rather than 
negative, elective affinity provides an understanding of the United Kingdom that 
promotes regional diversity within the framework of the union state.  This is a vital 
reading of Unionism and Britishness in the twenty-first century due to devolution 
and the recent constitutional events that have occurred across the Union. 
 
Relationships within a union state must be examined in two ways: first, as a political 
relationship, and second, as a social and cultural relationship.  Both of these 
relationships may mean different things to different people, but without both of 
these aspects working together a union state would not be able to survive.  The 
very fact that the United Kingdom has been in existence for so long, albeit with a 
few changes such as the loss of Ireland, means that it has been successful in 
managing these two aspects of Britishness.  One aspect of how this has been 
achieved is the lack of written constitution within the United Kingdom.  Although 
this may be viewed as a negative, it has actually been a positive for the United 
Kingdom.  An uncodified constitution allows for a level of flexibility which is vital in 
regards to managing the interests of four separate and distinctive nations 
simultaneously. 
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What was discovered within the analysis of these findings is that Unionist identity in 
Northern Ireland can be described as having come full circle in regards to how it is 
viewed internally.  According to Richard Rose in his 1968 study, Northern Irish 
Unionists had a unique Ulster dimension to their identity, but they were still British.  
The range of identities mentioned during the interviews as participants’ first choice 
identities, along with the complex and layered multi-identities they described leads 
one to the conclusion that identity within Ulster Unionism has returned to pre-
Troubles levels similar to those which Rose found.  With Northern Ireland’s place in 
the Union secured through the Principle of Consent, Ulster Unionists may no longer 
feel any doubt towards their position within the United Kingdom due to outside 
forces doubting that they belong.  No one can tell the people of Northern Ireland 
they do not belong within the Union except for the Northern Irish electorate 
themselves.  What this security does for Ulster Britishness is it allows it to be more 
fluid and multi-faceted.  Ulster Unionists now feel as though they can hold multiple 
identities at once without fearing this will make other people view them as being 
not British.  As a result this brings Ulster Unionists into line with Great Britain where 
individuals can also hold regional identities simultaneously with British national 
identity. 
 
These findings are also interesting when observed from the viewpoint of the 
traditional academic typologies of Ulster Unionism.  These tended to view Unionism 
as being a highly black and white concept, that a Unionist can only be instrumental 
or non-instrumental.  From the data gathered and analysed for this thesis, it is clear 
this approach is too simplistic to deal with the complex social identity that is Ulster 
Unionism.  This thesis found instead that Unionism contains a massive grey area 
whereby it is possible to be both instrumental and non-instrumental.  It is this 
finding that connects the concept of elective affinity to that of Ulster Unionism.  
Elective affinity provides a theoretical framework within which Ulster Unionism can 
be simultaneously viewed as being both instrumental and non-instrumental as in 
reality one of these components could not work within the United Kingdom without 
the support and backing of the other.  It works like a continuing loop: Ulster 
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Unionists feel that they are British and they elect to remain within the United 
Kingdom for this reason and because they elect to remain within the United 
Kingdom they feel British.  The sense of belonging which underpins the 
constitutional arrangement for Ulster Unionists cannot be overlooked.  It is the key 
to the continued survival as a part of the Union.  It is also the difference between 
Ulster Unionists who support the Union and Irish Nationalists who support the 
Union.  Many Irish Nationalists in Northern Ireland support the Union for the 
instrumental benefits this union provides, but they do not feel any affinity towards 
the United Kingdom.  This is why if a United Ireland was to become a more 
financially stable alternative, many Irish Nationalists would choose to leave the 
United Kingdom.  For Ulster Unionists the perceived instrumental benefits would 
not outweigh the importance of shared culture and identity, the same reason why 
Irish Republicans and some Irish Nationalists would always choose to become a part 
of a United Ireland even if the United Kingdom provided more benefits.  That is why 
the support of Irish Nationalists to the Union is a tricky thing to measure or to 
depend upon.  It is allegiant only so long in that there is instrumental gain and this 
relationship contains no identity to support it. 
 
Whilst the 2017 deal between the Conservative Party and the Democratic Unionist 
Party took place after the research stage of this thesis was conducted it remains an 
important component of the research and one that can be analysed within the 
context of this section.  When focusing on the future of the United Kingdom, the 
participants themselves did not envisage that Northern Ireland, and in particular 
Ulster Unionists, would have such a major role to play.  Having been effectively 
raised to the position of political queenmakers within Westminster following the 
result of the 2017 General Election, the Democratic Unionist Party now finds itself 
at the very core of British politics.  This is a marked change from the traditional 
academic notions of Northern Ireland being a place apart from the rest of the 
United Kingdom; a problem child that must be kept at arm’s length least it should 
disturb the other regions as well.  This deal offered Northern Irish Unionists, apart 
from an extra £1 billion, the opportunity to reinforce that they are in fact a 
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necessary component part of the United Kingdom and that they are as British as 
any of the other Westminster political parties.   
 
What is interesting about the deal between the Conservative Party and the 
Democratic Unionist Party from an elective affinity viewpoint is the way the British 
public have reacted to this.  There has been somewhat of a negative reaction from 
the British media surrounding this deal due to the Democratic Unionist Party’s 
stance on moral and social issues such as decriminalising abortion and legalising 
equal marriage.  The Democratic Unionist Party was democratically elected to 
Westminster as the largest Unionist party from Northern Ireland and the 
Conservative Party was well within its rights to make a deal with it as the two 
parties share similar views on the Union and on other key political issues.  Yet there 
appears to be little to no affinity between the Democratic Unionist Party and the 
population of Great Britain.  The style and appearance of the Democratic Unionist 
Party is alien to the majority of the electorate of Great Britain for the very same 
reasons that Ulster Unionists in general are viewed as either being British, but not 
acting like they are, or as really being Irish.  It is simply because the version of 
Britishness expressed by the Democratic Unionist Party is overt.  There are even 
those within the Conservative Party themselves who are unhappy with the deal and 
who see the differences between the two parties as being potentially problematic.  
For the Democratic Unionist Party and for Ulster Unionism in general this deal 
solidified the position of Ulster Unionists within the United Kingdom, allowing them 
a mainstream position at the heart of British politics in Westminster.   
 
During the interview process participants were asked for their views and opinions 
on the United Kingdom and of the current political issues such as the Scottish 
independence referendum, the European referendum, and also of the recent 
increase in support for English votes for English laws.  The responses received from 
participants were varied, but the results overwhelmingly show there is a concern 
within Northern Irish unionism over the future of the United Kingdom.  The 
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overwhelming view was not that Northern Ireland’s position within the Union is at 
risk, but rather that it now finds itself one of the most secure regions of the United 
Kingdom.  This in itself is an important finding.  If Northern Ireland is now seen as 
secure within the United Kingdom by the participants interviewed, why then did the 
Democratic Unionist Party election campaign in 2016, and in particular during the 
snap election campaign of 2017 (Foster, 2017), noticeably go down a path of 
arguing that they were the only party in Northern Ireland that was strong enough to 
secure the Union?  Why in 2017, almost 100 years on since the creation of the 
Northern Irish state, can Unionists still not feel secure in their identity?  Why is 
there still a sense of a community under attack whenever Unionism is still the 
largest ethno-national group and political group in Northern Ireland?  One can see 
some of the reasoning behind this fragile sense of belonging in the results of the 
2017 Assembly Election (The Guardian, 2017).  This election cannot be counted as 
anything other than a disaster for mainstream Unionism.  Although Unionism kept 
its Stormont majority it did so by only one seat, making this the closest election 
ever in Northern Irish history.   
 
Even though this election could be seen as a wakeup call for Westminster and for 
Unionism across the United Kingdom it also provided greater benefits than anyone 
would have foreseen going into it.  Even with the gap between Unionist and 
Nationalist representation at Westminster closing, the minority Conservative 
government that was returned following the results of the election chose to make a 
deal with the Democratic Unionist Party in order to secure their power at 
Westminster.  In this deal, the Democratic Unionist Party was able to secure a 
financial package of over £1 billion for Northern Ireland in return for giving their 
support to the minority Conservative government during important votes.  This 
reinforced that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and that Ulster 
Unionism is core to British politics, albeit because they are needed to prop up the 
Conservative Party.  It reconciles the contract and solidarity tropes within Ulster 
Unionism, as through the deal the Democratic Unionist Party are connected to the 
heart of the British politics through choice, but it also simultaneously shows and 
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promotes solidarity between both Northern Ireland and Great Britain, and Ulster 
Unionist and Westminster politics. 
 
Overall, out of the participants interviewed for the thesis, the majority felt that 
although the Scottish independence referendum was a closer result than expected, 
it does not affect the place of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom.  Many 
participants talked about the possibility of how it could have impacted Northern 
Ireland if Scotland had left the United Kingdom.  In this scenario, a newly 
independent Scotland could have led to increased support within Northern Ireland 
for Irish Nationalism and ultimately led to calls for a border poll.  However, it is 
necessary to state that Irish Nationalism has strong support on its own even 
without Scottish Nationalism.  Had this hypothetical border poll been successful 
Northern Ireland could have found itself as part of a United Ireland.  This was, and 
will continue to be, a nightmare scenario for Northern Irish Unionists.  Many of the 
participants stated that although the result should be taken as a positive that does 
not mean that the United Kingdom can afford to be complacent.  This referendum 
was extremely close, too close for comfort from the viewpoint of Unionists in 
Northern Ireland.  What needs to happen now is that Unionism across the United 
Kingdom unites to work together to promote the benefits of the Union in order to 
prevent a similar event from happening in the future. 
 
Elective affinity, as outlined within this thesis, provides a framework for better 
understanding of the complexities of the paradoxes of Ulster Britishness.  This 
concept allows for the reconciliation of the seemingly contradictory paradoxes of 
allegiance and identity, contract and solidarity and instrumentalism and non-
instrumentalism which define the relationship between Britishness and Ulster 
Unionism.  What elective affinity does and does well is that it highlights the 
importance of both the elective choice of Ulster Unionists to be a part of the Union, 
whilst simultaneously highlighting the importance of affinity and belonging to the 
United Kingdom.  Throughout this thesis it has been observed that neither aspect of 
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Britishness can hold the United Kingdom together by itself, they are two parts of 
the one whole and must be treated as so.  To view Ulster Britishness through a 
framework of elective affinity is to state definitively that Ulster Unionists are British 
and are an important component part of the United Kingdom that is central and not 
peripheral to British politics.  
 
9.5: Conclusion 
To complete the thesis, we have returned to the start, but with a newfound 
knowledge of where we came from.  Unionist Britishness in Northern Ireland can 
now be described as having returned to pre-Troubles levels when one examines the 
findings of both this thesis and the 2015 Northern Ireland Life and Times survey and 
compares them to Richard Rose’s 1968 study.  This is significant as it shows that 
other identities within Ulster Unionism are flourishing, something only achievable 
when Northern Ireland’s place within the Union is secure.  From the findings one 
can observe that for Ulster Unionists, Northern Ireland is no longer the biggest 
threat to the Union and that this title lies with the recent constitutional unrest 
across the United Kingdom, courtesy of the 2014 Scottish independence 
referendum and the 2016 European referendum.  Britishness as an identity is 
having to work hard in the face of constitutional upheaval which threatens the very 
structures that bind the United Kingdom together.  As outlined throughout this 
thesis, identity on its own cannot work to save or maintain the Union.  There must 
also be an elected or instrumental arrangement which binds the regions together.  
This is why Unionists interviewed felt that Northern Ireland’s place within the Union 
is secured. The Principle of Consent, coupled with the fact we are now nineteen 
years on from the 1998 Good Friday Agreement allowed Ulster Unionists when the 
interviews took place - to be secure in the knowledge their position within the 
Union is protected.  Ulster Unionism is complex, but so is every other regional 
identity within the United Kingdom.  What it truly needs is to be accepted as British 
by those within Great Britain and to be accepted as a core component of 
Britishness. 
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Elective affinity can and has provided us with a framework through which to obtain 
a better understanding of the complexities of the relationships which exist between 
the regions of the United Kingdom.  This approach does not exclude or find 
problems with regional diversity.  On the contrary, it welcomes and views it as a 
necessary component within a union state.  This is key to the continuation of the 
United Kingdom.  Each region must elect to remain as part of the Union, but must 
also cement this constitutional contract with a shared sense of affinity and 
belonging to the nation-state as a whole.  The people of Scotland have elected to 
remain as part of the United Kingdom, but the concerns of the participants of this 
research have expressed must be done to ensure a sense of solidarity and 
belonging is prevalent across the Union.  Whether this is a sense of complacency or 
not, it must be addressed at Westminster involving all of the regions of the United 
Kingdom.   
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Appendix Two – Project description for participants 
Project Description 
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Ulster Unionism and the United Kingdom: a relationship in transition? 
 
 
Background to the research: 
 
The United Kingdom is undergoing a significant process of constitutional change. 
This has been called by the Institute for Government (Paun and Munro: 2015) in a 
recent report a process of ‘Ever Looser Union’ which will impact on each part of the 
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Unionist representatives are at the heart of this debate but their views have not been 
systematically examined. The research will also consider a further question: is there 
still a common sense of Britishness binding together the United Kingdom (Curtice 
2006: 96). 
 
 
Aims of the research: 
 
This research will investigate how elected Unionist representatives understand the 
implications of these constitutional changes for Northern Ireland and its relationship 
with the rest of the United Kingdom. In particular it aims to: 
 
• To investigate the thoughts of elected Unionist representatives on the state of 
the United Kingdom today and their judgement of those issues which will influence 
its future. These issues include, for example, Scotland, further devolution, the 
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• To investigate how elected Unionist representatives understand the 
implications of these constitutional changes for Northern Ireland and its relationship 
with the rest of the United Kingdom. 
 
 The research will assess the state of political thinking on the Union and map that 
assessment onto views about Northern Ireland’s place within the Union.  
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Three general areas will be explored under the general headings of identity (of 
Unionist representatives), engagement (with constitutional change) and relationship 
(of Northern Ireland to this process of change).  The questions proposed by the 
research represent a current gap within academic writing on Unionism in Northern 
Ireland.   
 
 
Methodology: 
 
After desk-based research, interviews have been identified as a key methodology.  
Semi-structured one-on-one interviews have been chosen to allow the researcher to 
accumulate all attainable qualitative data relating to the chosen subject.  
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews will allow the researcher to follow similar 
lines of questioning in each interview, whilst providing an option to deviate from set 
questions to follow new lines of enquiry the researcher may not have previously 
considered or been aware of.  Partaking in interviews is a comprehensive method of 
gathering opinions and allows for a wider selection of organisations and individuals 
in Northern Ireland to have an input into the research.   
 
At this point in the research it is necessary to note that pre-assumptions of the 
direction and outcome of the research based on the researchers own background has 
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social science research and a conscious decision by the researcher to limit any bias, 
all research areas and questions have arisen directly from gaps in the previous 
academic literature on this topic.   
 
All unionist designated political elites from Northern Ireland will be invited to 
participate in the research process.  Based on the nature of the research, sixty-seven 
interviews have been allocated for.  All unionist designated Members of European 
Parliament (MEPs), Members of Parliament (MPs) and Members of Legislative 
Assembly (MLAs) have been chosen to participate in order to provide an in-depth 
examination of how British identity influences political elites within Northern 
Ireland.  The researcher has chosen to exclude all unionist designated councillors and 
all non-unionist designated political elites within Northern Ireland as it was felt the if 
these groups were included that the scope of the research would be too large for the 
timescale available. 
 
Recruitment for this research will be conducted by the researcher.  The political 
elites chosen for this study will be contacted directly by the researcher via email.  
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description, a subject information form and a consent form.  The political parties 
representing the political elites involved in this research will also be contacted to ask 
for their help in encouraging recruitment.  Follow up emails and phone calls will be 
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The researcher is aware of the Ulster University ethics guidelines for research, 
especially that which includes human participants.  As the research is based on a 
non-sensitive topic and full disclosure will be given to all participants it is not 
anticipated that there will be any ethical issues during the course of the research.   
 
As with ethical implications, any risks associated with this study are unlikely.  The 
risks which may be involved with this research are that of the risks which can be 
associated with conducting semi-structured one-on-one interviews.  As the level of 
risk for this research is low, it is anticipated that the benefits to our academic 
understanding of Britishness gained from this study will far outweigh any risks.  
However, methods will be taken to ensure that any risks emerging from the use of 
semi-structured one-on-one interviews will be kept to a minimum.  All participants 
will complete a consent form prior to the interviews taking place and they are free to 
withdraw their participation up until the point of submission.  The interviews will 
then take place in public areas of work, such as Stormont or constituency offices, for 
the benefit of both the participants and the researcher.  Prior to the interviews, the 
research will contact supervisors to let them know where they are, who they are with 
and at what time they are expected to finish at.  The researcher will then contact 
supervisors after leaving the interview.   Another possible risk that may emerge is 
that of the participants’ anonymity being compromised. In order to protect the 
anonymity of participants, code names will be given to each participant.  However, 
due to the high profile nature of the participants and the sample size, it may be that 
individuals are able to draw conclusions as to who the participants are.  All measures 
will be taken to limit this 
 
 
Data Analysis: 
 
During the interview process, data will be collected using audio recording and hand 
written notes taken during the interviews.  The data will then be analysed via NVivo 
in order to discern shared themes throughout the separate interviews. 
 
Under the Data Protection Act, all information will be stored securely.  Raw data 
will be filled in a secure locked cabinet on premises at the Ulster University.  All 
processed data will be stored on the Ulster University computer system on a 
password protected one user computer, with copies saved to the Cloud, an external 
hard drive and a password protected pen drive. 
 
 
Resources: 
 
The resources available for this research are as follows: 
 
Human resources: 
• Contacts with unionist representatives from a range of political parties in 
Northern Ireland  
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Physical resources: 
• NVivo system for analysing the data 
• Secured filling cabinet for data storage  
• Password protected computer, an external hard drive and a password 
protected pen drive for data storage 
• Transportation to interviews 
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Appendix Three – Participant recruitment letter and participant information 
 
Dear  
 
My name is Ashleigh Perry and I am a PhD candidate at Ulster University.  I am writing to 
invite you to participate in my PhD study, ‘Ulster Unionism and the United Kingdom: a 
relationship in transition?’  This document contains further information on the aims of the 
research project and also what your role as an interviewee would entail. 
 
The United Kingdom is undergoing significant process of constitutional change. The 
Institute for Government in London has called this a process of ‘Ever Looser Union’.  The 
aims of the study are as follows: 
• To investigate your thoughts, as an elected Unionist representative, on the state of 
the United Kingdom today and your judgement of the issues which will influence its 
future, for example Scotland, further devolution, the English Question, and the 
European Union Referendum 
• To investigate how you, as an elected Unionist representative, understand the 
implications of these constitutional changes for Northern Ireland and its 
relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom 
 
As an elected politician who not only represents public opinion but also helps to form it, 
you are invited to take part in this study via an interview.  Each interview will take place at 
a location convenient to the participant. Participant confidentiality will be protected – 
every effort will be made to ensure it is impossible to identify individual interviewees from 
the material used in the thesis or in any other publication. All personal data will be securely 
held in accordance with Ulster University policies. Participation is voluntary and you would 
remain free to withdraw permission even after giving an interview. 
 
If you have any further questions about the project, please do not hesitate to contact me 
by email (perry-a2@email.ulster.ac.uk) or telephone (02890368243). Alternatively, you can 
contact the chief investigator Professor Arthur Aughey (a.aughey@ulster.ac.uk  / 028 
90366659).  Due to the timescale of the research, it would be greatly appreciated if you 
could contact me by the 30th September in order to arrange an interview time. 
 
Thank you for your time.  I look forward to discussing the project with you further. 
 
 
 
 
Ashleigh Perry 
PhD candidate  
Enc  
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Information for participants   
Project: Ulster Unionism and the United Kingdom: a relationship in transition? 
Researcher: Ashleigh Perry (PhD candidate, School of Criminology, Politics and Social 
Policy, Ulster University) 
Supervisory team: Professor Arthur Aughey and Dr Kirk Simpson 
About the research 
What is the purpose of the research? 
This research is investigating the changing United Kingdom and how that change is 
understood by Unionist elected representatives. The purpose is to assess the state of 
Unionist political thinking on a range of relevant matters – constitutional, political, financial 
etc – and to map that assessment onto views about Northern Ireland’s place within the 
Union. 
Why is this project important? 
Much of the academic research on Ulster Unionism has often been concerned with the 
issue of British identity and sub-categories of it, for example Ulster Loyalist and British 
Unionist. While interesting and suggestive, this research intends to go beyond those 
categories of identity to examine a fundamental political question which has been asked by 
academics in Great Britain: what is the United Kingdom for in the 21st century? In other 
words, how does the Union function today and can diversity be reconciled with unity? 
Unionist representatives are at the heart of this debate but their views have not been 
systematically examined. This thesis will address that gap. 
What is my contribution? 
As an elected representative, your contribution will play a vital role in this research. Your 
reflections on the changing Union – and Northern Ireland’s place within it – will allow the 
researcher to test models and theories of the United Kingdom. It will also capture an 
accurate assessment of the current ‘state of mind’ of Unionism in Northern Ireland. 
What risks are involved and how will I be protected? 
Confidentiality is an important factor in any research and all interviews conducted will be 
confidential.  Secure storage of personal data, including the attached consent form, and 
protection of the anonymity of interviewees to the maximum extent possible will be 
treated as a matter of utmost importance.  All work is conducted in accordance with the 
code of practice and data protection policy of the Ulster University. 
Contact 
Ashleigh Perry (PhD candidate) - perry-a2@email.ulster.ac.uk / 028 90368132 
Professor Arthur Aughey (chief investigator) -  a.aughey@ulster.ac.uk  / 028 90366659 
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Appendix Four – Consent form 
Consent form 
Project: Ulster Unionism and the United Kingdom:  a relationship in transition? 
Researcher: Ashleigh Perry 
Chief investigator: Professor Arthur Aughey 
Second supervisor: Dr Kirk Simpson 
Completion of this form indicates the signatory’s consent to take part in the above named 
PhD research project being conducted at the School of Criminology, Politics and Social 
Policy, Ulster University. 
Research participant’s declaration (please tick boxes): 
I confirm that I have been given and have read and understood the information sheet        [  
] 
For the above study and have asked and received answers to any questions raised 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any          [  
] 
 time without giving a reason and without my rights being affected in any way 
 
I understand that the researchers will hold all information and data collected securely       [  
] 
and in confidence and that all efforts will be made to ensure that I cannot be identified  
as a participant in the study (except as might be required by law) and I give permission  
for the researchers to hold relevant personal data 
 
I agree to take part in the study          [  
] 
___________________________                               ___________________________ 
Signature      Signature of person taking consent 
 
___________________________   ___________________________ 
Print name      Print name 
 
___________________________   ___________________________ 
Date       Date 
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Appendix Five – Interview questions 
Hello… Thank you for agreeing to take part in this interview.  This study aims to 
look at the identity of Unionist designated politicians and how this impacts on their 
view of the United Kingdom.  Today I’ll be asking you questions about your identity 
and politics, your thoughts on current events happening within the UK, and also 
your opinion on the future of the Union.  
 
Introduction questions: 
 
The first few questions I’m going to ask are about your identity and about how you 
became involved in politics. 
 
1. Your political designation is Unionist, but how would you define your 
identity? 
• Can you explain a little more about what you mean by …? 
• How do you view yourself as a unionist? 
2. How long have you been involved in politics? 
3. How did you become interested in politics?  
4. What are your key political values?   
• Have you always felt strongly about this? 
5. Why did you join your party? 
• Do you feel that the party has changed over time? 
6. It has been asked what does the UK means in the 21st century.  What is your 
answer to that? 
• How do you feel about this? 
• Have your views on the Union changed over time? 
 
The next questions will be based on current events happening within the UK and will 
be divided into three sections looking at the political, social and economic union 
between NI and the UK.  In the first section on political union, I will ask you for your 
views on a section of current issues within British politics, such as the current debate 
on EU, and how you believe this to be impacting upon NI’s relationship with GB. 
 
354 
 
Political union 
1. What are your views on the possibility of a constitutional convention? 
• What impact do you think this might have on NI?   
• Why?  
• Can you give examples? 
2. What is your opinion of EVEL?   
• How do you think this will affect the union? 
3. What were your opinions of the Scottish referendum?   
• What impact could this have on NI?   
• Do you think that it is a possibility in the future? 
4. What do you believe will happen if there is an EU referendum? 
• Why?   
• Could you give examples? 
• Does being a member of the EU impact on your identity? 
5. Is there a limit to the amount of devolution NI can receive? 
• Can you explain a little more about what you mean by…? 
• How would this impact on the union? 
• How would this affect relationships between NI and 
Westminster? 
 
The next few questions are on the social union of the UK.  In this section I’m going 
to ask you how close you feel that NI is to the rest of the UK and whether you feel 
that NI is a valued member of the UK.  This will cover areas such as what are 
common symbols of Britishness and what does British citizenship mean to you? 
 
Social union 
1. How close do you feel that NI is to GB? 
• Why? 
• Could you provide an example? 
2. For you, what are common symbols of Britishness? 
• How closely do you feel that this represents you? 
• As a NI unionist, how closely does this represent you? 
• How/What would you change? 
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3. Would you like NI to have more importance in perspectives of Britishness? 
• How could this be achieved? 
4. What does being a citizen of the UK mean to you? 
• Can you elaborate on …? 
• Why? 
• Do you feel like a fully-fledged citizen of the UK? 
• What has your personal experience been?   
5. Have there been any experiences which have made you feel that NI is apart 
from the UK as a whole? 
• Can you give examples? 
• How would you change this? 
 
So we are now going to look at the economic union between NI and the UK.  These 
questions will ask for your opinions on how financial issues such as the current 
debates on welfare reform and lowering corporation tax will affect NIs place within 
the UK. 
 
Economic union 
1. What are your thoughts on Welfare reform? 
• Why? 
2. What are your thoughts on the plan to lower corporation tax in NI? 
• How would this affect NIs place within the Union? 
3. Is there greater scope for economic autonomy within NI?   
• If so, what implications does this have for other devolved 
regions? 
• How would this affect relations with Westminster? 
 
Finally, I am going to ask your opinion on a few questions about the future of the 
Union and how you see the UK progressing. 
 
Final questions: 
1. It has been suggested from the 1970s that the Union will break.   
• Can you envisage the Union breaking? 
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• How do you feel about this? 
2. Leaving the EU? 
• What would a non-EU UK look like? 
• What do you think of Nicola Sturgeon’s suggestion that each 
region of the UK should be allowed a separate referendum on 
leaving the EU? 
• Would this strengthen or weaken the Union? 
• Why? 
3. Scottish independence?   
• Do you think that this could lead to a united Ireland? 
• Why? 
4. It has been said that we are no longer a union state, but a state of nations.  
What do you think about this? 
• Why? 
• Can you provide examples? 
 
Thank you very much for your time.  Do you have any further comments you would 
like to add? 
 
 
  
